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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A spotlight on classical microfinance
The microfinance industry is a financial sector which has risen sharply in the past
years and which continues to grow in outreach, service offers and its mission. The
global outreach of microfinance is clearly illustrated by the number of customers
having increased from 13 million in 1997 towards 211 million customers in 2013
(Cull and Morduch, 2018). The microfinance movement has its foundations in the
Grameen bank in Bangladesh, a pioneer in successfully granting microcredits
to the poor without credit history or collateral. Microfinance institutions
(MFIs), which aim to provide financial services to the unbanked poor have been
established mostly in developing countries. The service offers have highly been
extended by establishing saving possibilities through deposits, insurances and
payment services for the poor part of the population (Bogan, 2012; Hoque et al.,
2011). In line with the growth, the mission of microfinance has been broadened
from poverty alleviation of the poorest in developing countries (Morduch, 1999)
towards financial inclusion of the unbanked population, which is not served by
the mainstream financial market (Helms, 2006).
This thesis focuses on microcredits, the core of the microfinance movement.
Therefore, a spotlight on classical microfinance with regards to innovations in
the contract, the mitigation of credit default risks and the rising demand for
debt capital of MFIs is provided in the following.
Information asymmetry in credit markets resulting in adverse selection and
moral hazard risks is very well known (e.g. Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). In the microfinance sector, lenders, in particular
MFIs, have to deal with the problem of imperfect information and imperfect
enforcement due to lacking collateral of the poor (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
Apart from direct screening and monitoring activities, MFIs have the possibility
to use indirect mechanisms in order to reduce the information asymmetry.
Indirect mechanisms are e.g. introducing reasonable interest rates, the threat of
terminated access to credit, instrumentalizing the risk of reputational loss and
establishing an interlinkage of credit transactions with other markets (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1983; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). However, additional key innovations
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have been the main drivers that make lending to the poor without collateral
possible and successful (Morduch, 1999; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,
2010).
Group lending with joint liability: Loans are granted to a group of borrowers who
is jointly responsible for the total loan amount and jointly burdens the credit
default risk. Therefore, group members have an incentive to select appropriate
peers of similar risk, monitor their peers’ entrepreneurial activities and enforce
successful loan repayment (Ghatak, 1999; Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate,
1995).
Progressive lending: MFIs build up the borrowers’ expectation to receive future
loans of increasing size dependent on their repayment performance (Churchill,
1999). MFIs are able to test the borrowers’ creditworthiness with small loans,
to increase the opportunity cost of default and to enforce loan repayment in
particular ex-post (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).
Regular repayment schedule: Borrowers are required to repay small install-
ments following a regular weekly or monthly schedule immediately after loan
disbursement. Thus, MFIs steadily obtain information about the borrowers’
repayment behavior and skim off the borrowers’ outside income independently
of the investment return (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).
Targeting women: Several studies have identified female borrowers to be better
credit risks than their male peers (e.g. D’Espallier et al., 2011; Kevane and
Wydick, 2001). Women’s limited mobility, the severe risk of damage by social
sanctions, missing alternative sources of credit and the non-existence of a female
labor market are proven to be reasons for the lower moral hazard risk of female
borrowers (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Morduch, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008;
Emran et al., 2011).
The classical microfinance movement has experienced widespread success around
the globe accompanied by the development of a huge number of MFIs (Bruton
et al., 2011). Thus the MFIs’ demand for capital resources rises. Applying life
cycle theory in the context of microfinance, the MFIs’ need for capital differs
in the distinct phases of institutional development. In the initial youth phase,
MFIs have a high demand for risk-tolerant capital and quite often, donor funds
are the main source (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Bogan, 2012). In
the growth phase, MFIs attempt to realize the transformation into a regulated
institution. As this process is costly, the majority of MFIs remains dependent
on external subsidized capital (Helms, 2006; Bogan, 2012). Donations and
subsidies from international donors are one of the main sources for debt capital.
However, donor funds are limited (Bogan, 2012). The transformation also
provides new opportunities for an MFI. First, the MFI’s access to commercial
funding sources is enhanced (Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). However, for the
majority of MFIs the access to mainstream capital markets remains a challenge
and is not used to its full extent (Helms, 2006; Hoque et al., 2011). Second,
MFIs obtain the possibility to mobilize deposits. Deposit taking is known to be
a stable and sustainable source of debt capital which helps MFIs to become
less dependent on subsidized external capital (Caudill et al., 2009; Helms, 2006;
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Bogan, 2012). But, in general, only regulated MFIs are allowed to mobilize
deposits, which limits the use of this funding source (Bogan, 2012). Also in the
phase of maturity, debt capital sources increase in importance, even though
equity financing becomes available (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004;
Fehr and Hishigsuren, 2006; Bogan, 2012; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). Despite
the increasing openness towards mainstream capital markets, the majority of
external capital still comes from non-commercial investors which does not fulfill
the MFIs’ demand for funding and therefore, results in an increasing funding
gap (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013).
The debt capital demand of MFIs in developing countries is not expected to
fade.
Classical microfinance, in general, is mainly associated with poverty alleviation
and financial progress in developing countries. Apart from this, the microfinance
movement has also been present in developed countries with the aim to serve
the poor (Conlin, 1999). In recent years, some researchers have taken interest
in investigating microfinance programs in developed countries such as Canada,
the United States, and the European Union. But one can say that the various
patterns of microfinance in developed economies are still under-researched
(Pedrini et al., 2016).
1.2 Introductory aspects on commercial peer-
to-peer crowdlending
Crowdlending is an innovative approach which connects a crowd of private
investors who are willing to fund loans requested by a private borrower without
financial intermediation (Lin et al., 2013). Apart from crowdlending, several
types of crowdfunding such as donation-based, equity-based and reward-based
funding have emerged and are mainly accessible online to the public (Berns
et al., 2018; Mollick, 2014). However, for this thesis the only relevant strand is
peer-to-peer (p2p) crowdlending which implies that investors employ capital by
granting loans and in exchange receive interest rates and the repayment of the
loan principal. Commercial crowdlending as a source of debt capital through
loans has emerged in the internet since 2005. The concept is realized by several
commercial peer-to-peer lending platforms such as Zopa or Prosper.com which
have grown impressively in recent years (Gonzalez and McAleer, 2011). To date
(Sep.18), the first launched platform Zopa has transferred loans of more than
3.63 billion British pound in the UK and the leading platform Prosper.com
has accompanied loan transactions valued 13 billion USD (Zopa.com, 2018;
Prosper.com, 2018).
Commercial P2P platforms have intensively been researched. Analogous to the
traditional credit market, the actors on online peer-to-peer lending marketplaces
face the problem of information asymmetry. Adverse selection and moral hazard
risk might be even more severe due to the anonymity of lenders and borrowers,
the limited information mainly provided by borrowers themselves and missing
monitoring and enforcing possibilities for lenders (Herzenstein et al., 2011;
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Bachmann et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2013; Emekter et al., 2015). Despite the
obstacles of information asymmetry, investors and borrowers engage with each
other using the online debt capital marketplaces which has evoked research on
the behavior of the main actors – investors and borrowers. Several studies have
examined the investors’ funding behavior and credit default risk of borrowers.
Loan characteristics (Emekter et al., 2015), borrowers’ characteristics and
appearance (e.g. Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Duarte et al., 2012; Ravina, 2018),
the social network (Lin et al., 2013; Freedman and Jin, 2017), soft facts in the
narrative (Dorfleitner et al., 2016) have been proven to be main predictors of
funding success and loan repayment. Additionally, Herzenstein et al. (2011)
and Zhang and Liu (2012) observe herding behavior of investors following the
’wisdom of crowd’ with the expectation to gain better insights by observing and
imitating the crowd (Surowiecki, 2004). Furthermore, the narratives provided
by borrowers to share information about themselves and the project idea are
shown to be crucial with regards to the reduction of information asymmetries
(e.g. Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Larrimore et al., 2011).
Even though the mentioned studies do not at all represent a complete list of
the different stands of literature1, it illustrates the great interest of researchers
on commercial peer to peer lending in recent years. Commercial peer-to-peer
lending itself and the listed empirical results are of interest for this thesis.
One can assume that the investors’ and borrowers’ behavior on commercial
debt-based marketplaces are similar to the ones in the context of microfinance.
However, as the market conditions are totally different, the investors’ funding
decision and the borrowers’ repayment performance are worth to be researched
separately for crowdlending of microloans without interest.
1.3 Crowdlending as a source of debt capital
in microfinance
Microcredits as the starting point of the classical microfinance movement found
global attention when in 2005 the United Nations announced the ’year of
microcredit’ and shortly afterwards in 2006, the Grameen Bank and its founder
Muhammad Yunus were awarded the Nobel Peace Price (United Nations,
1998; Nobel Peace Price Committee, 2006). Almost simultaneously with the
rising interest of socially-oriented investors, the first online microfinancing
platforms such as Kiva, Deki and Rang De were launched with the idea to
enable individual investors to participate in the microfinancing development.
The platforms connect a worldwide crowd of socially-oriented investors with
microentrepreneurs in financial need. Despite differences in terms of lending
model, size and concept, all platforms aim to materialize crowdlending as a
source of debt capital for the microfinance sector.
1For a more extensive summary, the review papers of e.g. Bachmann et al. (2011) and
Gonzalez and McAleer (2011) provide an informative overview. Furthermore, the research
paper of Dorfleitner et al. (2016) spends an introductory part on existing literature on
commercial p2p lending.
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Kiva is the pioneer of this business model. The success of facilitating micro-
financing through the crowd is illustrated by Kiva’s impressive numbers: A
funded loan volume of 1.2 billion USD by 1.7 million lenders to 3.0 million
borrowers located in 83 countries since Kiva’s foundation in 2005 until Septem-
ber 2018 (Kiva.org, 2018a). Kiva emphasizes its own strong social mission and
requests a high social commitment from participants.
Kiva enables microfinancing trough two different microfinancing models. The
first and most famous one is the intermediation-based model based on financial
intermediation by MFIs. Kiva partners with several local MFIs in developing
countries after conducting a due diligence process2. The partnered MFIs are
responsible for selecting and monitoring borrowers and enforcing loan repayment.
These MFIs post the granted loans on Kiva’s webpage with the aim to receive
refinancing through potential investors. The loan amount in USD is transferred
to the MFI as soon as the request is fully funded which has been the case for
nearly all loan requests in the last years.
The second and more recent model follows the direct peer-to-peer concept by
connecting investors directly with borrowers in the United States without any
financial intermediation. Additional to Kiva’s due diligence process3, borrowers
have to emphasize their creditworthiness by mobilizing their personal network
to support the loan request. The ’social underwriting’ is expected to strengthen
the borrower’s commitment to successful loan management, even though the
social underwriter is not financially responsible. Additionally, borrowers can
be endorsed by a third-party trustee. This is not the case for all borrowers.
Afterward, borrowers are allowed to post the loan application on Kiva’s online
webpage in order to reach potential investors. In contrast to the indirect model,
the past records show that only around two third of the applications have been
successfully funded.
The socially-oriented investors do not receive any interest rate on the employed
capital, but fully bear the risk of credit default in both the intermediation-based
model and the direct p2p model. Despite the fact of donating the interest rate,
crowdfunding through Kiva differs from purely charitable giving as investors
highly value the repayment of the loan principal in order to further empower
several borrowers in the long run (Ly and Mason, 2012a). While investors
contribute to refinancing microloans granted by MFIs in the intermediation-
based model, investors enable microloans to borrowers in the direct peer-to-peer
model.
Regarding the microborrowers, there is a notable difference between the two
models. Loans to microborrowers who are located in developing countries
around the globe are refinanced through the indirect model. These borrowers are
requested to pay interest rates to the MFIs. In contrast, the direct peer-to-peer
model is only available to US citizens who are in pursuit of an entrepreneurial
2Kiva staff reviews the MFI’s financial stability, value, possible risks and especially its social
commitment.
3Kiva staff reviews the borrower’s financial history, his personal constitution and the pursued
business idea.
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activity but lack financial resources. These borrowers do not pay any interest
rate for the debt capital directly provided by socially-oriented investors.
The main actors in the two different microfinancing models established and
maintained by the online platform Kiva are summarized in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Main actors in the intermediation-based model and the direct peer-to-peer model
on the microfinancing platform Kiva
In recent years, Kiva’s social mission, the socially-oriented lenders, microborrow-
ers and partnered MFIs have been subject to several studies. First, with respect
to Kiva’s mission, Bajde (2013) studies Kiva’s ideology and Schwittay (2014)
sheds light on Kiva’s social impact in terms of poverty alleviation. Second, the
decision making process of investors has found high attention. The cultural and
physical difference, social distance, transaction costs, the personal motivation
as well as the characteristics of the narratives describing the borrower and the
underlying project are discussed and identified as predictors of the funding
behavior of investors (e.g. Burtch et al., 2014; Galak et al., 2011; Meer and
Rigbi, 2013; Liu et al., 2012; Allison et al., 2013; Jancenelle et al., 2018). Third,
Jenq et al. (2015) studies the borrower’s physical and social appearance and
draws conclusion mainly on funding success and as a side aspect on the credit
default risk of borrowers.
Last but not least, the rising competition between MFIs on Kiva, organizational
characteristics and the appearance of MFIs have been examined to impact the
MFI’s success of attracting investors and receiving interest-free refinancing (Ly
and Mason, 2012a; Moss et al., 2015; Berns et al., 2018). It is noteworthy, that
all these empirical studies focus on the transactions using the intermediation-
based model, whereas to our knowledge research on transactions through the
direct peer-to-peer model is missing.
Also, this thesis makes use of the debt capital transactions on Kiva between
socially-oriented investors, MFIs and borrowers. Both microfinancing models –
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the intermediation-based model and the direct p2p model – are of empirical
interest.
1.4 Research objective of this dissertation
This dissertation combines aspects from classical microfinance and online com-
mercial crowdlending in order to investigate several aspects which are important,
but still under-researched in the field of crowdlending through socially-oriented
investors in microfinance.
As stated above, Kiva’s intermediation-based microfinancing model has exten-
sively been researched regarding several topics. However, we noticed a lack of
knowledge regarding the credit default risk of microborrowers which results
in financial losses for investors. Additionally, very little is known about the
MFIs which are the core of this microfinancing model. But this is important as
MFIs are simultaneously financial intermediaries and recipients of interest-free
capital. This thesis addresses these two gaps in empirical research. It aims to
shed light on, firstly, the determinants of credit default risk and, secondly, the
characteristics of the MFIs in the context of microfinancing through the world-
wide crowd. The third part of this dissertation provides very first insights on
the funding behavior of investors who enable microloans requested in developed
countries via Kiva’s direct peer-to-peer model without intermediation.
The research projects contribute to the literature on microfinance and crowdlend-
ing through examining MFIs refinancing their loan portfolio with interest-free
debt capital, analyzing credit risk factors and discussing the funding behavior
of investors who enable microloans in a developed country.
The following three academic research papers are the core of this dissertation:
1. Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing: Empirical evidence
from Kiva
2. The access of microfinance institutions to financing via the worldwide
crowd
3. From credit risk to social impact: On the funding determinants in interest-
free P2P lending
Below, the academic papers are briefly summarized regarding their research
objective, the data set, the methodology, empirical findings and the contribution.
1. Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing: Empirical
evidence from Kiva
Subject of this study is the repayment behavior of microentrepreneurs in the
intermediation-based model of Kiva. The research is based on a data sample of
microloans which were refinanced by the worldwide crowd of investors between
2010 and 2013.
By performing probit regressions on the probability of credit default, we find
evidence that the credit default risk is dependent on the screening and moni-
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toring quality of the respective MFI which grants the microloan. Additionally,
credit conditions such as the loan size, the loan term and a grace period before
the first repayment obligation is due reveal themselves to be main predictors
of credit default. Female individual borrowers appear to be more creditworthy
than their male counterparts. However, this phenomenon is not observable
for group loans. As a second aspect, the attractiveness of a loan measured by
the funding time is analyzed. The results lead us to conclude that investors
care about credit risk as well as social purpose when supporting microloans.
Regarding credit risk, the funding time does not serve as a predictor.
Our empirical findings on credit risk provide valuable implications mainly for
MFIs and investors. MFIs have an incentive to use the gained insights to
maintain a good repayment performance. A reliable reputation on Kiva is
crucial to attract potential investors and therefore, ensure refinancing of mi-
croloans. Knowledge about the determinants of credit default enables investors
to adequately choose low-risk loans as the repayment is highly valued in order
to support several borrowers in the long-run.
2. The access of microfinance institutions to financing via the world-
wide crowd
This study examines the characteristics of MFIs which have access to and make
use of refinancing through the worldwide crowd of socially-oriented investors
from the demand and supply perspective. The research is based on a panel data
set consisting of MFI-specific information such as social performance measures
and financial indicators derived from MIX Market. The information about
the MFI’s access to the microfinancing platform Kiva between 2005 to 2015 is
added.
First, binary regressions are performed to explore the probability of access
to Kiva. The results show that the MFI’s social performance measured by
targeting female borrowers, ensuring a reliable portfolio quality and charging
low interest rates is a main predictor. The financial performance and the
MFI’s extent of deposits are negatively associated with access to Kiva. We find
evidence that mature MFIs and MFIs operating in less-developed countries are
more likely to refinance microloans using Kiva. Second, the termination of the
partnership between an MFI and Kiva, which is observable in some cases, is
examined. The female share within the MFI’s portfolio and the MFI’s extent
of deposits appear to be main predictors as these MFIs appear to be less likely
to retain the partnership with Kiva.
This research paper contributes valuable insights about the characteristics of
MFIs which make use of the refinancing possibility of microloans through the
crowd. Empirical evidence identifies the determinants which are crucial for
Kiva’s and the MFI’s decision to enter into a partnership. Additionally, the
study clarifies what encourages MFIs to be reluctant to partially refinancing
their loan portfolio using Kiva.
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3. From credit risk to social impact: On the funding determinants
in interest-free P2P lending
This study investigates the funding behavior of investors who have both financial
and prosocial concerns once providing interest-free capital to US citizens via
the direct p2p model of Kiva. The unique data set of more than 6,000 US
direct loans is highly expanded by the addition of detailed information directly
obtained from original loan campaigns.
By performing logistic regressions on funding success and tobit regressions
on funding time, we find evidence that a third-party endorsement for loan
applications is highly appreciated by investors. The borrower’s willingness to
share information is positively related to funding success. The possibility to
empower women and groups of borrowers appears to positively attract investors.
The borrower’s responsibility for family members does not appear to be favorable
with regards to funding success. The result shows that immigrants are more
likely to be funded by investors choosing non-endorsed loans. But this is not
observable for loans endorsed by a trustee.
To conclude, we gain the insights that prosocial investors strive for both mini-
mizing credit risk and maximizing social impact of their investment. The study
also contributes to the field of microfinance as a measurement to reduce financial
exclusion in developed countries such as the United States. Socially-oriented
investors reveal themselves to be willing to enable interest-free microloans to
US citizens in financial need.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 repre-
sents the research paper on the repayment behavior of microborrowers in the
intermediation-based microfinancing model of Kiva. In chapter 3, the empirical
findings on the access of microfinance institutions to debt capital from the
worldwide crowd of socially-oriented investors are outlined. Chapter 4 consists
of the research paper on the investors’ funding behavior concerning credit risk
and social impact in the direct peer-to-peer model of Kiva. Chapter 5 concludes
with a brief summary of the implications and limitations of the conducted
research.
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Repayment behavior in
peer-to-peer microfinancing:
Empirical evidence from Kiva
This research project has been carried out jointly by Gregor Dorfleitner and Eva-
Maria Oswald. The article has been published as: Dorfleitner, G., Oswald, E.,
2016. Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing: Empirical evidence
from Kiva. Review of Financial Economics, 30(1), 45-59
Abstract: Based on a sample of microloans (to individuals and to groups)
that were refinanced through the peer-to-peer microfinancing platform Kiva,
we study the determinants of the repayment behavior of micro-entrepreneurs
whose loans are available to international charitable lenders. We perform binary
regressions and account for influential factors such as the time required for
funding or the type of entrepreneurial activity. The screening and monitoring
quality of the microfinance institution which selects the borrowers is a main
driver of credit default. We find evidence that the loan size, the loan term
and the length of a possible grace period influence the probability of default.
Moreover, women demonstrate better repayment behavior which is, however,
not the case for groups of women.
Keywords: Crowdfunding, microfinance, financial intermediation
JEL Classification: D64 D82 G21
10
Chapter 2. Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, microfinance has been growing rapidly with more than 195
million clients having received microloans from microfinance institutions (MFIs)
by the end of 2011 (Reed, 2013). The MFIs refinance the loans they grant
partly through deposits and partly through international investors who provide
capital through indirect or direct investments. The rising interest of socially
oriented investors in contributing to microfinance development is recognized by
several online microfinancing platforms, such as Deki, Babyloan, Rang De and
Kiva. The most popular of these platforms is Kiva, which enables individual
lenders to fund microloans to poor entrepreneurs around the world without
receiving interest but, at the same time, fully bearing the credit risk. Lenders
donate their interest in the sense of charitable giving. However, microfinancing
via Kiva is beyond charitable giving as lenders are able to use the same funds
after loan repayment to empower several low-income borrowers.
In contrast to conventional P2P platforms, Kiva builds on the financial inter-
mediation performed by the participating MFIs which select and monitor the
borrowers. MFIs seek to appeal to investors in order to receive microloan-related
refinancing on Kiva.
The aim of this study is to identify the determinants of the repayment behavior
on Kiva which is crucial for investors who cannot compensate losses through a
risk-adjusted interest rate. To this end, we investigate the influence of several
variables such as loan characteristics on the default probability of a microloan
refinanced by individual lenders on Kiva. As Kiva selects the loans with respect
to their attractiveness to international investors, the default drivers may be
different to those known from other studies. Furthermore, we investigate the
impact of the MFIs’ screening and monitoring abilities on the default probability.
By identifying the credit risk drivers of Kiva loans we can also address the
question of financial motives (here minimization of losses) versus social ones
in the investment decision of the charitable lenders by utilizing the time to
complete funding as a measure of a loan’s attractiveness.
Kiva has been of academic interest in recent years. Its ideology has been
studied by Bajde (2013), the competition faced by the MFIs on the platform
has been considered by Ly and Mason (2012a) and Kiva’s impact on poverty
alleviation has been discussed by Schwittay (2014). While the decision making
process of the lenders with respect to the entrepreneurial narrative representing
a microborrower’s profile, social distance, motivation and transaction costs are
addressed by Burtch et al. (2014), Liu et al. (2012), Galak et al. (2011) and
Meer and Rigbi (2013), little is known about the repayment behavior on Kiva.
Only Jenq et al. (2015), who focus on the impact of the borrowers’ appearance
on the funding behavior of lenders, consider the impact of these characteristics
(and some controls) on credit default as a peripheral aspect. Due to their rather
small sample and their different focus, they only find the loan term and the
loan amount to be significant credit risk drivers.
Information asymmetry is known to be a main challenge in microfinance when
it comes to repayment behavior. Credit default and innovative means to
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overcome this problem are explored by several theoretical studies of Ghatak
(1999), Stiglitz (1990), Besley and Coate (1995) and Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch (2000). In classical microcredit literature, the influence of variables
such as group lending, loan conditions or gender on the repayment have been
studied by Gine et al. (2010); Godquin (2004); Field et al. (2013); D’Espallier
et al. (2011).
Review papers on commercial P2P lending demonstrate the academic interest
in online P2P lending platforms (Gonzalez and McAleer, 2011; Bachmann et al.,
2011). Credit default on commercial P2P lending platforms is studied in terms
of, for instance, financial intermediation, herding behavior, social networks and
personal characteristics of the borrowers (Berger and Gleisner, 2009; Herzenstein
et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2013; Pope and Sydnor, 2011).
In this study we connect aspects of classical microfinance and crowdfunding,
as we are interested in the determinants that play a role in the repayment by
borrowers on microfinancing platforms. Thereby, we contribute to the literature
analyzing credit risk aspects in microfinance. As Kiva is a microfinance platform,
which actually aims at refinancing MFIs through philanthropic investors, our
findings are very important for exactly these two groups of microfinance actors.
We focus on researching the influence of the funding behavior, the financial
intermediary, the borrower’s gender and the credit conditions on the repayment
behavior. We investigate the impact on the repayment behavior of individual
borrowers and of groups of borrowers by conducting several binary regressions.
Kiva connects social investors from developed countries with low-income bor-
rowers from developing countries based on the indirect model which contrasts
with classical P2P lending. Kiva works with local partner MFIs which screen
potential microfinance borrowers and submit internet profiles representing en-
trepreneurial and personal characteristics and the contractual conditions with
Kiva. Potential lenders from all over the world can browse the borrowers’ inter-
net profile and lend to individual borrowers or groups of borrowers. Usually, all
loan requests are fully funded and Kiva transfers the money to the MFI that
is in charge of the loan. In less than 1% of all cases Kiva has to refund loans
to lenders which is mainly due to a violation of Kiva’s policy and occasionally
due to incomplete funding. MFIs acting as local financial intermediaries are
responsible for selecting the borrowers. According to Allison et al. (2013), Kiva
explicitly requires their partner MFIs to focus on social impact and to select
rather poor borrowers, who are in urgent need of funding. Besides meeting
this condition, MFIs have an incentive to select creditworthy borrowers in
order to repeatedly attract potential lenders to fund their loans because lenders
may consider the MFI’s overall repayment reputation in their lending decision.
From this perspective, it is rational to present the most reliable borrowers in
terms of repayment on Kiva in order to ensure a good reputation and a quick
funding. As Kiva explicitly recommends lenders to use repaid loans to lend
again, the repayment of loans becomes valuable to charitable lenders in terms
of supporting several low-income borrowers in the long run. The loan does not
yield interest for the lenders. Therefore, lenders are not able to compensate
for a potential default through a higher interest rate, making research on the
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determinants of credit default even more valuable.
To date (Dec/05/2015), the total amount lent through Kiva is more than 787
million US dollars to more than 1.8 million microfinance borrowers. Our empir-
ical analysis is based on a randomized sample representing 29,304 transactions
on Kiva between February 2011 and October 2013. The data sample exclusively
includes closed, i.e. matured, loans that are successfully repaid or defaulted
upon. The overall repayment rate is 98.78%.
Our research yields some interesting findings. We find evidence to support
the fact that MFIs with fewer loan defaults in the previous period are also
able to limit the credit risk of their new loans, emphasizing the importance
of adequately selecting and highly monitoring the borrowers. Furthermore,
loan conditions such as the loan size and term play a significant role in the
repayment. Women also appear to make a more ambitious effort to repay loans
than men, while group loans are more risky up to a size of seven members.
An analysis of the funding time which proxies the attractiveness of the loan
applications to the social investors, yields deeper insights into the motives of
the lenders. The first important finding is that lenders indeed do care about
the credit risk of a loan which shows that they have financial motives even
though they abstain from receiving interest payments. However, also variables
indicating a social purpose such as loans to groups of women, can also make a
loan attractive even if the credit risk is increased by this purpose. Altogether
the funding time is not a significant determinant of the creditworthiness of
borrowers.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop
the hypotheses from the findings of previous research. After describing the
data set and methodology in Section 3, Section 4 represents the results of
the probit regression models. Section 5 discusses several robustness checks
that were carried out. Section 6 concludes with possible implications for P2P
microfinancing and future research.
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.2.1 Information asymmetry in the microcredit market
Risk of uncertainty due to information asymmetry in credit markets has been
widely researched (e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Sufi, 2007). Yum et al. (2012)
state that the information asymmetry problem exists to a larger extent in
the (online) P2P microcredit markets as private lenders lack information on
microfinance borrowers and on the MFIs which act as financial intermediaries.
Additionally, the majority of private lenders are non-professional investors and
thus not experienced in assessing creditworthiness (Yum et al., 2012). Private
lenders are unable to monitor and impose social sanctions against borrowers
in the case of bad repayment performance which increases the repayment risk
(Herzenstein et al., 2011). Not only the lenders but also the MFIs themselves
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face the problem of imperfect information and imperfect enforcement. The
severity of information asymmetry and the lack of effective loan enforcement
cause adverse selection problems and moral hazard risk. Additionally, the
missing collateral reinforces moral hazard behavior.
MFIs have the possibility of employing indirect or direct mechanisms to obtain
information on the characteristics and actions of borrowers to ensure loan
repayment. The contract itself can serve as an indirect mechanism. MFIs are
able to obtain information on the borrower’s riskiness and actions by requiring
an appropriate interest rate, using reputation effects and interlinking loan
contracts with other transactions in related markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983;
Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Therefore, a direct mechanism is established as lenders
are able to select and monitor clients based on additional information obtained
by market participation and communication (Siamwalla et al., 1990). Moreover,
MFIs rely on the direct screening and monitoring of borrowers to prevent
adverse selection, to support a borrower’s success and to inhibit strategic
defaults. The direct screening and monitoring process is quite often costly
and difficult. Geography and the kinship group have revealed themselves to
be crucial in successful monitoring and loan enforcement as living near each
other provides a source of information and enforcement mechanisms such as
social sanctions. In the past, local moneylenders, for instance, were more likely
to grant unsecured loans more successfully than financial institutions without
access to local information on borrowers (Stiglitz, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
Thus, the main challenges for MFIs are obtaining information on the riskiness
of borrowers, to creating incentives for borrowers to exert efforts to succeed
and enforcing repayment to limit the probability of default.
To conclude, indirect and direct mechanisms are used by MFIs to resolve the
three main problems which are endemic to the credit market in developing
countries. The MFI’s resources to screen and monitor clients and to enforce
contracts are crucial in inhibiting credit default. Therefore, we expect the
probability of default to depend on the screening and monitoring abilities of
MFIs.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The loans of MFIs which select and monitor
borrowers more carefully have a lower probability of default.
In addition to the traditional screening, monitoring and enforcing elements,
the Grameen bank, as a pioneer of the MFIs in Bangladesh, has established
new mechanisms to ensure loan repayment by low-income borrowers without
collateral. Group lending, progressive lending, regular repayment schedules and
targeting women as borrowers are the key innovations which have largely made
microfinance possible and are still widely employed. We discuss these items in
the subsequent subsections.
2.2.2 Group lending with joint-liability
Group lending with joint liability is a key innovation in microfinance which is
uncommon in standard banking. Loans are provided to a group of borrowers
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who are burdened with joint liability payments in the case of one group member
defaulting. The MFI transfers screening, monitoring and enforcing costs to the
borrowers by establishing an interdependence among group members regarding
borrowing costs (Morduch, 1999). Borrowers utilize local information embodied
in social networks to screen and self-select group members. Ghatak (1999)
demonstrates the fact that borrowers tend to form homogeneous groups. This
homogeneous grouping enables MFIs to price discriminate even though all
borrowers receive the same loan contract because the effective borrowing costs
are less for safe types of borrowers than for risky ones burdened with higher
expected joint liability payments. Therefore, safe types of borrowers are driven
back into the market and the average probability of default decreases (Ghatak,
1999; Morduch, 1999). In addition to peer selection, group lending provides
benefits in terms of peer monitoring and peer pressure as mechanisms to
inhibit ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard risks. Group members are willing
to monitor each other because one’s utility is dependent on the success of
the projects undertaken by the peers. Monitoring is done by borrowers who
have local information of each other’s entrepreneurial project and the level
of effort employed by their peers to succeed (Stiglitz, 1990; Morduch, 1999).
Moreover, peers have local knowledge about the return on the project and can
judge whether the group member may refuse payment. In the case of strategic
default, group members have the possibility to apply peer pressure to each
other to ensure loan repayment by their peers (Besley and Coate, 1995). Group
lending has been researched intensively. Gine et al. (2010) and Ahlin (2010)
acknowledge the self-selection of borrowers into risk homogenous groups.
According to the theory, the anecdotal studies by Wydick (1999), Karlan
(2007), Ahlin and Townsend (2007) and Gine et al. (2010) show that peer
monitoring and peer pressure improve the repayment performance of groups.
In a laboratory experiment, Abbink et al. (2006) also observe that groups of
borrowers outperform individual borrowers. However, the findings of Abbink
et al. (2006), Gine et al. (2010) and Fischer (2013) are partly contradictory
regarding the risk-taking of borrowers under joint liability. In a field experiment,
Giné and Karlan (2014) do not find any evidence of the advantage of group
lending over individual lending. Additionally, the findings of Wydick (1999)
and Karlan (2007) do not acknowledge the fact that group lending outperforms
individual lending.
By considering peer selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure as important
mechanisms in ensuring loan repayment in theory and the empirical evidence
found in several studies, we expect groups of borrowers to have a better
repayment rate ompared with individual borrowers.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Groups of borrowers are less likely to default
compared to individual borrowers.
2.2.3 Progressive lending
Regardless of the question of whether group or individual lending is applied,
progressive lending serves as a dynamic incentive for loan repayment. The
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MFI grants the borrower access to future loans of increasing size over time
conditioned on the repayment history of previous and current loans (Churchill,
1999). Reliable customers with a good repayment performance can expect to
receive larger loans over time whereas customers in arrears are denied access
to future loans. Through this mechanism, the MFI is able to increase the
opportunity costs of default faced by borrowers and thus to enforce repayment
and to prevent strategic default. Progressive lending is widely implemented in
microfinance programs (Morduch, 1999; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,
2000). Robinson (2001, p.111ff) reports that the repayment of nearly all loans
disbursed by 18 different microfinance programs in various countries is ensured
through progressive lending as an enforcement element. The study of Gine
et al. (2010) shows that the possibility of having access to future loans decreases
the choice of riskier projects associated with ex-ante moral hazard by 21.5%
and increases the repayment rate by 12.3%. The threat of not providing re-
financing to bad risk/defaulted borrowers enables the MFI to test borrowers
regarding their reliability and trustworthiness. Vogelgesang (2003) reports that
loan officers provide smaller loans to clients who are more likely to default.
Despite this caution, loan size and credit risk appear to be positively correlated.
According to Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Godquin (2004), there is a positive
relationship between the loan size and credit default. The higher the loan size,
the higher the probability of default as the difficulty in meeting repayment
obligations in case of project failure increases as well as the gain of moral hazard
behavior in terms of non-repayment increases.
Regarding the loan term, in classical credit risk literature it is a stylized fact
that a borrower’s probability of default increases over time (Hull, 2015). Various
authors also confirm this finding for microloans (e.g. Roslan and Abd Karim,
2009; Van Gool et al., 2012). Generally, Ledgerwood (1999) states that the cash
flow partially determines the debt-serving capacity of borrowers. On the one
hand, long loan terms may exceed the maturity of businesses undertaken by
borrowers and borrowers struggle to save enough revenue to meet the repayment
obligations in the future. Additionally, a long loan term may lead to a decrease
in a borrower’s discipline in repaying a loan over time as current revenues are
spent instead of saved for repayment obligations due in the future. On the other
hand, short loan terms may make it difficult for borrowers to generate enough
revenue to meet repayment obligations on time. In line with the latter argument,
there is also evidence (Mokhtar et al., 2012; Awunyo-Vikor, 2012) that longer
loan terms can reduce the borrower’s difficulty in repaying loans. However,
as Kiva focuses on very poor borrowers, who may have more difficulties in
buffering cash flows over a longer period, we tend to expect the classical credit
risk term structure in the Kiva setting.
In summary, we state two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). The loan size is positively related to the
probability of default.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b). The length of the loan term is positively
related to the probability of default.
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2.2.4 Regular repayment schedule
A standard feature of the classic microloan contract is to require small regular
installments one or two weeks after loan disbursement. Despite high transaction
costs, it is relatively common that MFIs demand weekly, fortnightly or monthly
payments, even before investment returns are realized by microfinance borrowers.
One reason is that the regular repayment schedule serves as an early warning
system. Credit officers become aware of emerging problems due to the steady
flow of information regarding repayment capacity and repayment discipline. The
credit officer is immediately able to expand the monitoring activities if a borrower
is in arrears with payments. Borrowers who have difficulties in saving their
income are disciplined through regular installments. Furthermore, the regular
repayment schedule helps MFIs select low-risk microfinance borrowers. Due
to the repayment obligations beginning immediately after loan disbursement,
microfinance borrowers need to have another source of earnings besides the
entrepreneurial activity to repay installments. Therefore, MFIs effectively lend
partly against a borrower’s outside income ensuring loan repayment even if the
investment does not generate the expected revenues (Armendáriz de Aghion
and Morduch, 2000).
The impact of a regular repayment schedule on the probability of default is only
explored by a few studies. Field and Pande (2008) do not identify a relation
between highly frequent repayment installments and the probability of default
in a field experiment in urban India. McIntosh (2008) finds no difference in
repayment performance between borrowers paying weekly installments and
borrowers paying fortnightly installments either. In a further field experiment
in India, Field et al. (2013) note a positive correlation between the grace period
and the probability of default. Loans with a grace period of two months are
more likely to default in the short- and long-run compared with classic loan
contracts. Furthermore, the regular repayment schedule gives credit officers the
ability to establish a personalized relationship by frequently communicating
with the microfinance borrowers. Credit officers become acquainted with clients
and their needs.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). Loans with highly regular repayment obli-
gations are less likely to default.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Loans with a grace period default more
often.
2.2.5 Targeting Women
In microfinance it is relatively common to give priority to female borrowers
because they demonstrate better repayment behavior when compared with
men (see Gibbons and Kasim (1990), Roslan and Abd Karim (2009), Hulme
(1991), Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Kevane and Wydick (2001) for evidence
supporting this fact in various countries). A global study surveyed by D’Espallier
et al. (2011) shows a significantly negative relationship between the proportion
of female clients and both the portfolio risk and the portfolio write-offs of MFIs.
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The global study identifies women as being better credit risks and also the
fact that giving loans to women prevents credit default. Apart from the pure
financial aspects, there is evidence that businesses run by female entrepreneurs
out-survive businesses owned by male entrepreneurs (Kalnins and Willians,
2014). The phenomenon that women appear to be more reliable than their
male counterparts can be explained in terms of more risk-averse investments
and lower moral hazard risk (Kevane and Wydick, 2001). Women’s lower level
of mobility, their sensitivity to social sanctions, lacking credit alternatives and
the missing female labor market appear to be reasons for the lower moral
hazard risk (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008, p. 124; Emran et al., 2011). Due to
the lower mobility level, credit officers and peers are better able to monitor
women’s investment activities, to intervene in terms of arrears and to enforce
loan repayment (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Goetz and Gupta,
1996). Additionally, women appear to be more sensitive to social sanctions in
terms of peer pressure or financial exclusion by credit officers as microfinance
credit programs provide an important socializing opportunity for women. (Goetz
and Gupta, 1996). Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008, p. 124) and Armendáriz de
Aghion and Morduch (2010) report that women are better customers due to
fewer alternative sources of credit caused by cultural, social or legal constraints.
Women tend to honor their loan contracts and the access to financial services
more than men. Additionally, access barriers to the formal labor market in
many developing countries could be a reason (Emran et al., 2011). By being
excluded, to an extent, from the formal labor market, women are dependent on
microfinance credit programs if they seek to attain self-employment through
entrepreneurial activity. The economic opportunity to generate returns serves
as an incentive to successfully repay loans in order to ensure the business
opportunity.
In summary, we state our last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Women and groups of women as microbor-
rowers are less likely to default.
2.2.6 Lender’s behavior and the funding time
Kiva lenders are charitable lenders and do not seek a financial return. How-
ever, one can assume that lenders value the repayment of loans in order to
subsequently use the amount of money to support several projects in a row,
which differentiates microlending from charitable giving (Ly and Mason, 2012a).
Besides these credit risk aspects though, which comprise the focus of this paper,
lenders also appear to consider social aspects when funding a loan request, such
as the empowerment of women or the preference of poor borrowers (Liu et al.,
2012). As for each funded loan, we can observe the time that was required to
fully fund the loan, we can draw conclusions from this variable concerning the
attractiveness of a loan request for the lenders. A higher level of attractiveness
can be due to more advantageous credit risk characteristics as well as to a
perceived greater social impact.
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By including the funding time in the analysis of credit risk, we can draw
conclusions about whether the loans preferred by investors have a lower or
higher credit risk which would indicate that the investors either put more
emphasis on the credit risk component (if they are able to assess it correctly ex
ante) or more on the social impact component, which they could pursue while
consciously sacrificing financial interests. A third possibility is that the funding
time does not explain much of the credit risk. Thus, we do not formulate an ex
ante hypothesis on this issue.
An additional analysis of the funding time can be used for a direct estimation of
the determinants of a loan’s attractiveness. Analyses of this kind have already
been performed in previous literature. Galak et al. (2011), Ly and Mason
(2012a), Allison et al. (2013) and Jenq et al. (2015) all use the funding time to
assess the attractiveness of a loan request and to analyze how it is influenced by
the social distance, the competition between MFIs, the entrepreneurial rhetoric
of the description texts and the appearance of the borrowers, respectively. We
mainly add the connection of the funding time to the drivers of credit risk to
this literature, but only as a side aspect of our research.
2.3 Data and methodology
2.3.1 Data description
All individual loan data and MFI-specific information used in our analysis have
been retrieved via Kiva’s public Application Programming Interface provided
online. We study loans posted on Kiva between February 1, 2010, when Kiva
changed the default protection rules (Kiva.org, 2010), and October 13, 2013.
This change of the protection rules ensures that the loans of defaulted borrowers
are not repaid by the MFI itself, which used to be common practice before the
change.1 MFIs considered the option to compensate a borrower’s default in
approximately 90% of all posted loans in 2006 to 2008, in 75% and 69% of all
loan requests in 2009 and 2010 before the policy change in February 2010 was
implemented. As we are not able to observe the defaults of those loans paid
back by the MFI itself, we conclude that the default variable was biased before
the change and consequently exclude loans posted on Kiva before February
2010 from our research.
All of these loans either have the status repaid, i.e. repaid fully, or defaulted,
i.e. not repaid fully. We make use of simple random sampling to obtain 30,110
representative observations. Moreover, macroeconomic indicators such as GDP
per capita and Crop production index and geographical regions are obtained
from the World Bank. After removing observations with missing macroeconomic
1 Such behavior is only rational if the (average) screening costs per loan for selecting better
credit risks are higher than the (average) losses and consequently a thorough screening does
not take place. Thus, for those MFIs that frequently used to pay back defaulted loans to
Kiva we can assume that the selection process has become more stringent since the change.
19
Chapter 2. Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing
data and unrealistic values regarding loan term and activity term of partner
MFIs the final data sample contains 29,304 observations and includes individual
and group loans.
Credit default is the dependent binary variable with a value of one if the loan is
defaulted and zero otherwise. Kiva defines a loan as defaulted if repayment by
a borrower or partner MFI is doubtful or if the amount expected as of 180 days
previously is not cumulatively repaid as of a quarterly reconciliation (Kiva.org,
2014). Of the 29,304 considered loans, 650 loans are defaulted. These loans are
attributable to 71 different MFIs. The default rate over the entire sample data
is 2.22%.
All explanatory variables are defined in detail in Table 2.1.
As pointed out above, we use the variable funding time as a proxy for the lenders’
behavior in the sense that the faster a loan is funded the more attractive it
must have been for the lenders.
The default rate of the previous year is employed as a proxy for the screening
and monitoring quality of an individual MFI. Loans are considered to belong
to a respective calender year if the majority of the loan term (more than 50%)
is in that year. Therefore, considering a loan of year x, the default rate of the
year x− 1 is used as proxy. The default rate of the previous year displays the
share of requested and defaulted loans in year x− 1. Several partner MFIs did
not have a default rate in the previous year. The metric variable is imputed
with its mean conditioned on the year in order to prevent the loss of these
observations.
The activity term of an MFI describes its experience in credit financing on Kiva
and is included as a control variable. Kiva reviews partner MFIs in a full or
basic due diligence to obtain information on the financial stability of each MFI.
Based on the due diligence process, Kiva provides a one-to-five star risk rating,
indicating the financial risk related to the failure of a MFI. A five star-rating
represents the lowest risk. A dummy variable for the type of due diligence
and the MFI-specific risk rating are included as MFI-specific control variables.
Relatively frequently, MFIs use the possibility of refunding loans which have
already been disbursed to the respective borrowers. Therefore, we include a
dummy variable indicating disbursement before or after publication on Kiva.
Loan characteristics are considered to be possible determinants of credit default.
To this end, a dummy variable for group loans is included in the analysis.
Furthermore, the number of borrowers in a group compared with individual
borrowers is of interest and included as a control variable. The loan size
requested on Kiva and the loan term until the loan matures are included in
order to test H3a and H3b. The classic microloan contract requires regular
repayments, starting immediately after loan disbursement. The metric variable
grace period describes the time period before the initial repayment is due. The
categorical variable repayment obligations is classified by the categories weekly,
fortnightly, monthly, every three to four months, twice a year and annual.
Dummy variables represent the corresponding categorical values.
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We also include dummy variables representing the gender of an individual
borrower. Moreover, if a group loan is granted to a mixed group, we include
the percentage of women in these groups to explore the gender effect.
To account for the stated (mostly entrepreneurial) purpose of the requested
loan, sectors of activity are included as loan-specific control variables.
To display macroeconomic influences, we include control variables such as the
GDP per capita, the CROPI as a proxy for the agricultural production in a
country and geographical regions.
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Variable Expected
effect
Description
Funding time Time to
funding
Time period in hours from posting the loan on Kiva to being
fully funded by Kiva lenders.
Default rate + Imputed
default rate
MFI-specific default rate in the previous year. Obtained by
dividing the value of requested and defaulted loans in the pre-
vious year by the total value of requested and ended loans in
the previous year.
Activity term Activity term of MFI in days on Kiva. Obtained by calculating
time period starting with first activity on Kiva to present.
Due diligence Type of due diligence processed by Kiva in order to define
the financial stability and risk rating of each MFI. Dummy
variable with the value of one if full due diligence is processed,
zero if basic due diligence is processed.
Rating MFI-specific
risk rating
1–5 star risk rating of each MFI provided by Kiva. Risk cate-
gories are defined as low risk (4–5 stars), moderate risk (2.5–
3.5 stars), high risk (1–2 stars), not-rated and no rating avail-
able. Dummy variables.
Disbursement Dummy variable with the value of one if a loan has been
disbursed before being posted and funded on Kiva, zero
otherwise.
Group loan − Indicating if loan is granted to an individual or a group of
a minimum of 2 individuals with joint liability. Dummy
variable.
NB − Number of
borrowers
Number of borrowers that request a loan. In the case of indi-
vidual borrowers the value is one, in the case of group loans
the group size is represented.
Loan size + Loan size in USD requested by an individual borrower or a
group of individuals.
Loan term + Time period in days from the disbursal date to the due date
of the last repayment obligation.
Grace period + Time period in days between the disbursal date and the initia-
tive repayment, taking into account the required repayment
obligation. Calculated as days between disbursal date and
initiative repayment date minus regular payment period.
Repayment + Repayment
obligation
Dummy variables for weekly repayment, fortnightly repay-
ment, monthly repayment, repayment each 3–4 month, repay-
ment twice a year and annual repayment.
Gender − Gender of
borrower
Dummy variable for female individual, male individual, group
of women, group of men and mixed group.
PCfemale − Percentage of
women
Percentage of group members who are female within a mixed
group of women and men.
Sector Sectors of
activity
Sectors of activity are agriculture, arts, clothing, construction,
education, entertainment, food, health, housing, manufactur-
ing, personal use, retail, service, transportation and wholesale.
GDPpC Gross domestic
product per
capita
USD value of the gross domestic income of the country, where
the microfinance borrower is located, divided by its midyear
population.
CROPI Crop
production
index
The crop production index accounts for the agricultural pro-
duction with the exception of fodder crops, for each year and
country. Base period: 2004–2006.
Region The geographical regions are Latin America and Caribbean
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan
Africa (AFRICA), South Asia (SA), Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia (EECA), North America (NA) and East Asia and
the Pacific (EAP).
Table 2.1: Definition of explanatory variables
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2.3.2 Methodology
As the dependent variable is a binary variable, we use a probit regression model
with the following specification:
probit{P (Yi = 1|(Ui, Vi, Xi, Zi))} = β0 + β1Ui + β2Vi + β3Xi + β4Zi + i ,
where Ui represents the variable describing the funding behavior of individual
Kiva lenders (the funding time) and Vi describes characteristics of the loan
contract, such as loan size, loan term, grace period, repayment obligations, type
of lending, purpose and gender. Xi is a vector of variables at the level of the
partner MFI and Zi is a vector of macroeconomic and geographical variables.
The symbol i ∼ N(0, σ2) is the error term. We apply Eicker–Huber–White
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in all regressions.
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the metric and the categorical variables based on
the data set are reported in Table 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
The average time to funding on Kiva.org is 133.37 hours which does not differ
greatly between individual loans and group loans. The average default rate
in the previous year is 1.06%, whereby some MFIs display a default rate of
zero and one MFI even has a default rate of 66.2%. The median value of
0.06% indicates the skewness of the distribution. More than 98% of loans are
already disbursed before being posted on Kiva. Approximately 85% of loans
are given to individual borrowers and the remaining loans to groups of at least
two individuals up to a maximum of 45 individuals. The average loan size is
$794.42. The average loan size given to groups of borrowers ($1,758) is more
than twice as high as the loan size given to individual borrowers ($624.09).
In contrast, the average loan term of individual loans exceeds the loan term
of group loans. The grace period ranges from –366 days to 441 days. Both
extreme cases correspond to loans with an annual repayment. The median
grace period is zero days. After an average grace period of 3.65 days, 21.77% of
loans require weekly repayment and 63.30% monthly repayment. Slightly less
than 12% comprise part of the remaining categories of repayment obligations.
The largest part of the loans is obtained by female individuals or groups of
women. Male and mixed groups are rare.
The average GDPpc is $2,933, including countries with a GDPpc of $219 as
well as countries with a GDPpc of $51,748. It is obvious that there are no
group loans in North America.
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All data (N=29,304)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Funding time 1.33e+2 2.06e+2 1.67e−2 3.53e+1 1.59e+3
Default rate 1.06e−2 3.16e−2 0.00e+0 6.00e−4 6.62e−1
Activity term 9.21e+2 4.42e+2 0.00e+0 9.09e+2 2.23e+3
Loan size 7.94e+2 7.87e+2 5.00e+1 5.75e+2 1.00e+4
Loan term 2.85e+2 1.42e+2 7.00e+0 2.80e+2 1.11e+3
Grace period 3.65e+0 2.04e+1 −3.66e+2 0.00e+0 4.41e+2
NB 2.11e+0 3.43e+0 1.00e+0 1.00e+0 4.50e+1
GDPpc 2.93e+3 2.96e+3 2.19e+2 2.29e+3 5.18e+4
CROPI 1.31e+2 2.94e+1 7.32e+1 1.23e+2 2.91e+2
Individual loans
(N=24,902)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Funding time 1.34e+2 2.13e+2 1.67e−2 3.16e+1 1.59e+3
Default rate 1.05e−2 2.83e−2 0.00e+0 6.00e−4 6.62e−1
Activity term 9.05e+2 4.36e+2 0.00e+0 8.85e+2 2.22e+3
Loan size 6.24e+2 4.95e+2 5.00e+1 5.00e+2 1.00e+4
Loan term 2.97e+2 1.45e+2 7.00e+0 3.00e+2 1.11e+3
Grace period 4.27e+0 2.08e+1 −3.66e+2 0.00e+0 4.41e+2
GDPpc 3.03e+3 2.99e+3 3.26e+2 2.36e+3 5.18e+4
CROPI 1.30e+2 3.02e+1 7.32e+1 1.21e+2 2.90e+2
Group loans (N=4,402)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Funding time 1.28e+2 1.66e+2 2.81e−2 5.27e+1 8.57e+2
Default rate 1.12e−2 4.60e−2 0.00e+0 6.31e−4 5.89e−1
Activity term 1.01e+3 4.63e+2 0.00e+0 1.06e+3 2.09e+3
Loan size 1.76e+3 1.28e+3 1.00e+2 1.33e+3 7.60e+3
Loan term 2.15e+2 9.35e+1 2.80e+1 1.83e+2 1.08e+3
Grace period 1.54e+1 1.74e+1 −1.84e+2 0.00e+0 4.39e+2
NB 8.36e+0 5.67e+0 2.00e+0 7.00e+0 4.50e+1
GDPpc 2.37e+3 2.62e+3 2.19e+2 1.21e+3 1.55e+4
CROPI 1.29e+2 2.39e+1 9.59e+1 1.26e+2 1.95e+2
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for metric variables based on the imputed data set
Notes: The data set is derived from the Kivas official webpage for researchers and the World
Banks data base. The entire data sample contains 29,304 loans. It is divided into the
subsample of individual loans with N=24,902 and the subsample of group loans with N=4,402.
Mean, S.D., maximum, median and minimum of metric variables are displayed. The variables
are defined in Table 2.1. Data source: Kiva, World Bank.
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All data Individual loans Group loans
N=29,304 N=24,902 N=4,402
Variable Obs. Relative Obs. Relative Obs. Relative
Defaulted loans 650 0.022 452 0.018 198 0.045
Repaid loans 2,8654 0.978 2,4450 0.982 4,204 0.955
Due diligence full 29,244 0.998 24,864 0.998 4,380 0.995
Due diligence basic 60 0.002 38 0.002 22 0.005
Rating_high 2,198 0.075 1,623 0.065 575 0.131
Rating_moderate 17,502 0.597 15,093 0.606 2,409 0.547
Rating_low 7,692 0.263 7,143 0.287 549 0.125
Rating_not-rated 184 0.006 43 0.002 141 0.032
Rating_not available 1,728 0.059 1,000 0.040 728 0.165
Disbursed before posted 28,817 0.983 24,520 0.985 4,297 0.976
Disbursed after posted 487 0.017 382 0.015 105 0.024
Repayment_weekly 6,380 0.218 5,409 0.217 971 0.221
Repayment_fortnightly 2,177 0.074 1,569 0.063 608 0.138
Repayment_monthly 18,550 0.633 16,155 0.649 2,395 0.544
Repayment_3–4month 430 0.015 390 0.016 40 0.009
Repayment_twice a year 1,124 0.038 965 0.039 159 0.036
Repayment_annual 643 0.022 414 0.017 229 0.052
Group loan 4,402 0.150
Individual loan 24,902 0.849
Female individual 17,561 0.599 17,561 0.705
Male individual 7,341 0.251 7,341 0.295
Group of women 2,706 0.092 2,706 0.615
Group of men 69 0.002 69 0.016
Mixed group 1,627 0.056 1,627 0.369
Sector_Agriculture 6,601 0.225 5,661 0.227 940 0.214
Sector_Arts 547 0.019 417 0.017 130 0.029
Sector_Clothing 1,976 0.067 1,581 0.064 395 0.089
Sector_Construction 564 0.019 503 0.020 61 0.014
Sector_Education 296 0.010 263 0.011 33 0.008
Sector_Entertainment 47 0.002 43 0.002 4 0.001
Sector_Food 7,264 0.248 6,062 0.243 1,202 0.273
Sector_Health 211 0.007 176 0.007 35 0.008
Sector_Housing 863 0.029 828 0.033 35 0.008
Sector_Manufacturing 401 0.014 353 0.014 48 0.011
Sector_Personal Use 346 0.012 325 0.013 21 0.005
Sector_Retail 6,775 0.231 5,659 0.227 1,116 0.254
Sector_Service 2,277 0.078 1,959 0.079 318 0.072
Sector_Transportation 1,080 0.037 1,025 0.041 55 0.013
Sector_Wholesale 56 0.002 47 0.002 9 0.002
Region_EAP 8,442 0.288 7,776 0.312 666 0.151
Region_EECA 1,604 0.055 1,420 0.057 184 0.042
Region_LAC 9,787 0.334 8,388 0.337 1,399 0.318
Region_MENA 806 0.028 791 0.032 15 0.003
Region_NA 31 0.001 31 0.001 0 0.000
Region_SA 585 0.019 142 0.006 443 0.101
Region_AFRICA 8,049 0.275 6,354 0.255 1,695 0.385
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables based on the imputed data set
Notes: The data set is derived from the Kivas official webpage for researchers and the World
Banks data base. The entire data sample contains 29,304 loans. It is divided into the
subsample of individual loans with N=24,902 and the subsample of group loans with N=4,402.
Absolute values and relative values of the dummy variables are displayed. The variables are
defined in Table 2.1. Data source: Kiva, World Bank.
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To gain deeper insights into the MFIs’ process of selecting loans which they
finally post on Kiva, we compare key figures of our data sample with key figures
for the entire loan portfolio of the respective MFIs as reported on MIX Market.
The results are displayed in Table 2.4.
First, we consider the average share of female borrowers in our data sample and
the one within the entire loan portfolio of the MFIs. We can observe the fact
that those loans posted on KIVA have a higher percentage of female borrowers
on average than the entire loan portfolios of the respective MFIs. This indicates
that MFIs tend to post loans granted to female borrowers on Kiva in order
to attract potential investors. Furthermore, we consider the average default
rate of the MFIs on Kiva with the write-off ratio and the loan loss rate of the
respective MFIs as reported on MIX Market. The comparison indicates that the
loans posted on Kiva are of lower risk than the overall loans of the respective
MFIs. Note that this is a conservative estimate as we implicitly assume a loss
rate of 100% for the defaulted loans on Kiva which is higher than the real loss.
The means of the default rate on Kiva and the means of the write-off ratio and
the loan loss rate on MIX Market are even significantly different in 2009 and
2010, but not in 2011. We conclude that MFIs prefer posting less risky loans
on Kiva compared with their entire loan portfolio. Altogether, low-risk and
female-borrower loans appear to be overrepresented to a certain extent on Kiva.
Posted at KIVA Reported at MIX
year N Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-statistic p-value
Average share of Average share of
female borrowers female borrowers
2010 71 7.56e−1 2.76e−2 6.95e−1 2.79e−2 1.56e+0 0.122
2011 84 7.29e−1 2.61e−2 7.01e−1 2.44e−2 7.88e−1 0.432
2012 80 6.92e−1 2.67e−2 6.61e−1 2.57e−2 8.59e−1 0.392
Average default rate at KIVA Average write-off ratio
2009 70 7.19e−4 2.45e−4 1.70e−2 2.38e−3 −6.84e+0 0.000∗∗∗
2010 86 1.02e−2 2.60e−3 2.03e−2 3.48e−3 −2.33e+0 0.021∗∗
2011 93 1.31e−2 2.30e−3 2.40e−2 7.37e−3 −1.41e+0 0.159
Average default rate at KIVA Average loan loss rate
2009 77 7.03e−4 2.23e−4 1.37e−2 2.23e−3 −5.82e+0 0.000∗∗∗
2010 87 1.01e−2 2.58e−3 1.75e−2 3.18e−3 −1.80e+0 0.074∗
2011 96 1.49e−2 3.00e−3 1.92e−2 6.97e−3 −5.73e−1 0.568
Table 2.4: Key figures of our data sample vs. the respective key figures of the same MFIs’
entire loan portfolios as reported on MIX Market
Notes: The average default rate at Kiva is calculated as described in Table 2.1, while the
write-off ratio is calculated by the total amount of loans written off during a period divided
by the average of all outstanding principals due for all outstanding client loans. Loans are
written off if these loans are recognized as being uncollectable. The loan loss rate is obtained
by dividing the total amount of loans written off minus the value of loans recovered by the
average of all outstanding principals due for all outstanding client loans. N is the number of
MFIs for which we have an observation on KIVA and on MIX at the same time.
Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level
and the 1% level. Data source: Kiva, MIX Market.
We do not expect an issue regarding multi-collinearity as the majority of
correlations between metric variables are below 30% and only a few are as high
as 50%. The Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 2.5.
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2.4 Results
Table 2.6 shows the mean values of the metric variables when differentiating
between the group of defaulted and the group of repaid loans. While the means
of funding time appear not to differ between the groups, the average default
rate and average activity term are significantly different. Also, the expected
values of the loan-specific variables are significantly different, with the exception
of the loan size. Additionally, the result shows a significant difference between
the means of GDPpc and the means of CROPI.
Defaulted loans Repaid loans
(N=650) (N=28,654)
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-statistic p-value
Funding time 1.22e+2 1.94e+2 1.34e+2 2.07e+2 1.39e+0 0.166
Default rate 5.70e−2 1.25e−1 9.50e−3 2.47e−2 −3.89e+1 0.000∗∗∗
Activity term 7.80e+2 4.45e+2 9.23e+2 4.42e+2 8.24e+0 0.000∗∗∗
Loan size 8.44e+2 8.13e+2 7.93e+2 7.86e+2 −1.64e+0 0.101
Loan term 3.21e+2 1.76e+2 2.84e+2 1.41e+2 −6.68e+0 0.000∗∗∗
Grace period 8.00e+0 2.70e+1 4.00e+0 2.00e+1 −4.88e+0 0.000∗∗∗
NB 2.00e+0 3.00e+0 2.00e+0 3.00e+0 −2.49e+0 0.013∗∗
GDPpc 2.59e+3 5.82e+3 2.94e+3 2.86e+3 2.95e+0 0.003∗∗
CROPI 1.26e+2 2.40e+1 1.31e+2 2.90e+1 3.82e+0 0.000∗∗
Table 2.6: Independent t-test for metric variables among defaulted loans and repaid loans
based on the imputed data set
Notes: The data set is derived from the Kiva official webpage for researchers and the World
Banks data base. The entire data sample contains 29,304 loans. It is divided into the
subsample of defaulted loans with N=650 and the subsample of repaid loans with N=28,654.
Mean and S.D. of metric variables and t-statistic and p-values are displayed. Values labeled
with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level.
The variables are defined in Table 2.1. Data source: Kiva, World Bank.
Table 2.7 exhibits the frequencies of the categorical variables based on the
imputed data set for the defaulted and the repaid loans. Considering the
disbursement, we notice that, on average, defaulted loans are less often disbursed
before posted on Kiva compared with repaid loans. More than 75% of defaulted
loans have been considered to be repaid monthly. The repaid loans are mainly
redeemed on a monthly basis but the share of weekly repayment obligations is
higher compared with defaulted loans. A share of 30% of the defaulted loans
is provided to groups of borrowers whereas only 15% of the repaid loans are
group loans.
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Defaulted loans Repaid loans
N=650 N=28,654
Variable Obs. Relative Obs. Relative
Due diligence full 649 0.998 28, 595 0.998
Due diligence basic 1 0.002 59 0.002
Rating_high 83 0.128 2, 115 0.074
Rating_moderate 314 0.483 17, 188 0.599
Rating_low 30 0.046 7, 662 0.267
Rating_not-rated 20 0.031 164 0.006
Rating_not available 203 0.312 1, 525 0.053
Disbursed before posted 585 0.900 28, 232 0.985
Disbursed after posted 65 0.100 422 0.015
Repayment_weekly 110 0.169 6, 270 0.219
Repayment_biweekly 22 0.034 2, 155 0.075
Repayment_monthly 489 0.752 18, 061 0.630
Repayment_3-4month 5 0.008 425 0.015
Repayment_twice a year 5 0.008 1, 119 0.039
Repayment_annual 19 0.029 624 0.022
Group loan 198 0.305 4, 204 0.147
Individual loan 452 0.695 24, 450 0.853
Female individual 279 0.429 17, 282 0.603
Male individual 173 0.266 7, 168 0.250
Group of women 73 0.112 2, 633 0.092
Group of men 8 0.012 61 0.000
Mixed group 117 0.180 1510 0.053
Sector_Agriculture 120 0.185 6, 481 0.226
Sector_Arts 16 0.025 531 0.019
Sector_Clothing 66 0.102 1, 910 0.067
Sector_Construction 14 0.022 550 0.019
Sector_Education 1 0.002 295 0.010
Sector_Entertainment 2 0.003 45 0.002
Sector_Food 170 0.262 7, 094 0.248
Sector_Health 13 0.020 198 0.007
Sector_Housing 11 0.017 852 0.029
Sector_Manufacturing 5 0.008 396 0.014
Sector_Personal Use 3 0.005 343 0.012
Sector_Retail 145 0.223 6, 630 0.231
Sector_Service 62 0.095 2, 215 0.077
Sector_Transportation 21 0.032 1, 059 0.037
Sector_Wholesale 1 0.002 55 0.002
Region_EAP 20 0.031 8, 422 0.294
Region_EECA 1 0.002 1, 603 0.056
Region_LAC 171 0.263 9, 616 0.336
Region_MENA 6 0.009 800 0.028
Region_NA 7 0.011 24 0.001
Region_SA 51 0.078 534 0.019
Region_AFRICA 394 0.606 7, 655 0.267
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables based on the imputed data set for
defaulted loans and repaid loans
Notes: The data set is derived from the Kiva official webpage for researchers and the World
Banks data base. The entire data sample contains 29,304 loans. It is divided into the
subsample of defaulted loans with N=650 and the subsample of repaid loans with N=28,654.
Absolute values and relative values of the dummy variables are displayed. The variables are
defined in Table 2.1. Data source: Kiva, World Bank.
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The results of the estimated probit models are reported in Table 2.8. Model
specification (I) is the basic model with a dummy variable for a group loan versus
an individual loan to test the advantage of group loans over individual loans
in terms of credit default. In model specification (II) three dummy variables
indicating the type of group regarding gender are added. Model specification
(III) corresponds to model specification (II) and includes the percentage of
female members in a mixed group.
The default rate in the previous year representing the selection and monitoring
quality of MFIs has a significant positive sign in all model specifications. Loans
issued by MFIs with a high default rate in the previous year are positively
associated with probability of default. The result illustrates the important role
of MFIs in terms of selecting and monitoring microfinance borrowers in order
to ensure loan repayment. The result supports H1. This finding can also be
an indication that some MFIs permanently manage to select low-risk loans
while others fail to do so or may have a different policy. The negative and
significant coefficient of the activity term implies that the more experienced an
MFI is on Kiva, the less likely one of its loans is to be defaulted. The dummy
variable for full due diligence versus basic due diligence processed by Kiva shows
a positive sign. The result is significant and surprising as loans distributed
by MFIs which have been reviewed in more detail by Kiva are more likely to
default. Regarding the risk rating of each MFI, loans of low risk-rated MFIs
appear to perform better compared with loans of high risk-rated MFIs. The
result is slightly significant in specification II and III. It is obvious that the
probability of default increases if the MFI is not rated or if the risk rating is no
longer available due to the termination of activity on Kiva. The coefficient of
the dummy variable indicating whether a loan is disbursed beforehand or not
is negative and significant. Loans which have already been disbursed exhibit
a lower probability of default which could be an indication that MFIs seek to
refund relatively reliable loans on Kiva in order to ensure a good repayment
performance on Kiva.
The dummy variable for group loans has an unexpected positive and significant
coefficient. Groups of borrowers perform worse than individual borrowers re-
garding repayment in our data set. However, this finding needs to be interpreted
together with the significant negative coefficient of the number of borrowers
in the group. The joint effect of both implies that groups of eight and more
members ceteris paribus have a lower default probability than a single borrower.
In fact, only small groups are more likely to default. This effect could be
linked to the insurance effect of bigger groups as the bigger the group, the
smaller the joint liability burden per group member. Group members appear
to be able to jointly repay the entire loan amount even in the case of a peer
defaulting. Therefore, hypothesis H2 cannot be directly confirmed, but in a
modified interpretation for large groups instead. In the context of the MFIs’
loan selection problem, this also can be due to a bias toward high-risk group
loans as the MFIs may be aware of the investors’ preference in favor of group
loans (see discussion around Table 2.9 below).
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The loan size has a significantly positive impact on the probability of default
in all model specifications. It appears to be more difficult for microfinance
borrowers and groups of borrowers to repay larger loans. The result corresponds
well with H3a. The positive and significant sign of the loan term supports our
expectation of H3b in terms of the borrower’s difficulty in saving returns in the
long run. As the self-discipline in repaying a loan may decrease over time and
more adverse events can occur, the probability of default increases.
The relationship between regular repayment obligations and the probability
of default is not definitely clarified. Loans requiring monthly repayment are
more likely to default compared to loans requiring weekly repayment. When
comparing the most popular types of repayment obligations, the results are
slightly significant in specifications II and III and support H4a. To gain a deeper
insight into this issue, it is important to distinguish between individual loans
and group loans. It is obvious that individual loans requiring weekly repayment
are advantageous over loans requiring monthly repayment (see column IV in
Table 2.8). However, this is not the case for group loans (see Table 2.10). In
total, the impact of the required repayment obligation on the probability of
default is only weakly supported in the entire data set. Additionally, loans
requiring annual repayment are proven to have a significantly lower probability
of default compared with loans requiring weekly repayment. This result is
contradictory to our expectation and may be linked to the fact that none of
the individual loans requiring annual repayment have defaulted. If we examine
the individual loans with annual repayment in closer detail, it is mentionable
that these are mainly distributed to Latin America and the Caribbean and
mainly granted for agricultural purposes and not as spread out as all other
loans requiring more frequent payments. These loans may be special in the
sense that they could be regarded as being very low risk by the partner MFIs
and thus rewarded with annual payments. As pointed out above, such low-risk
loans can be very attractive to investors and therefore be over-represented in
the selection process of the MFI. None of the coefficients of the remaining types
of repayment obligations are significant. As expected, the grace period has
a significant positive influence on credit default. The result favors H4b and
corresponds to the findings obtained by Field et al. (2013).
Next, we examine the gender effect. Female individual borrowers are associ-
ated with a lower probability of default when compared with to their male
counterparts as the sign of the gender dummy is negative and significant in
all model specifications. Hence, we observe evidence in favor of H5. Groups
of women and mixed groups appear to have greater difficulties in repayment
than male individual borrowers, whereas the coefficient of groups of male is
also positive but not significant. Furthermore, we test whether the dummy
variables indicating the type of group regarding gender have equal effects by
comparing groups of women and mixed groups as well as groups of men and
mixed groups. The equality of effects can be rejected in both cases. The equality
of effects between groups of women and groups of men cannot be rejected. The
coefficient of the percentage of female members in a mixed group is positive but
not significant and does not contribute to clarifying whether female borrowers
have a better repayment performance. When revisiting the MFIs’ loan selection
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problem, this observation can also be due to a bias toward groups, particularly
groups with a high percentage of women as these kind of loans appear to be
attractive to investors (see Table 2.9). In general, such a selection does not
necessarily increase the credit risk, but some MFIs may tend to select even
those women or group loans that are riskier than the average loan.
All included macroeconomic factors appear to influence credit default. The
GDPpc and the crop production index are negatively related to the probability
of default, indicating that the higher the GDPpc and the agricultural production
in a country, the lower the probability of default is.
Last, the funding time as a proxy for the attractiveness of a loan for Kiva lenders
is notably insignificant in all specifications. Therefore, we do not observe an
additional explanatory power of quickly-funded loans for credit risk.2 This is
an indication that various different social factors beside the repayment of loans
may influence the lending decision of charitable lenders.
To gain deeper insights into this issue, we regress the funding time on the
other available variables. We refrain, however, from using the CROPI as the
agricultural production output of a country, which ex post influences repayment,
cannot be forecast easily and thus is very unlikely to influence the attractiveness
of a loan. Table 2.9 presents the corresponding results.3
Obviously, the funding time is related to many of the explanatory variables.
However, with R2 values of approximately 28 per cent, it is not perfectly
explained by the rest of the variables, which is consistent with the above-
mentioned papers which provide evidence that the funding time is influenced
by further soft factors. Therefore, the first conclusion is that we do not have a
multi-collinearity problem in our default regressions. Secondly, as the logarithm
of the loan size has a positively significant coefficient, we can state that the loan
size, which obviously has a positive influence in the funding time, is already
accounted for. Thus, the other effects can be interpreted in a ceteris paribus
manner. A closer analysis of the significant effects supports the view that lenders
are obviously attracted by variables indicating low credit risk and likewise by
social impact measures. The negative impact of the group loan and the gender
dummies, indicating a quicker funding for groups and for female individuals,
can clearly be interpreted as being social-impact driven behavior. Also, the
positive coefficient of the disbursed dummy indicates that lenders prefer to
fund loans that have not been disbursed before, indicating that the lenders
prefer to enable projects instead of just refinancing already enabled ones. The
social claim holds even more if we look at the credit risk implications of these
2Note that this effect is robust and not a result of the specific definition of the attractiveness
measure. When plugging in the logarithm of the funding time or the funding time per
loan amount or the logarithm of the funding time per loan amount, the coefficient remains
insignificant in all of the cases.
3Note that a more conservative approach would be to estimate the probit regression and the
regression of the funding time simultaneously. However, as the standard way of implementing
this is a 2SLS approach which regresses the funding time first and plugs the estimated values
of the funding into the probit model second, the already now insignificant coefficient of the
funding time remains insignificant. Thus, we refrain from pursuing the 2SLS variant for the
ease of representation.
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variables (Table 2.8). Group loans and previously undisbursed loans do have a
higher default risk. Merely loans to female individuals are not only regarded
as a social investment, but also reveal a lower credit risk. However, lenders
appear to be reluctant to support poorer borrowers as the coefficient of the
logarithm of GDPpc is negative, indicating that lenders do not give money to
poorer countries willingly as the credit risk of poorer country loans is higher
(Table 2.8).
There are further indications that point to the fact that lenders do consider
variables indicating higher credit risk. A high default rate of the MFI or an
unrated MFI as well as long grace periods or long loan terms not only increase
the repayment risk but also lead to a reluctance among the lenders to fund such
a loan. Summarizing, the lenders are relatively strongly attracted by the credit
risk issues, again proving the importance of our research question. However,
they also consider some social issues when lending, even if this is harmful to
the repayment expectations.
The results of the probit regression on the individual loan sample are similar
to the findings of the main model. The majority of coefficients remain stable
with similar signs and confidence levels. Compared with the complete data
sample, the results regarding MFI-specific variables also confirm the impact
of the MFIs’ characteristics on repayment performance. The coefficient of the
default rate in the previous year is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus,
H1 is approved. The coefficient of the activity term of MFIs remains negative
and significant. In contrast to the complete sample, the dummy variable
indicating the type of due diligence is negative and significant. Regarding risk
rating, unrated MFIs appear to be more likely to ensure loan repayment when
compared with high risk-rated MFIs. The remaining relationships are similar
to the complete data sample. The possibility of the MFIs to refund loans
disbursed beforehand to individual borrowers is still in favor of loan repayment.
We detect loan characteristics to influence credit default. The sign of loan
size is significantly positive as predicted in H3a. The sign of the loan term
remains significantly positive and our suggestion in H3b is supported. Therefore,
individual borrowers face greater difficulties in repaying a loan if the loan size or
the loan term increases. The significance level of the dummy variable indicating
monthly repayment increases to the 1% level. However, the influence of regular
repayment obligations on credit default is not obvious as Hypothesis H4a is not
clearly supported by the different frequencies of repayment. We find evidence in
favor of H4b as a positive relation between the grace period and the probability
of default is obvious. In accordance with the result considering the complete
sample, the gender effect is approved. This finding favors our prediction in
H5 and supports the widely discussed priority given to women as borrowers in
microfinance. Regarding macroeconomic variables, the GDPpc and the crop
production index are again negatively related to probability of default.
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Entire data set Individual loans
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Investor’s decision
Funding time −1.53e−4 −1.77e−4 −1.74e−4 −1.23e−4
(1.08e−4) (1.09e−4) (1.09e−4) (1.15e−4)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 5.63e+0∗∗∗ 5.52e+0∗∗∗ 5.52e+0∗∗∗ 4.84e+0∗∗∗
(4.18e−1) (4.20e−1) (4.20e−1) (4.71e−1)
Activity term −2.48e−4∗∗∗ −2.45e−4∗∗∗ −2.45e−4∗∗∗ −2.18e−4∗∗∗
(5.23e−5) (5.25e−5) (5.25e−5) (5.61e−5)
Due diligence 2.60e+0∗∗∗ 2.47e+0∗∗∗ 2.48e+0∗∗∗ −2.19e+0∗∗∗
(5.11e−1) (5.14e−1) (5.14e−1) (6.20e−1)
Rating_moderate −7.03e−2 −9.28e−2 −9.34e−2 −9.43e−2
(7.04e−2) (7.09e−2) (7.09e−2) (8.19e−2)
Rating_low −1.41e−1 −1.63e−1∗ −1.63e−1∗ −1.96e−1∗
(9.70e−2) (9.79e−2) (9.79e−2) (1.06e−1)
Rating_not rated 2.16e+0∗∗∗ 1.98e+0∗∗∗ 1.99e+0∗∗∗ −2.79e+0∗∗∗
(3.18e−1) (3.22e−1) (3.23e−1) (4.49e−1)
Rating_not available 9.87e−1∗∗∗ 9.37e−1∗∗∗ 9.36e−1∗∗∗ 7.34e−1∗∗∗
(7.85e−2) (7.98e−2) (7.97e−2) (9.64e−2)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement −2.95e−1∗∗∗ −2.91e−1∗∗∗ −2.91e−1∗∗∗ −4.14e−1∗∗∗
(8.58e−2) (8.61e−2) (8.61e−2) (9.35e−2)
Group loan 3.17e−1∗∗∗
(8.88e−2)
NB −4.36e−2∗∗∗ −6.10e−2∗∗∗ −6.20e−2∗∗∗
(1.10e−2) (1.23e−2) (1.22e−2)
log(loan size) 1.06e−1∗∗∗ 1.09e−1∗∗∗ 1.08e−1∗∗∗ 1.14e−1∗∗∗
(3.91e−2) (3.94e−2) (3.94e−2) (4.28e−2)
Loan term 1.14e−3∗∗∗ 1.16e−3∗∗∗ 1.16e−3∗∗∗ 1.10e−3∗∗∗
(1.59e−4) (1.59e−4) (1.59e−4) (1.65e−4)
Grace period 1.79e−3∗∗∗ 1.79e−3∗∗∗ 1.79e−3∗∗∗ 1.97e−3∗∗∗
(6.49e−4) (6.51e−4) (6.51e−4) (6.48e−4)
Repayment_fortnightly −1.39e−1 −1.42e−1 −1.45e−1 −6.40e−2
(1.03e−1) (1.04e−1) (1.04e−1) (1.42e−1)
Repayment_monthly 1.02e−1 1.13e−1∗ 1.14e−1∗ 3.35e−1∗∗∗
(6.24e−2) (6.39e−2) (6.40e−2) (8.81e−2)
Repayment_3-4month −1.60e−2 −3.91e−2 −2.93e−2 1.44e−1
(2.21e−1) (2.25e−1) (2.25e−1) (2.71e−1)
Repayment_twice a year −3.10e−1 −3.44e−1 −3.23e−1 −2.91e−1
(1.98e−1) (2.10e−1) (2.06e−1) (3.56e−1)
Repayment_annual −1.45e+0∗∗∗ −1.48e+0∗∗∗ −1.48e+0∗∗∗
(2.78e−1) (2.81e−1) (2.81e−1)
Female individual −9.56e−2∗ −1.05e−1∗∗ −1.03e−1∗ −8.79e−2∗
(5.33e−2) (5.32e−2) (5.32e−2) (5.31e−2)
Group of women 1.98e−1∗∗ 2.05e−1∗∗
(9.80e−2) (9.75e−2)
Group of men 2.51e−1 2.54e−1
(2.44e−1) (2.44e−1)
Mixed group 6.87e−1∗∗∗ 5.82e−1∗∗∗
(1.13e−1) (2.01e−1)
PCfemale x Mixed group 1.78e−1
(2.56e−1)
Sectors yes yes yes yes
Macroeconomic and geographical variables
log(GDPpc) −1.81e−1∗∗∗ −1.46e−1∗∗∗ −1.47e−1∗∗∗ −8.93e−2∗
(3.95e−2) (4.05e−2) (4.04e−2) (4.64e−2)
CROPI −4.58e−3∗∗∗ −4.50e−3∗∗∗ −4.50e−3∗∗∗ −2.22e−3∗∗
(1.17e−3) (1.16e−3) (1.16e−3) (1.13e−3)
Regions yes yes yes yes
_cons −4.10e+0∗∗∗ −4.23e+0∗∗∗ −4.23e+0∗∗∗ −3.47e−1
(6.70e−1) (6.76e−1) (6.75e−1) (8.18e−1)
Number of observations 29,304 29,304 29,304 24,488
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.267 0.267 0.209
Akaike information criterion 4.68e+3 4.66e+3 4.66e+3 3.64e+3
Bayesian information criterion 5.04e+3 5.03e+3 5.04e+3 3.97e+3
Table 2.8: Coefficients of the probit models – entire data set and individual loans
Notes: Model specification I, II and III are probit regressions for the probability of default
based on the entire data set which includes individual loans and group loans. Model
specification IV is a probit regression for the probability of default of exclusively individual
loans. The dependent variable is a dummy variable. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Reference categories: For Rating category high risk, for Repayment category
weekly repayment, for Gender category male individual, for Sector category agriculture and
for Region category EAP. The variables are defined in Table 2.1.
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Entire data set
(I) (II) (III)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 1.91e+2∗∗∗ 1.73e+2∗∗∗ 1.63e+2∗∗∗
(3.98e+1) (4.01e+1) (4.02e+1)
Activity term 3.13e−2∗∗∗ 3.24e−2∗∗∗ 3.23e−2∗∗∗
(2.58e−3) (2.58e−3) (2.58e−3)
Due diligence 3.54e+2∗∗∗ 3.31e+2∗∗∗ 3.19e+2∗∗∗
(2.99e+1) (2.97e+1) (2.94e+1)
Rating_moderate 2.44e+1∗∗∗ 2.26e+1∗∗∗ 2.25e+1∗∗∗
(3.41e+0) (3.42e+0) (3.41e+0)
Rating_low 1.64e+1∗∗∗ 1.61e+1∗∗∗ 1.57e+1∗∗∗
(4.12e+0) (4.11e+0) (4.11e+0)
Rating_not rated 2.85e+2∗∗∗ 2.61e+2∗∗∗ 2.49e+2∗∗∗
(2.68e+1) (2.66e+1) (2.63e+1)
Rating_not available −2.39e+0 −7.13e+0∗ −6.47e+0
(4.02e+0) (4.05e+0) (4.05e+0)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement 5.21e+1∗∗∗ 5.28e+1∗∗∗ 5.29e+1∗∗∗
(7.37e+0) (7.40e+0) (7.40e+0)
Group loan −1.32e+2∗∗∗
(5.19e+0)
NB −3.00e+0∗∗∗ −3.78e+0∗∗∗ −3.44e+0∗∗∗
(4.90e−1) (5.01e−1) (5.02e−1)
log(loan size) 6.35e+1∗∗∗ 6.26e+1∗∗∗ 6.26e+1∗∗∗
(1.76e+0) (1.76e+0) (1.76e+0)
Loan term 1.63e−1∗∗∗ 1.68e−1∗∗∗ 1.68e−1∗∗∗
(1.03e−2) (1.03e−2) (1.03e−2)
Grace period 3.13e−1∗∗∗ 3.08e−1∗∗∗ 3.08e−1∗∗∗
(1.01e−1) (1.00e−1) (1.00e−1)
Repayment_fortnightly −1.18e+1∗∗∗ −1.33e+1∗∗∗ −1.19e+1∗∗∗
(4.06e+0) (4.06e+0) (4.06e+0)
Repayment_monthly −1.43e+1∗∗∗ −1.50e+1∗∗∗ −1.50e+1∗∗∗
(2.74e+0) (2.73e+0) (2.73e+0)
Repayment_3-4month −2.03e+1∗∗ −2.25e+1∗∗∗ −2.38e+1∗∗∗
(7.90e+0) (7.80e+0) (7.74e+0)
Repayment_twice a year 1.30e+1∗∗∗ 1.37e+1∗∗∗ 1.26e+1∗∗∗
(4.45e+0) (4.42e+0) (4.42e+0)
Repayment_annual 3.61e+1∗∗∗ 3.67e+1∗∗∗ 3.69e+1∗∗∗
(8.51e+0) (8.52e+0) (8.53e+0)
Female individual −1.32e+2∗∗∗ −1.32e+2∗∗∗ −1.33e+2∗∗∗
(3.24e+0) (3.24e+0) (3.24e+0)
Group of women −1.42e+2∗∗∗ −1.45e+2∗∗∗
(5.23e+0) (5.24e+0)
Group of men −6.60e+1∗∗∗ −6.61e+1∗∗∗
(2.24e+1) (2.25e+1)
Mixed group −9.88e+1∗∗∗ −3.05e+1∗
(7.02e+0) (1.59e+1)
PCfemale x Mixed group −1.04e+2∗∗∗
(2.18e+1)
Sectors yes yes yes
Macroeconomic and geographical variables
log(GDPpc) −9.06e+0∗∗∗ −7.42e+0∗∗∗ −7.05e+0∗∗∗
(2.37e+0) (2.39e+0) (2.39e+0)
Regions yes yes yes
_cons −6.50e+2∗∗∗ −6.35e+2∗∗∗ −6.25e+2∗∗∗
(3.73e+1) (3.70e+1) (3.67e+1)
Number of observations 29,751 29,751 29,751
R2 0.276 0.278 0.278
Akaike information criterion 3.92e+5 3.92e+5 3.92e+5
Bayesian information criterion 3.92e+5 3.92e+5 3.92e+5
Table 2.9: Coefficients of the linear regression – entire data set
Notes: Model specification I, II and III are linear regressions of the funding time based on
the entire data set which includes individual loans and group loans. The dependent variable
is a metric variable. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10%
level, the 5% level and the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Reference
categories: For Rating category high risk, for Repayment category weekly repayment, for
Gender category male individual, for Sector category agriculture and for Region category
EAP. The variables are defined in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.10 now provides the results of the group loan subsample. Some adjust-
ments regarding the MFI rating, sectors of activity and geographical regions
are necessary. The rating categories of low risk and moderate risk are united in
order to prevent a loss of observations. Loans used for housing are added to
the category of loans used for construction. Entrepreneurial activity such as
retail, wholesale and entertainment are united and reported as entrepreneurial
activity by retail. However, 44 loans requested for education or personal use
are not included because the dummy variables predict failure perfectly and we
do not consider the combination with remaining categories advisable as we aim
to maintain the difference between commercial and non-commercial purposes.
The regions of the Middle East and North Africa and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia are added to the reference category of East Asia and the Pacific in
order to keep the observations for the analysis. After these adjustments, 4,348
observations are used. Model specification I is equal to the main model. Model
specification II includes the loan size per group member instead of the overall
loan size.
Funding time now becomes negative and slightly significant in model speci-
fication I. Considering the fact that group loans are usually granted to very
low-income and vulnerable borrowers, the result could be linked to the philan-
thropic decision making of Kiva lenders in terms of funding loans according to
neediness.
Again, the positive relationship between the MFI’s default rate in the previous
year and the probability of default supports our suggestions in H1. The
coefficients of the activity term continue to be negative and significant. The
dummy variable for the type of due diligence is not included because basic
due diligence predicts failure perfectly and observations would become lost.
Regarding the risk rating, there are no considerable changes. The sign of
the dummy variable for disbursement remains negative. However, the result
becomes insignificant.
As in the main model, it appears to be easier for bigger groups to ensure
repayment in the case of default of a single group member as the need for
repayment compensation is spread over several group members.
When considering loan characteristics as possible determinants of credit default,
the coefficient of the loan size continues to be positive whereas the coefficient
of the loan size per group member is negative. However, the results are not
significant and we find no evidence to support H3a for group loans. The loan
term remains positively related to the probability of default and is consistent
with hypothesis H3b stating the decrease of borrower’s self-discipline over time.
In contrast to the complete sample, neither the grace period nor the dummy
variables for the frequency of repayment obligations provide information for the
analysis of repayment. Hence, there is no evidence to support H4a and H4b for
group loans.
The gender effect is not detected within group loans. Groups of women do
not prove themselves to have a better repayment performance than groups of
men. The result does not favor H5. Mixed groups and the percentage of female
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members in a mixed group display a positive sign, while the coefficients are not
significant. The equality of effects of female groups and mixed groups can be
rejected in either of the model specifications.
As in the previous findings, the macroeconomic variables influence the proba-
bility of default in the same way as the signs remain stable.
Compared with the findings referring to the entire data set and to individual
loans, in the subsample of group loans some coefficients become insignificant.
The change in confidence level may be explained by the reduced data set
containing 4,348 observations. However, variables at the level of partner MFIs
remain stable. The coefficients of important loan characteristics such as loan
size and grace period remain positive as they do in the main model whereas the
signs of the dummy variables for repayment obligations change to some extent.
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Group loans
(I) (II)
Investor’s decision
Funding time −5.10e−4∗ −4.63e−4
(3.06e−4) (3.03e−4)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 9.37e+0∗∗∗ 9.51e+0∗∗∗
(1.77e+0) (1.77e+0)
Activity term −3.70e−4∗∗ −3.74e−4∗∗
(1.53e−4) (1.54e−4)
Rating_moderate/low −3.70e−2 −1.96e−2
(1.64e−1) (1.64e−1)
Rating_not rated 6.70e−1∗∗∗ 6.71e−1∗∗∗
(2.34e−1) (2.34e−1)
Rating_not available 1.07e+0∗∗∗ 1.06e+0∗∗∗
(1.92e−1) (1.93e−1)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement −1.21e−1 −1.31e−1
(1.85e−1) (1.85e−1)
NB −4.63e−2∗∗∗ −3.99e−2∗∗∗
(1.43e−2) (9.84e−3)
log(loan size) 6.54e−2
(9.90e−2)
log(loan size/NB) −1.33e−2
(1.11e−1)
Loan term 2.47e−3∗∗∗ 2.50e−3∗∗∗
(6.64e−4) (6.74e−4)
Grace period 2.30e−3 2.21e−3
(2.16e−3) (2.15e−3)
Repayment_fortnightly −9.56e−2 −8.08e−2
(1.94e−1) (1.94e−1)
Repayment_monthly −2.32e−1 −2.13e−1
(1.47e−01) (1.48e−01)
Repayment_3-4month −8.41e−2 −7.06e−2
(4.54e−1) (4.53e−1)
Repayment_twice a year −4.68e−1 −4.47e−1
(3.63e−1) (3.62e−1)
Repayment_annual −2.28e−1 −2.70e−1
(2.70e−1) (2.76e−1)
Group of women 5.10e−2 4.17e−2
(2.74e−1) (2.76e−1)
Mixed group 3.24e−1 3.14e−1
(3.12e−1) (3.13e−1)
PCfemale x Mixed group 2.14e−1 2.21e−1
(3.07e−1) (3.08e−1)
Sectors yes yes
Macroeconomic and geographical variables
log(GDPpc) −2.15e−1∗∗ −1.97e−1∗∗
(9.49e−2) (9.10e−2)
CROPI −6.77e−3∗∗ −7.04e−3∗∗
(3.00e−3) (3.03e−3)
Regions yes yes
_cons −1.66e+0∗ −1.27e+0
(8.47e−1) (8.77e−1)
Number of observations 4,348 4,348
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.410
Akaike information criterion 1.02e+3 1.02e+3
Bayesian information criterion 1.23e+3 1.23e+3
Table 2.10: Coefficients of the probit models – group loans
Notes: Model specification I and II are probit regressions for the probability of default of
exclusively group loans. The dependent variable is a dummy variable. Values labeled with
the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Reference categories: For Rating category high
risk, for Repayment category weekly repayment, for Gender category group of men, for Sector
category agriculture and for Region category EAP, MENA, EECA. There are no group loans
to NA. The variables are defined in Table 2.1.
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2.5 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of the results, we estimate further probit models
employing clustered standard errors. In the entire data set, we distinguish
between 151 MFIs which select and monitor borrowers and ensure loan repay-
ment. Columns 1–3 in Table 2.11 report the results. Even if in our setting
this can be considered to be a very conservative approach, most of the effects
remain unchanged. However, the disbursement variable loses its significance
and there are differences regarding loan-specific variables. Also, the coefficients
of loan size and grace period do not remain significant in all model specifications.
Similarly, the dummy variables representing female individual borrowers and
groups of women now have insignificant coefficients.
Moreover, outlier robustness checks are carried out as outliers may influence the
results. Extreme observations below the 2.5th and above the 97.5th percentile
are dropped. Some adjustments are necessary to prevent the loss of observations.
Loans used for wholesale are added to the category of loans used for retail.
Loans distributed to Eastern Europe and Central Asia are added to the reference
category consisting of loans to East Asia and the Pacific. The results are shown
in columns 4–6 in Table 2.11. While the majority of variables reveals itself
to be consistent with our main results, the coefficient of loan size becomes
insignificant and negative in all model specifications. By contrast, the dummy
variables representing fortnightly repayment and repayment twice a year turn
out to be negative and significant, supporting a rejection of H4a. The overall
picture, however, is robust.
Additionally, we conduct probit regressions with clustered standard errors and
probit regressions without outliers on the two subsamples of individual loans
and group loans. All results are reported in Table 2.12 and Table 2.13.
When considering the individual loan subsample, we can distinguish between
137 MFIs. A considerable difference arises regarding the type of due diligence
processed by Kiva. The sign of the dummy variable turns out to be negative
and significant. Regarding loan-specific variables, some coefficients change
and become insignificant such as the dummy variable for disbursement, the
loan size, the grace period and the dummy variable for female borrowers. The
macroeconomic variables do not remain significant.
We carry out the robustness checks for outliers after some adjustments in both
subsamples regarding sectors of activity and regions have been made. Loans used
for retail and for wholesale are united and reported as retail. Loans to Eastern
Europe and Central Asia and to North America are added to the reference
category of loans to East Asia and the Pacific. The dummy variable representing
the type of due diligence is dropped due to collinearity. A considerable difference
is that the relation between the grace period and the probability of default
appears to be negative and significant. This result is not consistent with our
finding of the main model. The coefficient of the loan size is not significant
anymore. The remaining results appear to be similar to the previous findings
in Section 2.4.
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Considering the group loan subsample, we conduct the probit regression with
standard errors clustered in 70 MFIs. The results shown in columns 3–4
remain stable and support our hypotheses. Similarly, the results of the outliers
robustness check are mainly stable. The dummy variable for monthly repayment
obligations becomes significant. In total, the results remain stable with similar
confidence levels and values indicating the robustness of our results.
As an additional robustness check, we have employed logistic regressions on the
entire data set and the subsamples. The findings are very similar and thus not
reported here due to space restrictions.
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Clustered SE Without outliers
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Investor’s decision
Funding time −1.53e−4 −1.78e−4 −1.74e−4 8.80e−5 5.44e−5 5.46e−5
(1.68e−4) (1.68e−4) (1.67e−4) (1.40e−4) (1.41e−4) (1.41e−4)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 5.63e+0∗∗∗ 5.52e+0∗∗∗ 5.52e+0∗∗∗ 5.93e+0∗∗∗ 5.82e+0∗∗∗ 5.82e+0∗∗∗
(1.03e+0) (1.01e+0) (1.01e+0) (4.55e−1) (4.57e−1) (4.57e−1)
Activity term −2.48e−4∗∗ −2.45e−4∗∗ −2.45e−4∗∗ −3.30e−4∗∗∗ −3.17e−4∗∗∗ −3.17e−4∗∗∗
(1.17e−4) (1.15e−4) (1.15e−4) (5.65e−5) (5.68e−5) (5.69e−5)
Due diligence 2.60e+0∗∗∗ 2.47e+0∗∗∗ 2.48e+0∗∗∗
(4.63e−1) (4.69e−1) (4.69e−1)
Rating_moderate −7.03e−2 −9.28e−2 −9.34e−2 −3.89e−3 −2.58e−2 −2.58e−2
(1.50e−1) (1.42e−1) (1.42e−1) (7.54e−2) (7.60e−2) (7.60e−2)
Rating_low −1.41e−1 −1.63e−1 −1.63e−1 −7.41e−2 −9.20e−2 −9.20e−2
(1.97e−1) (1.91e−1) (1.91e−1) (1.03e−1) (1.04e−1) (1.04e−1)
Rating_not rated 2.16e+0∗∗∗ 1.98e+0∗∗∗ 1.99e+0∗∗∗ 1.09e+0∗∗∗ 9.61e−1∗∗∗ 9.61e−1∗∗∗
(3.93e−1) (3.96e−1) (3.96e−1) (1.48e−1) (1.51e−1) (1.51e−1)
Rating_not available 9.87e−1∗∗∗ 9.37e−1∗∗∗ 9.36e−1∗∗∗ 8.86e−1∗∗∗ 8.21e−1∗∗∗ 8.21e−1∗∗∗
(2.85e−1) (2.81e−1) (2.81e−1) (8.33e−2) (8.58e−2) (8.58e−2)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement −2.95e−1 −2.91e−1 −2.91e−1 −4.60e−1∗∗∗ −4.61e−1∗∗∗ −4.61e−1∗∗∗
(2.53e−1) (2.55e−1) (2.55e−1) (9.26e−2) (9.28e−2) (9.27e−2)
Group loan 3.17e−1∗ 3.33e−1∗∗∗
(1.79e−1) (9.31e−2)
NB −4.36e−2∗∗∗ −6.10e−2∗∗∗ −6.20e−2∗∗∗ −3.62e−2∗∗∗ −5.19e−2∗∗∗ −5.19e−2∗∗∗
(1.43e−2) (1.52e−2) (1.50e−2) (1.21e−2) (1.34e−2) (1.34e−2)
log(loan size) 1.06e−1 1.09e−1∗ 1.08e−1 −2.41e−2 −2.27e−2 −2.27e−2
(6.67e−2) (6.61e−2) (6.61e−2) (4.32e−2) (4.34e−2) (4.34e−2)
Loan term 1.14e−3∗∗∗ 1.16e−3∗∗∗ 1.16e−3∗∗∗ 8.25e−4∗∗∗ 8.61e−4∗∗∗ 8.61e−4∗∗∗
(3.43e−4) (3.42e−4) (3.41e−4) (1.76e−4) (1.75e−4) (1.75e−4)
Grace period 1.79e−3 1.79e−3 1.79e−3 −1.38e−2∗∗∗ −1.42e−2∗∗∗ −1.42e−2∗∗∗
(1.35e−3) (1.38e−3) (1.39e−3) (4.61e−3) (4.66e−3) (4.66e−3)
Repayment_fortnightly −1.39e−1 −1.42e−1 −1.45e−1 −3.86e−1∗∗∗ −3.80e−1∗∗∗ −3.80e−1∗∗∗
(1.87e−1) (1.81e−1) (1.80e−1) (1.30e−1) (1.30e−1) (1.30e−1)
Repayment_monthly 1.02e−1 1.13e−1 1.14e−1 −5.23e−2 −4.92e−2 −4.91e−2
(1.36e−1) (1.31e−1) (1.31e−1) (6.79e−2) (6.98e−2) (6.98e−2)
Repayment_3-4month −1.60e−2 −3.91e−2 −2.93e−2 −7.32e−2 −9.83e−2 −9.77e−2
(2.90e−1) (2.95e−1) (2.95e−1) (2.34e−1) (2.40e−1) (2.41e−1)
Repayment_twice a year −3.10e−1 −3.44e−1 −3.23e−1 −4.33e−1∗∗ −4.69e−1∗∗ −4.68e−1∗∗
(2.43e−1) (2.27e−1) (2.28e−1) (2.10e−1) (2.20e−1) (2.19e−1)
Repayment_annual −1.45e+0∗∗∗ −1.48e+0∗∗∗ −1.48e+0∗∗∗ −6.85e−1∗∗∗ −7.21e−1∗∗∗ −7.21e−1∗∗∗
(3.29e−1) (3.32e−1) (3.32e−1) (1.24e−1) (1.28e−1) (1.29e−1)
Female individual −9.56e−2 −1.05e−1 −1.03e−1 −1.08e−1∗ −1.19e−1∗∗ −1.19e−1∗∗
(6.93e−2) (6.82e−2) (6.77e−2) (5.78e−2) (5.77e−2) (5.77e−2)
Group of women 1.98e−1 2.05e−1 2.16e−1∗∗ 2.16e−1∗∗
(1.77e−1) (1.77e−1) (1.03e−1) (1.03e−1)
Group of men 2.51e−1 2.54e−1 3.67e−1 3.67e−1
(2.49e−1) (2.50e−1) (2.48e−1) (2.48e−1)
Mixed group 6.87e−1∗∗∗ 5.82e−1∗∗ 6.68e−1∗∗∗ 6.62e−1∗∗∗
(1.87e−1) (2.49e−1) (1.15e−1) (2.22e−1)
PCfemale x Mixed group 1.78e−1 1.02e−2
(2.32e−1) (3.00e−1)
Sectors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Macroeconomic and
geographical variables
log(GDPpc) −1.81e−1∗ −1.46e−1 −1.47e−1 −1.59e−1∗∗∗ −1.25e−1∗∗∗ −1.25e−1∗∗∗
(1.04e−1) (1.01e−1) (1.01e−1) (4.08e−2) (4.19e−2) (4.19e−2)
CROPI −4.58e−3∗ −4.50e−3∗ −4.50e−3∗ −3.43e−3∗∗∗ −3.38e−3∗∗ 3.38e−3∗∗
(2.63e−3) (2.60e−3) (2.60e−3) (1.31e−3) (1.32e−3) (1.32e−3)
Regions yes yes yes yes yes yes
_cons −4.10e+0∗∗∗ −4.23e+0∗∗∗ −4.23e+0∗∗∗ −7.55e−1∗ −1.02e+0∗∗ −1.02e+0∗∗
(1.21e+0) (1.19e+0) (1.19e+0) (4.29e−1) (4.38e−1) (4.38e−1)
Number of observations 29,304 29,304 29,304 24,226 24,226 24,226
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.267 0.267 0.254 0.258 0.258
Akaike information cri. 0.68e+3 4.66e+3 4.66e+3 4.01e+3 3.99e+3 3.99e+3
Bayesian information cri. 5.04e+3 5.03e+3 5.04e+3 4.33e+3 4.33e+3 4.34e+3
Table 2.11: Coefficients of the probit models with clustered SE and without outliers – entire
data set.
Notes: Model specification I, II and III are probit regressions with clustered standard errors
for the probability of default based on the entire data set. The clusters are determined by
151 different MFIs. Model specification IV, V and VI are probit regressions without outliers
for the probability of default. Robust standard errors are employed. Extreme observations
below the 2.5th and above the 97.5th percentile are excluded as outliers. Values labeled with
the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level.
Reference categories are analogous to Table 2.8. The variables are defined in Table 2.1.
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Individual loans
Clustered SE Without outliers
(I) (II)
Investor’s decision
Funding time −1.23e−4 6.44e−5
(1.57e−4) (1.51e−4)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 4.84e+0∗∗∗ 5.11e+0∗∗∗
(1.02e+0) (5.08e−1)
Activity term −2.18e−4∗ −2.68e−4∗∗∗
(1.14e−4) (6.24e−5)
Due diligence −2.19e+0∗∗∗
(4.56e−1)
Rating_moderate −9.43e−2 −5.01e−2
(1.48e−1) (8.76e−2)
Rating_low −1.96e−1 −1.71e−1
(1.97e−1) (1.17e−1)
Rating_not rated −2.79e+0∗∗∗ 6.70e−1
(4.86e−1) (5.13e−1)
Rating_not available 7.34e−1∗∗ 4.46e−1∗∗∗
(3.59e−1) (1.06e−1)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement −4.14e−1 −6.71e−1∗∗∗
(2.97e−1) (1.01e−1)
log(loan size) 1.14e−1 2.57e−2
(6.95e−2) (4.89e−2)
Loan term 1.10e−3∗∗∗ 5.78e−4∗∗∗
(3.63e−4) (1.87e−4)
Grace period 1.97e−3 −1.99e−2∗∗∗
(1.50e−3) (5.82e−3)
Repayment_fortnightly −6.40e−2 1.60e−1
(1.85e−1) (1.94e−1)
Repayment_monthly 3.35e−1∗∗∗ 4.78e−1∗∗∗
(1.24e−1) (1.34e−1)
Repayment_3-4month 1.44e−1 3.20e−1
(3.70e−1) (2.97e−1)
Repayment_twice a year −2.91e−1 −1.90e−1
(3.38e−1) (3.70e−1)
Female individual −8.79e−2 −1.17e−1∗∗
(6.14e−2) (5.78e−2)
Sectors yes yes
Macroeconomic and geographical variables
log(GDPpc) −8.93e−2 −6.91e−2
(1.09e−1) (4.72e−2)
CROPI −2.22e−3 −2.83e−3∗∗
(2.32e−3) (1.15e−3)
Regions yes yes
_cons −3.47e−1 −1.69e+0∗∗∗
(1.38e+0) (5.04e−1)
Number of observations 24,488 19,916
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.186
Akaike information criterion 3.64e+3 3.03e+3
Bayesian information criterion 3.97e+3 3.31e+3
Table 2.12: Coefficients of the probit models with clustered SE and without outliers –
subsamples
Notes: Considering individual loans, model specification I is a probit regression with clustered
standard errors. The clusters are determined by 137 different MFIs. Model specification II
is a probit regression without outliers. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are
significant at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level. Reference categories are analogous
to Table 2.8 and Table 2.10.
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Group loans
Clustered SE Without Outliers
(III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Investor’s decision
Funding time −5.10e−4 −4.63e−4 −2.24e−4 −1.86e−4
(5.07e−4) (5.06e−4) (3.80e−4) (3.81e−4)
MFI-specific variables
Default rate 9.37e+0∗∗ 9.51e+0∗∗ 8.60e+0∗∗∗ 8.70e+0∗∗∗
(4.16e+0) (4.17e+0) (1.84e+0) (1.84e+0)
Activity term −3.70e−4 −3.74e−4 −3.70e−4∗∗ −3.71e−4∗∗
(3.07e−4) (3.12e−4) (1.64e−4) (1.65e−4)
Rating_moderate/low −3.70e−2 −1.96e−2 −6.92e−2 −5.51e−2
(2.42e−1) (2.39e−1) (1.75e−1) (1.74e−1)
Rating_not rated 6.70e−1 6.71e−1 6.83e−1∗∗∗ 6.87e−1∗∗∗
(5.11e−1) (2.46e−1) (2.45e−1) (2.45e−1)
Rating_not available 1.07e+0∗∗∗ 1.06e+0∗∗∗ 1.02e+0∗∗∗ 1.01e+0∗∗∗
(3.94e−1) (3.94e−1) (2.10e−1) (2.11e−1)
Loan-specific variables
Disbursement −1.21e−1 −1.31e−1 −2.53e−2 −3.53e−2
(3.03e−1) (3.02e−1) (2.24e−1) (2.24e−1)
NB −4.63e−2∗∗∗ −3.99e−2∗∗∗ −5.68e−2∗∗∗ −4.95e−2∗∗∗
(1.73e−2) (1.12e−2) (1.69e−2) (1.11e−2)
log(loan size) 6.54e−2 7.28e−2
(1.41e−1) (1.18e−1)
log (loan size/NB) −1.33e−2 8.58e−3
(1.69e−1) (1.32e−1)
Loan term 2.47e−3∗∗∗ 2.50e−3∗∗∗ 3.40e−3∗∗∗ 3.40e−3∗∗∗
(7.42e−4) (7.76e−4) (8.08e−4) (8.16e−4)
Grace period 2.30e−3 2.21e−3 −4.30e−3 −5.07e−3
(2.44e−3) (2.43e−3) (1.25e−2) (1.26e−2)
Repayment_fortnightly −9.56e−2 −8.08e−2 −6.93e−2 −6.05e−2
(2.54e−1) (2.52e−1) (2.11e−1) (2.11e−1)
Repayment_monthly −2.32e−1 −2.13e−1 −3.16e−1∗∗ −3.08e−1∗
(2.32e−1) (2.26e−1) (1.61e−1) (1.61e−1)
Repayment_3-4month −8.41e−2 −7.06e−2 5.25e−2 5.21e−2
(4.02e−1) (4.01e−1) (5.00e−1) (5.03e−1)
Repayment_twice a year −4.68e−1 −4.47e−1 −4.46e−1 −4.38e−1
(4.38e−1) (4.43e−1) (3.56e−1) (3.57e−1)
Repayment_annual −2.28e−1 −2.70e−1 −3.13e−1 −3.51e−1
(5.06e−1) (5.14e−1) (2.74e−1) (2.79e−1)
Group of women 5.10e−2 4.17e−2 −4.39e−2
(2.56e−1) (2.51e−1) (2.83e−1)
Mixed group 3.24e−1 3.14e−1 3.87e−1 3.50e−1
(3.44e−1) (3.38e−1) (2.35e−1) (3.21e−1)
PCfemale x Mixed group 2.14e−1 2.21e−1 9.38e−2 9.17e−2
(1.96e−1) (1.98e−1) (3.23e−1) (3.25e−1)
Sectors yes yes yes yes
Macroeconomic variables
log(GDPpc) −2.15e−1 −1.97e−1 −1.25e−1 −1.09e−1
(1.69e−1) (1.67e−1) (9.41e−2) (9.16e−2)
CROPI −6.77e−3∗ −7.04e−3∗ −8.19e−3∗∗ −8.44e−3∗∗
(3.90e−3) (3.83e−3) (3.28e−3) (3.35e−3)
Regions yes yes yes yes
_cons −1.66e+0 −1.27e+0 −2.45e+0∗∗∗ −2.07e+0∗∗
(1.27e+0) (1.27e+0) (8.98e−1) (9.59e−1)
Number of observations 4,348 4,348 3,704 3,704
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.410 0.403 0.403
Akaike infor. criterion 1.02e+3 1.02e+3 9.04e+2 9.07e+2
Bayesian infor. criterion 1.23e+3 1.23e+3 1.11e+3 1.12e+3
Table 2.13: Coefficients of the probit models with clustered SE and without outliers –
subsamples continued
Notes: Model specification III and IV are probit regressions with clustered standard errors.
The clusters are determined by 70 different MFIs. Model specifications V and VI are probit
regressions without outliers. Extreme observations below the 2.5th and above the 97.5th
percentile are excluded as outliers. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant
at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level. Reference categories are analogous to Table
2.8 and Table 2.10.
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2.6 Conclusion
Credit risk on P2P microfinancing platforms has so far been under-researched.
In this analysis, we study the determinants of credit default by using data from
Kiva.
By conducting several probit regressions, we can conclude that some results
from classical microfinance research also apply to online P2P microfinancing.
Financial intermediation by MFIs appears to have a high impact on the prob-
ability of default as the screening and monitoring quality of MFIs is crucial
for a prevention of repayment problems by individual micro-entrepreneurs and
groups of borrowers. In contrast to the results from classical microfinance
research, we do not detect a negative relationship between group lending and
the probability of default. Furthermore, we find evidence to support the fact
that loan conditions, e.g. the loan size, the loan term and the grace period are
important variables that positively influence the probability of default. There is
weak evidence suggesting that women perform better regarding successful repay-
ment which supports the highly discussed gender effect. Contrary to the results
based on commercial P2P lending platforms, we do not find any evidence that
a quickly-funded loan request could be an indicator of good creditworthiness.
We note that the belief in the wisdom of the crowd appears to be overrated
regarding the prediction of credit default in the case of microlending. However,
the analysis of the funding time yields deeper insights into the objective function
of the lenders. It turns out that they indeed consider credit risk aspects, but
additionally social aspects of their investments. Thus, one can say that they
try to minimize the financial loss and try to maximize the social impact of
their investments even though the trade-off between the two dimensions may
be handled differently by each investor.
Even though our results are derived from loans posted before 2014, they are still
representative for more recent loans, but not for loans posted before the change
in repayment rules on Kiva in 2010 which may have changed the selection
process of the MFIs. However, the latter issue is only a small limitation within
our research as today’s investors still face the policy that was in place in our
observation period.
Considering the real-world implications of our research, we state the following.
As information on the performance of MFIs and on loan-specific conditions are
relevant and publicly available on Kiva, we advise social investors to screen
loan applications very carefully. From an investor’s perspective, providing a
loan to an MFI with a good repayment rate in the previous year is the most
important and secure measure in preventing a loss of the investment. Therefore,
MFIs have incentives to screen and monitor microfinance borrowers effectively
in order to ensure their good reputation on Kiva and their access to interest-free
refinancing.
As microfinancing platforms have been growing quickly in recent years, further
research is necessary. Data from other online microfinance platforms such as
Babyloan, Deki or Rang De could be utilized to gain further insights into the
robustness of our findings.
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Abstract: The rising funding demand in the microfinance industry prompts
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to seek additional, emergent debt capital
sources such as crowdfunding. As the crowd-based approach has experienced
widespread growth, we study the characteristics of MFIs having and using
access to refinancing microloans via crowdfunding based on a panel data set
obtained from the peer-to-peer microfinance platform Kiva. By performing
binary regressions, we find evidence that the MFI’s social performance regarding
granting loans to women and the interest rate charged from borrowers are main
predictors of refinancing through Kiva. We observe that mature MFIs exhibit
better access to funding from Kiva than those which are new to the market.
The results show that the likelihood of refinancing microloans through Kiva is
negatively related to the financial performance and to the extent of deposits of
an MFI. MFIs operating in less-developed countries appear to be more likely to
have access to Kiva’s refinancing model. Additionally, we examine those cases
in which the partnership between the MFI and Kiva has been terminated and
find strong evidence that MFIs with a high share of deposits are more likely to
discontinue the partnership with Kiva.
Keywords: Crowdfunding, microentrepreneurs, microcredit, financial interme-
diation
JEL Classification: G15 G21 O16
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3.1 Introduction
Due to their rising funding demand, microfinance institutions (MFIs) tend to
seek additional, emergent sources of debt capital such as crowdfunding. In the
recent years, the crowd-based approach has experienced a widespread growth.
This paper is the first to study the characteristics of those MFIs that have and
also use access to refinancing their microloans via crowdfunding. Thereby the
paper sheds light on the question under which conditions this refinancing source
can play a role in the capital structure of an MFI.
Crowdlending as a new, crowd-based approach to fund loans to individuals
and to small businesses, has emerged in the financial capital market since 2005
and is steadily growing regarding market size and importance. The concept
of crowdlending implies that several individual investors enable the funding
of a loan requested by another private person without the intermediation by
a financial institution (Lin et al., 2013). The interest of individual investors
to contribute with private capital to the debt market has been recognized by
several commercial online peer-to-peer lending platforms (e.g. Prosper.com,
Zopa, Auxmoney). Commercial online peer-to-peer lending platforms have been
of academic interest in recent years (e.g. Emekter et al., 2015; Freedman and
Jin, 2017; Hornuf and Cumming, 2017). However, this strand of literature is
not directly related to our analysis, as we focus on crowdlending concepts with
intermediaries and specifically analyze the relationship between the intermediary
and the microfinancing platform.
In the microfinance industry, which aims at financing microentrepreneurs in
developing countries, an increasing funding gap has become apparent in recent
years as the funding demand of microfinance institutions exceeds the amount
of donor capital, which remains the main source of debt capital (Mersland and
Urgeghe, 2013). A promising innovation that has the potential to diminish
these credit constraints is crowdlending (Bruton et al., 2015). Crowdlending
has started to matter as source of debt capital provided by individuals as it is
beyond charitable giving but much more a source of implicit subsidies in terms
of low or no interest obligation against the investors (see Cull et al., 2018).
Crowdlending offers the potential to be used as a source of debt capital by MFIs
during their transition from the dependency on donor capital towards the ability
to gain access to the mainstream capital market. The increasing relevance of
crowdlending in the field of microfinance is reflected in a number of online
microfinancing platforms (MYC4, Veecus, myELEN, Zidisha, unitedprosperty
etc.). The most popular microfinancing platform is Kiva. Several studies on
the decision making process and funding behavior as well as on the repayment
behavior and credit risk provide valuable insights into the behavior of Kiva
investors and microborrowers (Jenq et al., 2012; Meer and Rigbi, 2013). Besides
Kiva investors and the microentrepreneurs at both ends, the core of this
microfinancing model are the microfinance institutions (MFIs) which act as
financial intermediaries. Thus, one cannot talk of (direct) peer-to-peer lending
in this case but rather of an indirect form of lending from the crowd to the MFI.
Kiva’s microfinancing model is based on the financial intermediation by local
MFIs which select and grant loans to microborrowers and monitor the repayment
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of the loans to Kiva investors. Kiva provides MFIs the possibility to refinance
their loans without paying interest to the charitable investors. This paper is the
first to analyze the characteristics of those MFIs that receive refinancing through
international crowdfunding platforms. We thereby contribute to clarifying the
question of how the leading microfinancing platform Kiva actually chooses MFIs
to be funded as well as the question concerning what encourages MFIs to leave
the partnership and abandon such a funding possibility.
Previous studies have found that microfinancing via Kiva is beyond charitable
giving as the investors highly value the repayment of their capital. Therefore,
Kiva itself and the MFIs have an incentive to ensure repayment and the MFI’s
positive financial and social reputation in order to appeal to potential investors
and preserve the possibility of interest-free refinancing (Ly and Mason, 2012a).
On the one hand, it is the responsibility of Kiva to establish requirements,
to select and partner with MFIs and to connect the MFI’s needs with the
expectations of the social investors. On the other hand, the MFI itself has to be
willing to adopt Kiva’s requirements and to approach the investors’ expectations.
We derive a set of hypotheses from theoretical considerations, taking into
account both the supply and the demand side perspective. In our empirical
strategy, we connect information derived from MIX Market with information
available on Kiva’s Application Programming Interface (API) in order to identify
the determinants of having access to Kiva and making use of it. Note that the
access notion we employ in the remainder of this paper captures the fact that
Kiva is willing to provide access to refinancing and at the same time that the
MFI makes use of it. Our panel data set includes several social and financial
performance indicators. By performing binary regressions, we ascertain that the
MFI’s social performance in terms of granting loans to women and charging low
interest rates is a main predictor of having and using access to Kiva. Several
maturity variables appear to show a significant correlation with the probability
of access, which leads us to the conclusion that mature, more experienced MFIs
have access to funding from Kiva more frequently than new, less-experienced
MFIs. Furthermore, we find evidence that MFIs with a solid operational self-
sufficiency1 and a large extent of deposits are less likely to have access to Kiva.
MFIs operating in poorer countries appear to exceed their peers in high-GDP
countries in terms of having access to funding through Kiva. Additionally, we
examine those cases in which the partnership between Kiva and an MFI has
been terminated. Based on the same influential variables, we perform binary
regressions and Cox proportional hazard models. As the termination of the
partnership is initiated2 by the MFI, either directly or indirectly by intentionally
violating certain requirements, this approach enables us to shed some light on
demand side aspects. The share of female borrowers reveals itself to be not only
1Operationally self-sufficient MFIs are able to cover their operating costs by their revenues
resulting in an OSS ratio > 100% (e.g. Schäfer and Fukasawa, 2011; Bogan, 2012).
2Kiva’s explanations on terminated partnerships published on its webpage reveal that either
the MFI has lost its interest in refinancing through Kiva due to internal changes (e.g. a new
management, a change in the overall strategy, a shift towards other funding sources) or has
violated Kiva’s requirements by loan program failures or even fraud. In the latter case, Kiva
is forced to react in order to secure its mission and reputation towards investors.
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a positive driver of access to Kiva, but also a predictor of the termination of the
partnership. In contrast to the access results, neither the maturity, the portfolio
quality, nor the operational self-sufficiency have predictive power. However,
we find strong evidence that MFIs which are able to mobilize deposits as a
sustainable, independent source of debt capital have a lower tendency to retain
the partnership with Kiva, which requests an MFI to fulfill certain (ethical and
financial) requirements.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, the Kiva
microfinancing model is outlined. In Section 3, we develop a theory and derive
some hypotheses regarding the influence of institutional determinants. Section 4
describes the data and the regression models employed. Empirical findings
regarding refinancing through Kiva and termination of the partnership as well
as several robustness checks are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Kiva microfinancing model
Kiva, a donation-based NGO, is an online crowdlending platform that facilitates
microborrowing by connecting socially oriented investors with the poor aiming
to support their small businesses. Until mid of 2018, microloans of 1.2 billion
USD have been transferred into 85 countries through partnering with local MFIs
(Kiva.org, 2014). The core of Kiva’s microfinancing model is the partnership
with local MFIs. The main actors in Kiva’s microfinancing model are displayed
in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Kiva’s microfinancing model
MFIs act as financial intermediaries in terms of selecting microborrowers and
granting loans. The majority of loans requires microborrowers to pay an interest
rate3 defined by the individual MFI. Almost all loans are already disbursed to
borrowers (see Jenq et al., 2015; Dorfleitner and Oswald, 2016). Subsequently,
MFIs post loan requests on Kiva’s online webpage in order to reach potential
investors. As soon as a loan request is fully funded, which happens with nearly
all of the loan applications4, the loan amount is transferred to the MFI. The
MFIs do not pay any interest to Kiva investors, even though investors fully bear
3The particular interest rate per loan is not publicly shown, only the information whether or
not an interest obligation exists. The overall real portfolio yield, a proxy for the average
interest rate, of MFIs with access to Kiva is on average 26% (details are shown in Table 3.2).
4This kind of investors’ behavior, which is reported by references examining the funding time
on Kiva (e.g. Dorfleitner et al., 2017), is a clear difference to usual crowdlending.
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the credit default risk of the corresponding loan and, as the loans are granted
in USD, also the risk of depreciation5. Even though the MFIs play a central
role in Kiva’s microfinancing model, very little is known about these MFIs.
It is obvious that Kiva itself has a very strong social mission. Thus, it is not
surprising that Kiva requires a high level of social commitment from its partner
MFIs. Kiva’s social performance scorecard (existing of 7 different categories)
records in which areas the MFI is involved in order to serve the needs of the
low-income, vulnerable and excluded population. The institution’s strong social
commitment is shown to Kiva investors (Kiva.org, 2016a). In addition to the
requested social commitment, Kiva has established some minimum financial
requirements regarding e.g. assets6, its lending program7, and the volume of
loan portfolio8. MFIs have to fulfill these requirements in order to partner Kiva.
Furthermore, Kiva conducts an institutional due diligence process in order to
assess the MFI’s value and risks before partnering the MFI. Several documents,
such as financial statements, portfolio reports, and financial projections are
evaluated by Kiva staff. However, the financial requirements for receiving access
to the interest-free capital are not disclosed.
To summarize, besides Kiva’s claim for social commitment and some minimum
requirements, no detailed characteristics regarding the MFIs in terms of portfolio
quality, operating experience, financial performance or capital structure are
published. Thus, the question of how MFIs with access to refinancing through
Kiva can be characterized remains so far unanswered. In order to obtain
an impression of the MFIs’ view on this topic, we interviewed three MFIs
cooperating or having cooperated with Kiva in November 2018. These MFIs
reported that in their experience Kiva monitors the financial as well as the
social performance and that the fulfillment of the corresponding requirements
comes with certain costs for them. One MFI reported that it has stopped the
cooperation exactly because of these costs. The feedback also does not reveal
any contradictory information regarding other claims stated by Kiva.
3.3 Theory and hypotheses development
In this section, we first give a short summary of MFI funding, then develop a
theory regarding the access to refinancing via the crowd and finally employ this
theory to derive a set of hypotheses in a second step.
3.3.1 MFI funding in general
The typical MFI with regard to its funding sources is often pictured as small
unregulated NGO with donations as main funding source when it starts its
5Currency devaluations over 10% are covered by Kiva investors (Kiva.org, 2016a).
6The assets are required to be more than 100,000 USD.
7An existing lending program with an appropriate portfolio quality is required.
8The loan volume is required to be more than 50,000 USD in the first year after incorporation
with Kiva.
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operations. As the institution matures, it goes through a commercialization
process, in which subsidized funding is subsequently replaced by commercial
sources, e.g. retained earnings or commercial debt9. During the commercial-
ization, the MFI often is transformed into a regulated entity, which enables
the institution to consider deposits as additional source of funding (see e.g.
Ledgerwood and White, 2006). At the end of this process even the emission
of securities (e.g. bonds or a securitization of part of the loan portfolio) is
possible (see e.g. Bystrøm, 2008). Contrary to the expectation that larger,
more mature MFIs which have undergone a commercialization process should
be less dependent on subsidies, Cull et al. (2018) identify these MFIs to show
the highest level of subsidization per borrower. D’Espallier et al. (2013) show
that a majority of MFIs operate with subsidies. In addition to the persisting
use of traditional subsidized funding sources, the ongoing digitization of the
microfinance industry affects the refinancing of MFIs. Especially crowdfunding,
which serves as implicit subsidies, is a promising innovation employed by an
increasing number of institutions (Bruton et al., 2015).
3.3.2 Theoretical considerations on the MFI’s access to
and use of refinancing through Kiva
Generally speaking, the supply side, namely Kiva and its investors, requires
– or at least desires – some properties of an MFI to be eligible for funding
through Kiva. Consequently, meeting these requirements is a necessary, but
not a sufficient condition. Additionally, the MFI which fulfills Kiva’s criteria,
also needs to be willing to accept the refinancing offered by Kiva. Only if both
sides – namely Kiva and the MFI – esteem the partnership as being profitable,
it becomes reality. In this case, Kiva grants and the MFI uses the access to
refinancing microloans through the crowd of Kiva investors. We next detail on
the motivations and reasoning of both the supply and the demand side.
Supply side Kiva states relatively clearly that it aims to support MFIs with
a strong social mission. Consequently, to partner Kiva, MFIs are required to
submit an application revealing the MFI’s mission and the intention to use
the interest-free funding for loans with a high social or environmental impact
(Kiva.org, 2016a). However, this information remains rather unspecific, even if
the scorecard mentions concrete categories. As Kiva is a platform that needs
to generate revenues for the possibility to maintain its services and thus can
be assumed to strive for having many transactions, it has a clear incentive to
consider the preferences of its users, the investors. While we do not know much
about Kiva’s precise criteria, a lot is known about the needs and preferences of
the investors. It is undoubtedly clear that we do have socially oriented investors
on this platform (Ly and Mason, 2012a), which perceive a warm-glow effect by
9According to Cull et al. (2009), donors recommend that MFIs should include subsidized
funding sources in their capital structure only in the start-up phase, and generally support
the concept of commercialization.
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providing funding to microborrowers (Allison et al., 2013). Besides capturing
a financial return, these investors have a preference for taking responsibility
(Jessen, 2012). An easy and straight-forward way to model the result for an
investor is to set up an aggregate return
r + α · s (3.1)
where r represents the financial return and s the social return as a measurement
of portfolio responsibility, and α > 0 is a weighting factor. On Kiva, investors
receive no interest but have to bear the credit risk of a loan which they refinance.
Therefore, their expected financial return E(r) is less than zero. Thus, if the
investors are not completely irrational, they can be assumed to only refinance
loans with E(s). The higher the weighting factor α, the more positive the social
return is perceived by the investor under consideration. Thus α measures the
relevance of the social return component of the investor against the expected
financial return. From several studies investigating the investor behavior on
Kiva, one can draw conclusions concerning which features provide investors
with such a positive social return. These are e.g. lending to women or to groups.
However, from (3.1), one can also derive that loans with a lower default risk are
preferred, as for these, the negative expected return E(r) is at least close to
zero. This is also supported by the evidence of Dorfleitner and Oswald (2016),
who study the drivers of credit risk on Kiva. Naturally, Kiva has an incentive
to prefer refinancing those MFIs which fulfill all these aspects that are relevant
for the investors.
Demand side An MFI that seeks to attain refinancing is confronted with a
specific level of refinancing costs, the so-called financial expenses FE. It is clear
that (partial) refinancing through interest-free loans10 comes at minimal costs
and therefore decreases FE. However, the MFI considers not only financial
expenses, but the entire profit from microlending, i.e.
P = I − FE − LL−OE , (3.2)
with I being the interest (including fees), LL being the loans losses due to
defaults and OE being the operating expenses. An additional advantage for
an MFI being refinanced on Kiva is that it can transfer the default risk of the
respective loans to the investors, implying that some of the potential loan losses
are not to be borne by the MFI anymore. However, while FE and LL are
lowered through the Kiva refinancing, OE tends to increase as Kiva monitors
the MFIs and these have to make efforts to prove that they fulfill the reporting
obligations by e.g. providing financial statements and updates on the loan
portfolio, and supporting on-site visits of Kiva staff. Additionally, MFIs are
responsible to maintain their loan profiles and the channel for capital transfers
(Kiva.org, 2016a).
10Comparing the MFI’s credit amount raised through Kiva, averaged over the years from
establishing the partnership until July 2017, and the MFI’s average gross loan portfolio
reported to MIX Market in the respective years, illustrates that half of the MFIs refinance
10% and more of their gross loan portfolio through Kiva. The data are obtained from
Kiva’s API and MIX Market.
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Additionally, the anti-poverty focus can have a rather lowering influence on I.
Although Kiva allows MFIs to charge interest rates from their clients, Kiva
points out that these interest rates have to be justifiable in terms of sustainably
maintaining the operation (Kiva.org, 2016a). Kiva acknowledges the economic
necessity of interest rates, but is not willing to provide its interest-free funds
to highly profit-oriented MFIs. Altogether, an MFI will only use refinancing
through Kiva if the cost reduction on FE and LL is larger than the cost
increase on OE plus the reduction on I. MFIs with powerful access to other
cost-efficient debt capital sources with the same risk characteristics such as
deposits or subsidized debt from microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) can
be expected to make less use of Kiva loans.
3.3.3 Hypotheses
Social performance of the MFI The theoretical considerations regarding
the supply side in Section 3.3.2 directly lead to the hypothesis that the social
return s is relevant in the decision making process of Kiva investors. Indeed, as
already mentioned above, Kiva demands a strong social performance from its
partner institutions. Although Kiva does not state any measurable key figures
for the MFI’s social engagement, it assigns certain social performance badges
to its partner MFIs. For example, institutions that – among other things –
focus on granting small loans qualifying for the ‘Anti-Poverty Focus’ badge.
A second category comprises ‘Vulnerable Group Focus’, which is awarded to
MFIs engaged in providing services to the excluded and vulnerable population,
e.g. ethnic and religious minorities, unbanked farmers, and women (Kiva.org,
2016b). Measures that capture the focus on female clients as well as poorer
clients are often used to proxy the social performance in empirical investigations
(Schreiner, 2002; Cull et al., 2007).
Several studies (e.g. Allison et al., 2013; Burtch et al., 2014; Galak et al., 2011;
Jenq et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2012; Ly and Mason, 2012a; Meer and Rigbi, 2013)
consider the decision making process of Kiva lenders. Ly and Mason (2012a)
find evidence that loans granted to female borrowers receive much faster funding
than loans granted to men. Jenq et al. (2015) specifically study the borrower’s
characteristics and appearance as determinants of a loan’s funding success and
also find evidence in favor of gender preferences. Female borrowers and groups
of female borrowers appear to be favored and faster funded by Kiva investors.
Based on these empirical findings and our theoretical framework regarding the
supply side, we expect MFIs with a better social performance to be more likely
to obtain access to subsidized debt funding from Kiva, because social returns
are relevant for Kiva’s investors.
H1: Access to funding from Kiva is positively related to the social
performance of the MFI.
52
Chapter 3. The access of MFIs to financing via the worldwide crowd
Maturity of the MFI To apply for the partnership with Kiva, MFIs have
to meet several minimum requirements in terms of assets and operating volume.
Also, MFIs may have to exhibit a certain track record in order to be evaluated
by Kiva. Therefore, from a supply side point of view, one can expect mature
MFIs to be more likely to receive funding from Kiva investors.
Considering the demand side, we take into account the life-cycle theory in
order to assess an MFI’s request for funding from Kiva. Applying this theory
to microfinance, MFIs pass through three different phases of development –
the youth phase, growth phase and maturity – and develop different needs for
funding. While in the youth phase, the MFI’s need for risk-tolerant capital is
extensive (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Bogan, 2012), the growth
phase is often associated with the transformation into a regulated institution.
The transformation accompanied with regulation not only broadens the access
to commercial funding but is also a main step in order to be allowed to maintain
deposit programs (D’Espallier et al., 2017). However, the transformation process
is also costly for the MFI (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Helms, 2006;
Bogan, 2012). Therefore, even mature, well-experienced MFIs receive subsidized
loans from socially oriented investors (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004;
Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). However, the fact that the loans on Kiva are
denominated in hard currency is a slight indication that MFIs have to be well-
established and, to a certain extent, experienced in order to manage currency
risks. The ability to adopt mechanisms to handle and overcome the difficulty
in hedging currency risks is a challenge for the majority of MFIs (Reille and
Forster, 2008; de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004). This task may be easier
for more mature institutions. To summarize, we expect large and established
MFIs to strive for interest-free debt funds via Kiva as long as the MFIs are not
able to overcome their dependency on subsidized capital.
H2: Mature MFIs have a higher probability to have access to debt
funding from Kiva than MFIs that are new to the market.
Financial performance of the MFI Lately, the growth, the commercial-
ization of the microfinance industry, and the challenge of attracting commercial
investors have widely been discussed. Accordingly, the importance of financial
performance and sustainability of MFIs has increased (Mersland and Urgeghe,
2013; Schäfer and Fukasawa, 2011; Hoque et al., 2011; Fehr and Hishigsuren,
2006). Kiva could prefer to give access to MFIs with both a good social and
financial performance, as investors not only value social returns but also high
repayment rates, which are more likely for MFIs with better financial returns.
However, as Kiva emphasizes not to support higher-than-average interest rates –
as already mentioned in Section 3.3.2–, it could withhold its interest-free funds
from MFIs which are operational self-sufficient in the long run as these MFIs
are less dependent on the subsidized capital to continue their operation. We
expect this effect to prevail regarding the supply side perspective.
As the pressure on MFIs to become less subsidy-dependent has increased
53
Chapter 3. The access of MFIs to financing via the worldwide crowd
(Hoque et al., 2011), the MFIs have an incentive to strive for a good financial
performance. In particular, a good management of the profit as described in
(3.2) enables MFIs to run their business without external subsidies. To conclude,
an increasing operational self-sufficiency appears to reduce the MFI’s demand
for access to Kiva capital as well as Kiva’s willingness to provide access.
H3: Financial performance is negatively associated with access to
funding from Kiva.
Deposits as cost-efficient funding approach Kiva appreciates the pro-
vision of saving opportunities, which is indicated by the social performance
badge ‘Facilitation of Savings’. Thus, deposits are relevant from the supply side
perspective.
However, from the demand side perspective, deposit programs have revealed
themselves as an approach with the potential to substitute subsidized debt
capital. Cozarenco et al. (2016) investigate that MFIs taking voluntary savings
have received less subsidized or even donated equity and debt capital than their
peers focusing on credit programs. Furthermore, empirical studies considering
the relationship between funding sources and the MFI’s development in terms
of costs, profitability and sustainability reveal interesting aspects regarding
deposits as a source of funding (e.g. Caudill et al., 2009; Muriu, 2011; Bogan,
2012). Mostly, MFIs have to transform themselves into legal banks and comply
with prudential regulations in order to be allowed to mobilize deposits. Com-
plying with regulations can be costly for the MFI (Helms, 2006; Cull et al.,
2011). However, taking deposits has been proven to be a cost efficient, stable,
and sustainable source of funds in the long run (Caudill et al., 2009; Helms,
2006). Caudill et al. (2009) show that MFIs which rely more on deposits instead
of subsidies become more cost effective over time. One reason could be that
deposits are an indication of a maturing client base with good financial records.
Furthermore, deposit mobilization as an alternative source of domestic funding
helps MFIs to establish a reliable and relatively stable flow of funds and to
avoid foreign exchange risks (Helms, 2006; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). In
the long run, the mobilization of deposits enables MFIs to become more and
more independent from donors, subsidies, and external investors (Muriu, 2011;
Bogan, 2012). As already suggested in Section 3.3.2, deposits represent a cheap
source of funding for an MFI, and are therefore expected to lower the overall
FE of the institution. MFIs that are able to collect deposits may prefer to
make use of this type of funding instead of subsidized funding via Kiva, as
collecting deposits does not impose restrictions on OE and I (cf. formula (3.2)).
Therefore, we expect MFIs which are able to mobilize deposits as a sustainable
source of funds to have less incentive to fund their lending program via Kiva.
H4: The deposit volume of the MFI is negatively related to the
probability of access to refinancing through Kiva.
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Poverty level of the country in which the MFI operates According to
the theoretical considerations regarding the supply side in Section 3.3.2, the
investor may c.p. assume the social return s of an investment of a certain
amount of money (e.g. 100 USD) into a loan, to be higher if the country is less
developed. This consideration corresponds to the simple fact that in a poor
country one can achieve more progress with 100 USD than in a richer country.
Although this has nothing to do with the social performance of the MFI itself,
it is a well-documented phenomenon regarding the funding preferences of Kiva
investors (Jenq et al., 2015). Therefore, we also expect this effect to hold
regarding the willingness of Kiva to support MFIs in a poorer country. As a
result, we receive another supply side-related hypothesis. Additionally, Hudon
and Traca (2011) consider the aspect that donors tend to target low-GDP
countries in the context of providing subsidies to MFIs.
H5: The poverty level of the country in which the MFIs is located
is positively related to access to funding from Kiva.
3.4 Data and methodology
3.4.1 Data description
In our study, we combine MFI-specific financial and social performance indica-
tors reported to the online platform of the Microfinance Information Exchange
(MIX Market) with the information on the MFI’s activity on Kiva as a source
of subsidized debt funding. MFI-specific data, such as scale variables, social
performance indicators, and financial ratios, are derived from MIX Market. In
order to maintain good data quality, only data classified with a minimum of
a disclosure rating of 3 diamonds11 on MIX Market are used. We clean the
data with respect to unrealistic values regarding operational self-sufficiency
(values < 0) and deposits-to-assets ratio (values > 1), which slightly reduces
our original data set by 44 observations. Furthermore, following Dorfleitner
et al. (2016) 102 observations with an average loan size of more than 15,000
USD are excluded because in these cases the engagement in microfinance is not
obvious. The information about the MFI’s access to funds from Kiva lenders in
the period of 2005 to 2015 is retrieved from Kiva’s public API. To comprise
the macroeconomic environment in which the MFI mainly operates, we add
geographical regions and the GDP per capita derived from the World Bank
data base.
We merge the data sets for partnered MFIs with available MIX data which
builds a representative basis for our analysis12. The final unbalanced panel data
11MFIs classified with a 1 or 2 diamond disclosure rating do not report financial data which
is essential to our analysis.
12These MFIs are representative for the total of partnered MFIs with regard to Kiva’s risk
rating and the social performance badges assigned to partnered institutions as well as the
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set contains financial and social performance indicators of 909 MFIs with 5,621
observations in the period of 2005 to 201513. Therein, 125 MFIs14 had access
to Kiva and collaborate with Kiva on average for 6.9 years with a minimum of
0.4 years and a maximum of more than 9.6 years until end of the observation
period.
The MFI’s activity on Kiva per year is linked to the lagged variables indicating
the maturity, the social mission, and financial aspects of the respective MFI
reporting to MIX Market. The data set may have a certain sample selection
bias as only organizations which report to MIX Market are included. However,
these are the ones that are willing to expose themselves to a worldwide public,
which is also the case for those seeking a cooperation with Kiva. Therefore, the
bias may not be too alarming.
The dependent variable, access to Kiva, is a binary variable with a value of
one if the MFI has access to subsidized funding via Kiva in the respective year
and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables used in our analysis to test the
hypothesis are explained in detail in Table 3.1.
To measure the MFI’s social performance, we include several variables indicating
1) depth of outreach, and 2) interest rate charged.
1) Depth of outreach. The most commonly applied measures for the depth of
outreach, which is indicated by the poverty of the borrowers, are the average
loan size, the percentage of female borrowers, the lending methodology, and
the share of rural borrowers (Schreiner, 2002; Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and
Strøm, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011).15 A deeper outreach is measured by lower
values for the average loan size, as borrowers who obtain smaller loans tend
to be poorer. A higher fraction of borrowers who are female, received their
loans via group lending and/or live in rural areas is associated with a higher
depth of outreach, as these clients are expected to be poorer. We use the
average loan size as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per capita
to ensure the comparability between countries. In order to prevent the loss of
many observations due to missing values, we impute the variable illustrating the
percentage of female borrowers with its mean. We consider the MFI’s lending
methodology in terms of group lending versus individual lending, also indicating
a higher community empowerment, as group lending implies that the loan is
beneficial to several borrowers and most likely for even more people than the
regional distribution. Additionally, the importance of these MFIs is given as more than
90% of the raised loan volume through Kiva is requested by and transferred to these MFIs.
All other partnered institutions appear to be very minor players.
13Prolonging the observation period does not appear to be promising as the MIX data quality
has lessened in recent years. Nevertheless, the data set is still representative for more recent
observations.
14A set of 125 MFIs is included in our analysis, as 52 MFIs of the 203 MFIs with access to
Kiva and a MIX profile do not have a disclosure rating of at least 3 diamonds on MIX
Market. An additional 26 MFIs are lost due to missing values and unrealistic values.
15Note that other studies may use alternative measures to proxy the poverty of an MFI’s
clients. For example, Beisland et al. (2017) include the fraction of young clients as well
as the proportion of clients with disabilities in addition to the share of loans less than
3000 USD.
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borrowers themselves.
2) Interest rate. Following previous studies (e.g., Cull et al., 2007; Hudon and
Ashta, 2013), the real portfolio yield as a proxy for the interest rate charged
by the MFI is included. Even though high (nominal) portfolio yields are not
uncommon in the field of microfinance (Mersland and Strøm, 2009), (extremely)
high interest rates are considered critically (Yunus, 2007). The interest rate
serves as an indication of to which extent the MFI strives to transfer its costs
to clients.
The maturity of the MFI is measured by 1) assets, 2) operating age and 3)
debt-to-asset ratio.
1) Assets. As a proxy for the MFI’s size, we include the MFI’s sum of assets in
USD.
2) Operating age. As stated by de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz (2004) in the
context of life-cycle theory, MFIs pass through different stages of development.
First, following Bogan (2012), we classify MFIs into new (0–4 years), young
(5–8 years) and mature MFIs (>8 years) dependent on their age which is defined
by the number of years in operation as a financial service provider.
3) Debt-to-asset ratio. We include the debt-to-asset ratio as a further maturity
measure, indicating the stage of development according to the degree to which
the MFI is leveraged.
To measure the MFI’s financial performance, the operational self-sufficiency
(OSS) is commonly considered in microfinance (e.g. Hartarska and Nadolnyak,
2007; Schäfer and Fukasawa, 2011; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). The opera-
tional self-sufficiency illustrates whether or not the MFI is able to cover all its
costs (financial expenses, impairment loss, operating expense) by its financial
revenue (Schäfer and Fukasawa, 2011; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007).
In order to test the deposits as a cost efficient funding approach hypothesis, the
ratio of deposits-to-assets is considered as the relevant variable.
As a proxy for the development status of a country, the GDP per capita is
employed. The GDP per capita denotes the general economic performance and
wealth of the country in which the MFI mainly grants loans to microborrowers.
We control for MFI-specific characteristics, such as the refinancing costs. As
a proxy, we include the ratio of financial expense to assets. Considering the
legal status, our data set contains banks and rural banks, nonbank financial
institutions, nongovernmental organizations, credit unions, and others. A
dummy variable with the value of one indicates that the MFI is a bank or
rural bank, otherwise the value is zero. Furthermore, the portfolio at risk (30
days) accounts for the portfolio quality of the MFI. Besides external influences
and borrower behavior as roots of over-indebtedness, the MFI itself as lender
bears responsibility. The MFI needs to evaluate the repayment capacity of its
clients correctly to establish appropriate lending policies and to install lending
practices suitable to customer needs in order to avoid the negative impact of
the individual borrower’s over-indebtedness on its own portfolio quality and
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stability (Schicks, 2013).
To control for the year in which the MFI has access to subsidized funding
on Kiva, we include a year index variable, which ranges from 1 to 11 in an
ascending order and represents the access to Kiva in the years between 2005
and 2015. Additionally, we also include the square of the year index to control
for a potential non-linearity.
Furthermore, to display the macroeconomic environment, we include dummy
variables for the geographical regions such as Latin America and Caribbean,
the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific.
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Variable Expected effect Description
Social performance
AVLB_GNI − Average loan balance per borrower as a % of the gross national
income per capita.
Female + Share of female borrowers within the MFI’s total number of
clients.
Portfolio yield (real) − The real portfolio yield illustrates the revenue from loans rela-
tive to average gross loan portfolio adjusted for the inflation.
Group lending share + Share of clients engaged in group lending compared with the
MFI’s total number of clients.
Rural lending share + Share of rural borrowers compared to the MFI’s total number
of clients located in rural or urban areas.
Maturity
Assets + Total value of assets, calculated as the sum of each individual
asset accounts.
Age of MFI + Dummy variables for the MFI’s years of operation. New MFIs
(0-4 years), young MFIs (5-8 years) and mature MFIs (>8
years). Reference category: New MFIs.
Debt-to-asset + The debt-to-asset ratio is calculated as (total debt)/(total as-
sets) in the respective year.
Financial performance
OSS − Operational self-sufficiency ratio is calculated as (financial rev-
enue)/(financial expense + impairment loss + operating ex-
pense). An OSS value > 1 indicates the operational self-
sufficiency of the MFI.
Funding approach
Deposits-to-assets − / + Total deposits include voluntary, compulsory, retail and insti-
tutional deposits. The ratio is calculated as (deposits)/(total
assets).
Poverty level
GDP per capita − USD value of the gross domestic product of the country, in
which the MFI is located and mainly operates, divided by its
midyear population.
MFI specific controls
Financial expenses The ratio of financial expense to assets measures the refinanc-
ing costs of the MFI. The ratio is calculated as the (average
total financial expense)/(total assets).
PAR30 The portfolio at risk 30 days represents the sum of principals
of all outstanding loans that have at least one installment past
due more than 30 days. The total is divided by the gross loan
portfolio.
Legal type Dummy variables with the value of 1 for banks/rural banks and
zero for others. Others include nonbank financial institutions
(NBFI), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), Credit unions
(CU), and others. Reference category: Others
Year Index Index variable for each year of Kiva activity in an ascending
order (e.g. value of 1 for 2005 and 11 for 2015).
Macroeconomic controls
Region The geographical regions are Latin America and Caribbean
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) , Sub-Saharan
Africa (AFRICA), South Asia (SA), Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia (EECA), North America (NA), and East Asia and
the Pacific (EAP). Reference category: EECA.
Table 3.1: Definition of explanatory variables
Notes: All MFI-specific variables such as the MFI’s social performance, maturity, financial
performance, funding approach and controls are derived from MIX Market. Macroeconomic
indicators are derived from the World Bank data base.
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3.4.2 Methodology
To account for the panel structure of the data, we use pooled logit regression
models with cluster-robust standard errors. The specification is as follows:
logit{P (Yi,t = 1|(Si,t−1, Fi,t−1, Ci,t−1)} = β0+β1Si,t−1+β2Fi,t−1+β3Ci,t−1+ui,t
In our main research setting Yi,t is the binary dependent variable with the value
of 1 if the MFI has access to debt funding from Kiva in the respective year, zero
otherwise. Si,t−1 is a vector of social performance measures. Fi,t−1 is a vector
of variables measuring the financial key figures in terms of maturity, portfolio
quality, sustainability and the ability of deposit mobilization. Ci,t−1 represents
MFI-specific and geographical controls. The standard errors are clustered by
MFIs.
In our second research setting regarding the termination of a partnership
between Kiva and the MFI, we apply the pooled logit model accordingly.
The binary dependent variable we use is closing event with the value of 1 in
case the partnership was terminated in the respective period, zero otherwise.
Additionally to the mere fact that the partnership was terminated, the time
period between entering the partnership and terminating the partnership is
observable which is the second dependent variable. We apply a Cox proportional
hazard model to analyze the ’survival time’ of the partnership between Kiva
and the MFI. The specification is as follows:
h(t; (Si,t−1, Fi,t−1, Ci,t−1)) = h0(t) · exp(β0 + β1Si,t−1 + β2Fi,t−1 + β3Ci,t−1)
It should be noted that the empirical setup is not suited to completely rule out
endogeneity and that the identified relationship can therefore not be interpreted
to be a causal one. In order to account for a potential omitted variable bias,
we perform fixed effect and lagged-dependent variable models in the robustness
subsection.
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 report the descriptive statistics for metric and categorical
variables. The observations in our sample show that the percentage of female
borrowers in the MFIs’ portfolio is on average as high as 66%, whereby the
variable ranges from 0% to 100%. However, for MFIs with access to Kiva,
the minimum value stands at 10% of female borrowers. The mean of the real
portfolio yield amounts to 26%. The maximum yield value of MFIs with Kiva
access differs significantly from the maximum value of MFIs without Kiva access.
Most of the MFIs have an operating age of more than 8 years. In the subsample
of MFIs with access to Kiva, almost 75% of the observations stem from mature
MFIs, whereas less than 10% stem from new MFIs. Regarding the MFI’s size
in terms of assets, MFIs with access to Kiva are, on average, smaller than MFIs
without access. Overall, the MFIs are highly leveraged with a debt-to-asset ratio
of 0.68 on average and a median value of 0.75. The mean value differs slightly
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between the subsamples of MFIs with Kiva access and MFIs without Kiva
access. The OSS mean and median are higher than 100% in both subsamples,
which illustrates that for the majority of MFIs the operation-related costs are
covered by their revenues (Schäfer and Fukasawa, 2011). While the overall
portfolio quality with a PAR30 value of 6.0% is low, the mean and median of
PAR30 is even lower in the sample of MFIs with Kiva access compared with
the sample of MFIs without Kiva access. The deposits-to-assets ratio with a
median value of 0.0% reveals that deposit mobilization has, until now, not been
a main funding source of the MFIs in our sample. The average GDP per capita
is $3,500. The respective mean and median values are lower in the subsample
of MFIs with access to Kiva compared with the subsample of MFIs without
access to Kiva. More than 40% of the observations are from the region of Latin
America and the Caribbean, followed by 18% from Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, and 17% from South Asia.
In addition to the descriptive statistics, we run an independent t-test to compare
all metric variables between the subsamples of MFIs with access and those
without access to Kiva. It is obvious that the means of some metric variables
are significantly different. The results are shown in Table 3.4.
61
Chapter 3. The access of MFIs to financing via the worldwide crowd
Total
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
AVLB_GNI 5,592 0.55 1.04 0.00 0.27 31.89
Female 5,592 0.66 0.25 0.00 0.66 1.00
PAR30 5,592 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.03 1.00
Portfolio yield (real) 5,592 0.26 0.18 -0.22 0.22 1.79
Group lending share 4,723 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.32 1.00
Rural lending share 3,289 0.53 0.33 0.00 0.58 1.00
Assets 5,592 72.00 263.00 0.01 9.76 6130.00
Debt-to-asset 5,592 0.68 0.25 0.00 0.75 2.87
OSS 5,592 1.16 0.39 0.00 1.13 7.83
Deposits-to-assets 5,592 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.99
GDP per capita 5,592 3.50 3.10 0.14 2.45 15.74
Financial expenses 5,592 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.39
With Kiva access
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
AVLB_GNI 617 0.48 0.54 0.02 0.29 4.00
Female 617 0.70 0.23 0.10 0.70 1.00
PAR30 617 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.30
Portfolio yield (real) 617 0.26 0.14 -0.22 0.25 0.86
Group lending share 543 0.50 0.43 0.00 0.55 1.00
Rural lending share 401 0.56 0.29 0.00 0.64 1.00
Assets 617 29.40 83.70 0.37 9.35 1,100.00
Debt-to-asset 617 0.71 0.23 0.01 0.74 2.20
OSS 617 1.09 0.26 0.22 1.10 2.41
Deposits-to-assets 617 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.80
GDP per capita 617 3.00 2.50 0.24 2.05 14.58
Financial expenses 617 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.16
Without Kiva access
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
AVLB_GNI 4,975 0.55 1.09 0.00 0.27 31.89
Female 4,975 0.65 0.25 0.00 0.66 1.00
PAR30 4,975 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.04 1.00
Portfolio yield (real) 4,975 0.25 0.18 -0.22 0.21 1.79
Group lending share 4,180 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.27 1.00
Rural lending share 2,888 0.53 0.34 0.00 0.58 1.00
Assets 4,975 77.20 277.00 0.01 9.84 6,130.00
Debt-to-asset 4,975 0.68 0.25 0.00 0.75 2.87
OSS 4,975 1.17 0.41 0.00 1.14 7.83
Deposits-to-assets 4,975 0.20 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.99
GDP per capita 4,975 3.56 3.17 0.14 2.49 15.74
Financial expenses 4,975 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.39
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for metric variables
Notes: The entire data sample contains 5,592 observations. It is divided into the subsample
of 617 year-observations of MFIs with access to Kiva and 4,975 year-observations of MFIs
without access to Kiva in 2005 to 2015. Assets and GDP per capita are reported in million
and in thousand USD, respectively. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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Total With Kiva access Without Kiva access
N=5,592 N=617 N=4,975
Variable Obs. Relative Obs. Relative Obs. Relative
Age of MFI
New 701 12.54 52 8.43 649 13.05
Young 1,083 19.37 105 17.02 978 19.66
Mature 3,808 68.10 460 74.55 3,348 67.30
Legal Type
Bank/Rural Bank 758 13.56 35 5.67 723 0.15
Others 4,834 86.44 582 94.33 4,252 0.85
Geographic regions
EECA 1,009 18.04 100 16.21 909 18.27
EAP 565 10.10 98 15.88 467 9.39
Africa 559 10.00 108 17.50 451 9.07
LAC 2,321 41.51 266 43.11 2,055 41.31
MENA 169 3.02 18 2.92 151 3.04
SA 969 17.33 27 4.38 942 18.93
Year Index
2005 217 3.88 0 0.00 217 4.36
2006 305 5.45 7 1.13 298 5.99
2007 433 7.74 36 5.83 397 7.98
2008 510 9.12 52 8.43 458 9.21
2009 595 10.64 64 10.37 531 10.67
2010 638 11.41 71 11.51 567 11.40
2011 662 11.84 84 13.61 578 11.62
2012 666 11.91 87 14.10 579 11.64
2013 596 10.66 73 11.83 523 10.51
2014 479 8.57 67 10.86 412 8.28
2015 491 8.78 76 12.32 415 8.34
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables
Notes: The entire data sample contains 5,592 observations. It is divided into the subsample
of 617 year-observations of MFIs with access to Kiva and 4,974 year-observations of MFIs
without access to Kiva in 2005 to 2015. Running Pearson’s chi-squared tests for the MFI’s
age, the MFI’s legal status and geographical regions shows p-values < 0.01 indicating a
statistically significant relationship. Absolute values and relative values of the categorical
variables are displayed. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
Total With Kiva access Without Kiva access
N=5,592 N=617 N=4,975
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Difference
AVLB_GNI 0.55 1.04 0.48 0.54 0.55 1.09 1.6236
Female 0.66 0.25 0.70 0.23 0.65 0.25 −4.0918∗∗∗
PAR30 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 4.3551∗∗∗
Portfolio yield (real) 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.18 −1.2641
Group lending share 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.44 0.44 −2.8683∗∗∗
Rural lending share 0.53 0.33 0.56 0.29 0.53 0.34 −1.3316
Assets 72.00 263.00 29.40 83.70 77.20 277.00 2.5534
Debt-to-asset 0.68 0.25 0.71 0.23 0.68 0.25 −3.1197∗∗∗
OSS 1.16 0.39 1.09 0.26 1.17 0.41 4.6746∗∗∗
Deposits-to-assets 0.19 0.27 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.28 8.2151∗∗∗
GDP per capita 3.50 3.10 3.00 2.50 3.56 3.17 4.2686∗∗∗
Financial expenses 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 −0.4111
Table 3.4: Independent t-test for metric variables among year-observations of MFIs with
access to Kiva and MFIs without access to Kiva
Notes: Mean and standard deviation of metric variables and p-values are displayed. The
number of observations for group lending share and rural lending share are different from
the overall number of observations as stated in Table 3.2. Assets and GDP per capita are
reported in million and in thousand USD, respectively. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are
defined in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.5 presents the Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients for metric ex-
ogenous variables which are included in our estimation models. According
to Kennedy (2008), correlation coefficients with a value of 0.8 are critical for
the detection of potential multicollinearity problems between metric variables.
Even though some correlations are significant, the correlation coefficients are
far below 0.8 and we do not expect a multicollinearity issue.
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. AVLB_GNI 1.0000
2. Female −0.2682∗ 1.0000
3. PAR30 0.005 −0.1178∗ 1.0000
4. Portfolio yield (real) −0.1622∗ 0.1374∗ −0.0117 1.0000
5. Group lending share −0.2918∗ 0.5310∗ −0.0807∗ 0.1284∗ 1.0000
6. Rural lending share −0.0059 0.0583∗ −0.0305 −0.1324∗ 0.1667∗ 1.0000
7. Assets 0.0843∗ −0.0509∗ −0.0039 −0.0994∗ −0.1551∗ −0.0254
8. Debt-to-asset 0.0839∗ 0.012 0.0406∗ −0.1946∗ −0.0742∗ 0.0526∗
9. OSS 0.0361∗ −0.0479∗ −0.1814∗ −0.0301∗ −0.0790∗ 0.0748∗
10. Deposits-to-assets 0.2095∗ −0.1340∗ 0.0972∗ −0.1609∗ −0.2515∗ −0.0473∗
11. GDP per capita −0.1755∗ −0.1859∗ 0.0142 0.2965∗ −0.2142∗ −0.2540∗
12. Financial expenses −0.0335∗ 0.0219 −0.0044 0.0254 −0.0445∗ 0.0588∗
Variable 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
7. Assets 1.0000
8. Debt-to-asset 0.1430∗ 1.0000
9. OSS 0.0404∗ −0.2177∗ 1.0000
10. Deposits-to-assets 0.2587∗ 0.3738∗ −0.0415∗ 1.0000
11. GDP per capita 0.0714∗ −0.0974∗ 0.0285∗ −0.0503∗ 1.0000
12. Financial expenses 0.0184 0.4457∗ −0.0909∗ 0.0055 0.1304∗ 1.0000
Table 3.5: Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients for metric exogenous variables
Notes: Values labeled with the symbol ∗ are significant at the 5% level. The variables are
defined in Table 3.1.
3.5 Regression analysis
3.5.1 Results on the access to debt capital from Kiva
In this section, we investigate the access to funding from Kiva as dependent
variable. As already noted, access can only be observed if both Kiva and the
MFI mutually agree upon the funding relationship. Table 3.6 exhibits the
results of the estimated pooled logistic models. Model I includes the entire
5,621 observations in the panel data set. Model I is extended by the squared
debt-to-asset ratio, resulting in model II. Model III is the base model including
the real portfolio yield as a further social performance indicator. Additionally,
model IV includes the share of group lending within the MFI’s portfolio.
The relationship between the MFI’s social performance and the probability
of access to Kiva is tested by several variables. The average loan balance
per borrower has a negative but insignificant coefficient. The share of female
borrowers in the portfolio is positively associated with the access to Kiva. The
result is significant at the 5% level which illustrates that targeting women is
a crucial predictor. Adding the real portfolio yield in model II and III as a
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proxy for the interest rate charged from borrowers enriches the insights into
the MFI’s social performance. The higher the portfolio yield, the lower the
probability of being granted access to Kiva. Kiva allows MFIs to charge interest
from microborrowers for the interest-free refinanced loans. However, Kiva does
not support (extremely) high interest rates as Kiva requires the interest-free
capital to result in lower costs not only for the MFI but also for its borrowers.
Considering the MFI’s lending methodology, we do not find evidence that MFIs
focusing on group lending—which implies that borrowers of these might be
poorer—are more likely to have access. In summary, H1 is confirmed from the
supply side’s perspective. Kiva highly values the MFI’s social performance in
terms of targeting women as a vulnerable group and taking social responsibility
for its clients.
The logarithm of the assets as a size measure is positive but insignificant.
This might be a first indication that the probability of having access to Kiva is
positively related to the development of purely new and small sized MFIs towards
well-growing MFIs throughout years of operation. The MFI’s years of operation
are represented by dummy variables, which are positive and significant in model
specifications I to III. This supports the expectation that better established
MFIs are more likely to partner Kiva compared with MFIs which are new to the
market. From the perspective of the supply side, Kiva’s requirements regarding
assets, loan programs and operating volume might be more likely to be fulfilled
by more mature and larger MFIs. From the demand side’s perspective, it is
obvious that also mature MFIs are still in need for subsidized debt capital
(e.g. Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). Additionally, these MFIs might be more
experienced in hedging currency risks.
Considering the level of leverage as an indication of the MFI’s life cycle stage,
we observe evidence in favor of H2. The coefficient of the debt-to-asset ratio
is positive and significant at the 1% level in all model specifications. This
result strengthens the reflection that more mature MFIs experience a higher
probability of having access to and using refinancing through Kiva. However,
increasing levels of leverage may also be an indication that the MFI has already
gained access to commercial debt capital and is less dependent on subsidized
debt capital. Therefore, from the supply side’s point of view, Kiva may tend to
withhold its interest-free capital from MFIs at a certain point of leverage. When
including the quadratic term of the debt-to-asset ratio in model II, we consider
this U-shaped relation. The quadratic term of the debt-to-asset ratio has the
expected negative sign which indicates that, up to a certain level, the rising
leverage is negatively associated with the probability of Kiva access. However,
the result is not significant.
The OSS variable has a significant negative sign in all model specifications,
which supports H3. This result illustrates that MFIs with a better financial
performance and a lower dependency on external subsidies in the long run are
less likely to receive and use debt funding through Kiva. The reason behind this
finding may be ambiguous. First, sustainable MFIs may focus on commercial
funding instead of striving for subsidized funds from Kiva and second, Kiva
may prefer MFIs which are dependent on the subsidized capital in order to run
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their businesses.
Considering the MFI’s funding approach, the negative and highly significant
coefficient of the deposits-to-assets ratio in all model specifications confirms
the negative relationship between the extent of deposits and the probability
of access to Kiva. This finding supports the view that MFIs which implement
deposits as a stable and cost efficient source of funding, do not strive for
the partnership with Kiva. A higher extent of deposits reduces the MFI’s
demand for interest-free refinancing through Kiva. Although Kiva honors the
opportunity of savings for borrowers with its social performance badge, the
majority of the partner MFIs does not collect deposits at all (median = 0.00%,
see Table 3.2), resulting in a negative relationship between the MFI’s ability to
mobilize deposits and the use of refinancing through Kiva. Altogether, H4 is
supported by the empirical evidence.
Considering the poverty level of the country in which the MFI mainly operates,
we find evidence in favor of H5. MFIs operating in poorer countries have a
higher probability of access to Kiva compared with MFIs operating in richer
countries. One reason for this result could be that – although microfinance itself
implies that all borrowers receiving loans from MFIs are perceived as needy –
independently of the MFI’s social mission, the social impact of providing capital
to low-GDP countries is recognized as being more beneficial.
The MFI-specific controls, such as financial expenses and legal type do not
appear to have any influence. However, there is a significant negative relation
between the PAR30 and the probability of access to Kiva. This result is likely
to be driven by the supply side perspective as Kiva highly values an MFI’s
experience in ensuring a reliable portfolio of sustainable clients in order to
keep repayment rates to investors at a high level and therefore is expectable
from the borrower’s perspective. To take the respective years of activity on
Kiva into account, we include a year index variable representing each year
between 2005 and 2015. The coefficient of the index variable is positive while
the coefficient of the quadratic term of the index variable is negative. Both
results are significant and illustrate that the probability of having access to
Kiva has increased accordingly with Kiva’s fast growth and stagnates since
2013 onwards.
To control for the macroeconomic environment, dummy variables for the regions
are included. While MFIs located in South Asia are less likely to participate on
Kiva, MFIs located in Africa are more likely to have access to Kiva compared
with the reference group of MFIs located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
In total, our regression results provide valuable information based on social and
financial aspects to answer the question of which MFIs are likely to strive for
and be granted access to subsidized debt capital through the partnership with
Kiva.
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(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Social performance
AVLB_GNI −0.1191 −0.1219 −0.1479 −0.2960
(0.1369) (0.1373) (0.1461) (0.2390)
Female 1.1532∗∗ 1.1831∗∗ 1.3099∗∗ 1.2635∗∗
(0.5279) (0.5307) (0.5306) (0.5993)
Portfolio yield (real) −1.0135∗ −1.3875∗∗
(0.5968) (0.6876)
Grouplending share −0.2898
(0.3246)
Maturity
ln(Assets) 0.0276 0.0126 0.0134 −0.0307
(0.0601) (0.0609) (0.0608) (0.0669)
Age_young 0.5333∗∗ 0.5051∗∗ 0.5246∗∗ 0.3085
(0.2552) (0.2498) (0.2571) (0.2791)
Age_mature 0.7661∗∗ 0.7271∗∗ 0.7202∗∗ 0.4730
(0.2992) (0.2957) (0.3033) (0.3287)
Debt-to-asset 1.6032∗∗∗ 2.8222∗∗∗ 1.6881∗∗∗ 1.8626∗∗∗
(0.4048) (0.9300) (0.4017) (0.4612)
Debt-to-asset2 −0.7166
(0.4821)
Financial performance
OSS −0.8018∗∗∗ −0.8097∗∗∗ −0.7950∗∗∗ −0.5645∗
(0.2999) (0.3074) (0.3000) (0.3060)
Funding approach
Deposits-to-assets −2.8837∗∗∗ −2.9589∗∗∗ −2.9391∗∗∗ −3.2111∗∗∗
(0.5724) (0.5867) (0.5625) (0.6128)
Poverty level
GDP per capita −0.1862∗∗∗ −0.1841∗∗∗ −0.1761∗∗∗ −0.1641∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0492) (0.0551)
MFI-specific controls
Financial expenses −0.2905 −1.1051 0.2045 −0.4270
(2.4239) (2.5279) (2.4218) (2.7963)
PAR30 −4.7740∗∗∗ −4.6574∗∗∗ −4.7758∗∗∗ −4.8119∗∗∗
(1.4118) (1.4511) (1.3780) (1.5732)
Legal Type −0.3569 −0.3375 −0.3242 −0.4752
(0.4549) (0.4546) (0.4559) (0.5640)
Year Index 0.6486∗∗∗ 0.6337∗∗∗ 0.6357∗∗∗ 0.6234∗∗∗
(0.0774) (0.0767) (0.0783) (0.0848)
Year Index2 −0.0349∗∗∗ −0.0337∗∗∗ −0.0337∗∗∗ −0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0057)
Macroeconomic controls
Region_EAP 0.2236 0.2260 0.2080 0.4252
(0.4385) (0.4400) (0.4451) (0.4733)
Region_AFRICA 0.7830∗ 0.7941∗ 0.8816∗∗ 1.3321∗∗∗
(0.4351) (0.4382) (0.4431) (0.4820)
Region_LAC 0.1792 0.1734 0.2110 0.1858
(0.3222) (0.3231) (0.3228) (0.3426)
Region_MENA −0.3250 −0.3070 −0.2892 −0.1368
(0.7336) (0.7371) (0.7342) (0.8875)
Region_SA −2.7379∗∗∗ −2.7215∗∗∗ −2.9036∗∗∗ −2.8360∗∗∗
(0.5385) (0.5377) (0.5486) (0.5948)
_cons −5.2375∗∗∗ −5.3561∗∗∗ −4.9059∗∗∗ −4.1188∗∗∗
(1.0703) (1.0964) (1.0917) (1.1825)
N 5,621 5,621 5,592 4,723
pseudo R2 0.1744 0.1761 0.1775 0.1932
Table 3.6: Coefficients of pooled logistic regressions with access as dependent variable
Notes: Model I is extended by the squared debt-to-asset ratio, resulting in model II. Model III
includes a further social performance indicator in terms of the real portfolio yield. Additionally,
model IV includes the share of group lending within the MFI’s portfolio. Standard errors
clustered at MFI level are in parentheses. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are
significant at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in
Table 3.1.
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3.5.2 Results on the termination of the partnership
Within our observation period, it was possible to observe some cases of a
termination of the partnership between the MFI and Kiva. These cases provide
valuable data, from which we can obtain further insights, especially into the
demand side perspective. A necessary condition for a termination of the
partnership is the requirement for it to have been established before. Thus, all
corresponding MFIs have once complied with Kiva requirements. Therefore,
one can assume that a termination of the partnership is either caused by a
direct cancellation through the MFI or by an intentional violation of Kiva’s
requirements through the MFI. The latter will take place in cases in which
the gains (lower refinancing costs) outweigh the disadvantages (less revenues,
higher operational costs) in the sense of the above demand side theory. In any
case, one can exclude the fact that the MFI has no opportunity to receive the
partnership for a general mismatch with Kiva requirements.
To make use of these observations, we run logistic regressions analoguously to
our main models for the probability of the closing event. The regression results
are reported in Table 3.7. Models I–III include the entire 620 year-observations
of all MFIs with access to Kiva in the years 2005 to 2015. Therein, as the
termination of the partnership is a rare event, 26 MFIs faced a closing event. As
in this approach non-closing events are over-represented, we reduce the data set
by allowing MFIs (with Kiva access) to be considered only once in a second step.
The respective year-observation of the MFIs are selected by random selection
without replacement. These results are shown in columns IV–VI.
Looking at the social performance measures, the results are surprising. A
higher percentage of female borrowers is positively related to the probability
of terminating the partnership. In model specifications IV–V, additionally,
the variable for the average loan size per borrower turns out to be negative
and significant. In contrast, the real portfolio yield does not appear to be
significantly associated with the closing event. The results indicate that the
partnership between Kiva and an MFI with a high level of social commitment
in terms of depth of outreach is more likely to be terminated. An explanation
for this phenomenon may lie in the fact that such MFIs are often offered debt
capital from other external sources, such as, for instance, MIVs (Dorfleitner
et al., 2016).
While nearly all other variables are insignificant, only the deposits-to-assets
variable shows a positive and significant coefficient in all models. Therefore,
MFIs which are able to mobilize deposits to a greater extent are positively
related to the probability of the closing event. Again, together with the negative
relationship between the ability of deposit mobilization and Kiva access, this
finding provides an overall clear picture. MFIs which are able to mobilize
deposits appear to have a lower incentive to strive for and, even after using
refinancing through Kiva, remain in the partnership.
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Social performance
AVLB_GNI −1.0727 −1.0700 −0.8304 −1.9762∗∗ −1.9855∗ −2.2453
(0.9711) (1.0378) (1.0906) (0.9425) (1.0798) (1.6062)
Female 3.2012∗∗ 3.1755∗∗ 2.3490 3.4789∗∗ 3.4951∗ 3.2568∗
(1.3155) (1.3762) (1.7111) (1.6283) (1.8408) (1.9494)
Portfolio yield (real) 0.1699 0.2584 −0.0883 −0.0714
(2.1662) (2.2577) (3.3231) (3.5376)
Grouplending share 0.8952 0.9630
(0.6929) (0.8662)
Maturity
ln_Assets 0.2162 0.2199 0.3082 0.4103 0.4111 0.4533
(0.2099) (0.2103) (0.2652) (0.2624) (0.2668) (0.3270)
Age_young −0.4466 −0.4262 −0.3160 −0.9584 −0.9623 −0.8171
(0.8472) (0.8489) (0.8209) (1.1460) (1.1423) (1.2886)
Age_mature −1.0619 −1.0284 −1.1459 −1.7382 −1.7448 −1.8917
(0.9971) (1.0063) (1.0677) (1.2464) (1.2989) (1.5053)
Debt-to-asset −2.5981 −2.6088 −3.2507∗ −2.9438 −2.9635 −3.4079
(1.5810) (1.6317) (1.7373) (1.9489) (2.1346) (2.2759)
Financial performance
OSS 0.4235 0.4060 −0.0882 0.1482 0.1456 −0.0931
(1.0886) (1.0887) (1.2778) (1.0342) (1.0395) (1.2251)
Funding approach
Deposit-to-assets 3.9961∗∗∗ 4.0320∗∗∗ 4.6379∗∗∗ 4.0061∗∗ 4.0030∗∗ 4.0785∗∗
(1.1628) (1.2095) (1.5034) (1.5796) (1.6099) (1.8967)
Poverty level
GDP per capita 0.0931 0.0919 0.1175 0.0792 0.0803 0.1406
(0.1097) (0.1098) (0.1211) (0.1680) (0.1751) (0.1990)
MFI-specific controls
Financial expenses 12.1978 12.0657 14.4732 6.4673 6.5492 12.7860
(9.8021) (10.9328) (11.3945) (13.4903) (14.6191) (15.5824)
PAR30 3.8820 3.8731 3.5673 6.8305 6.8605 9.3680
(3.3883) (3.4107) (4.3734) (5.4901) (5.5479) (8.9239)
Legal type 0.6265 0.5846 1.1278 1.7885 1.7942 4.7928∗∗
(0.9409) (1.0391) (0.9311) (1.2232) (1.2807) (2.1090)
Year Index −0.2966 −0.2749 −0.2165 −0.2426 −0.2429 −0.2204
(0.4443) (0.4468) (0.4340) (0.7028) (0.7043) (0.8540)
Year Index2 0.0314 0.0299 0.0261 0.0122 0.0122 0.0102
(0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0305) (0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0593)
Macroeconomic controls
Region_EAP −1.2206 −1.2013 −0.7246 −2.6746∗ −2.6806∗ −2.0984
(1.0628) (1.0546) (1.1370) (1.5844) (1.5823) (1.6728)
Region_AFRICA/Mena −1.3242 −1.3169 −1.2448 −2.8233∗∗ −2.8247∗∗ −2.2039
(1.0747) (1.0676) (1.1203) (1.3958) (1.3949) (1.5511)
Region_LAC −1.2734 −1.2919 −0.9561 −1.9594∗ −1.9607∗ −1.7293
(0.9079) (0.9128) (1.0124) (1.1297) (1.1277) (1.3913)
Region_SA −0.9967 −0.9712 −0.5236 −2.3338∗ −2.3496 −2.1667
(1.2507) (1.3517) (1.2687) (1.3952) (1.6079) (1.8866)
_cons −6.9391∗ −7.0799∗ −8.1944∗∗ −5.1414 −5.1207 −6.5431
(3.6271) (3.6256) (4.0989) (4.3732) (4.3444) (5.2974)
N 620 617 543 114 114 103
Pseudo R2 0.1396 0.1408 0.1711 0.2356 0.2356 0.2982
Table 3.7: Coefficients of pooled logistic regressions with the termination of the partnership
as dependent variable
Notes: Out of the 125 MFIs with access to Kiva, 26 MFIs faced a closing event within the
observation period. Models I–III include all year-observations of MFIs having access to
Kiva between 2005 and 2015. Models IV–VI include only selected year-observations of MFIs.
MFIs are selected by a random selection without replacement. Standard errors clustered at
MFI-level are in parentheses. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at
the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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As a further analysis regarding temporal aspects of the closing event, we run Cox
proportional hazard models, which analyze the ‘survival time’ of the partnership
between the MFI and Kiva. When applying the Cox model, we look at all
MFIs which have had access to Kiva since 2005 and observe at which point of
time the event of terminating the partnership occurred. As our study ended
in February 2016, most of the partnerships have not been determined, which
is something the Cox model can deal with. From Kiva’s API, we retrieve the
information concerning at which point of time the MFI partnered Kiva and in
the case of terminating the partnership, at which point of time the closing event
occurred. Due to lacking data in the respective year when the cooperation
between the MFI and Kiva was decided, our data set reduces to 107 MFI-year
observations including 25 closing events (compared to the logit model, one MFI
facing a closing event is lost due to lacking data). We run Cox proportional
hazard models with the same model specifications as the logistic regressions.
The results are reported in Table 3.8.
The overall picture is consistent with our findings based on the logistic re-
gressions. Considering the social performance of the MFI, the percentage of
female borrowers reveals itself to be positive and significant at the 5% level
in models I and II. We find clear evidence that the MFI’s ability to mobilize
deposits tends to shorten the partnership. Accordingly, we summarize that
deposit-taking MFIs have a lower incentive to stick to subsidized debt capital as
they gain independency by using deposits as source of debt capital. In contrast
to the logit regressions, the coefficient of the GDP per capita is positive and
significant in all model specifications. This could be an indication that MFIs
operating in better developed countries spend less time focusing on interest-free
refinancing through Kiva as other funding sources may become available and
more attractive. However, as this variable was not significant in the logit
regressions, the finding should not be over-interpreted either.
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(I) (II) (III)
Social performance
AVLB_GNI 0.6843 0.8854 0.3930
(0.7093) (0.8946) (1.4521)
Female 3.4456∗∗ 3.1867∗∗ 2.5800
(1.6535) (1.5519) (1.8099)
Portfolio yield (real) 2.0663 2.7546
(3.4438) (4.4542)
Grouplending share 0.6455
(1.2466)
Maturity
ln_Assets 0.3044 0.3465 0.4202
(0.3194) (0.2857) (0.3515)
Age_young −1.6987 −1.9051∗∗ −1.2272
(1.0547) (0.9466) (1.1999)
Age_mature −0.8418 −1.0017 −0.5169
(1.0511) (1.0078) (1.0438)
Debt-to-asset −2.6130 −2.6563 −2.8414
(1.6879) (1.7145) (1.8370)
Poverty level
GDP per capita 0.3685∗∗ 0.3681∗∗ 0.3056∗
(0.1696) (0.1695) (0.1691)
Financial performance
OSS −0.1810 −0.0035 −0.0751
(1.1977) (1.2908) (1.9533)
Funding approach
Deposits-to-assets 2.8946∗∗ 3.1578∗∗ 3.3268∗
(1.1811) (1.4304) (1.6979)
MFI-specific controls
Financial expenses 13.3350 10.5496 9.0955
(10.9061) (12.0907) (18.0512)
PAR30 −3.0505 −2.3108 0.4395
(3.5055) (4.0565) (5.8767)
Legal type 0.7544 0.6256 1.1984
(1.0283) (1.1618) (1.0171)
Year Index −1.0337 −0.9783 −0.1090
(0.9712) (1.0125) (1.3166)
Year Index2 0.0964 0.0952 0.0308
(0.0796) (0.0803) (0.1032)
Macroeconomic controls
Region_EAP −0.3079 −0.0869 −0.0670
(1.0712) (1.0463) (1.1358)
Region_AFRICA/Mena 0.0275 −0.0820 −0.3794
(0.9675) (0.9828) (1.1843)
Region_LAC −0.5981 −0.5718 −0.9026
(1.0169) (1.0357) (1.0746)
Region_SA 0.2065 0.4986 0.3753
(1.5251) (1.6945) (1.7930)
N 107 107 94
Pseudo R2 0.1420 0.1460 0.1710
Table 3.8: Coefficients of Cox proportional hazards models on the event that the partnership
between Kiva and the MFI is terminated before February 2016
Notes: Within the observation period, 25 closing events occurred. Model specifications
are analogous to pooled logistic regressions in Table 3.7. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level,
the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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3.5.3 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of the first part of our findings, further logistic regres-
sions are run.
First, we add the share of rural lending as an additional social performance
measure. The coefficient of the rural lending share is insignificant and does
not provide further insights regarding our hypotheses on the MFI’s social
performance. The majority of the variables do not change, but the real portfolio
yield and the OSS variable become insignificant. However, the validity is limited
as the data set is significantly reduced due to missing data of the added variable.
Second, we exclude all MFIs from countries which do not have at least one
MFI with access to Kiva. The regression results are shown in column II. Third,
we conduct a logistic regression with standard errors clustered by countries
instead of by MFIs, as applied in our main models. The results are shown in
column III. In both models, the overall picture is robust as all variables, except
the dummy variables for the MFI’s years of operation, reveal themselves to be
consistent with our main findings. However, the debt-to-asset ratio remains
stable and significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, a fixed-effects model clustered by countries is estimated. MFI-fixed
effects help to overcome endogeneity issues related to unobserved time-invariant
variables on the MFI level. While the debt-to-asset ratio and PAR30 are in
accordance with our previous findings, several variables such as the share of
female borrowers, the real portfolio yield, OSS, and deposits-to-assets ratio do
not remain significant. The insignificance of some variables could be linked to
the fact that these variables do not change greatly with time. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to carry out a country-fixed-effects model due to data restrictions
as we only have the data of a few MFIs available for some countries.
As another way to alleviate endogeneity of the MFI level, we lastly establish
regression models including the lagged dependent variable (access to Kiva).
The results are reported in column V. The majority of the variables do not
change and are similar to our main results. A slight difference arises as the
variable indicating the percentage of female borrowers becomes insignificant.
However, the real portfolio yield remains unchanged in support of H1. The
lagged access variable turns out to be positive and significant. This result
supports the understanding that MFIs are likely to continue the partnership
with Kiva once refinancing through Kiva has been used.
Furthermore, we perform several robustness checks without showing the detailed
results in a separate table.
First, we run the regressions without the 130 observations of rural banks as
these represent a unique organizational type, which we cannot use as a separate
category for statistical reasons. However, the main findings are not significantly
altered by this sample reduction.
Second, we exclude all 30 observations of MFIs with an average loan volume of
more than 10,000 USD in order to account for a different view on the question
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beyond which loan amount level microfinance ends. However, the results confirm
the robustness of our findings in the main model.
Third, we substitute the OSS variable with a self-constructed financial self-
sustainability (FSS) variable in order to account for grants and subsidies
received by MFIs16. The significant negative coefficient of the FSS variable is
in accordance with our findings on the OSS variable and therefore confirms the
validity of using the OSS variable.
16This robustness check is only possible for a set of 3,691 MFI-year observations, for which
we know the amount of donations. This information is only available on a smaller data set
ending in 2013. On this subset, we obtain the FSS variable analogously to the OSS but
with the financial revenues net of donations.
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Social performance
AVLB_GNI 0.0462 −0.2363 −0.2960 −0.0042 −0.2527
(0.1960) (0.2368) (0.2003) (0.0113) (0.2038)
Female 1.3934∗ 1.7265∗∗ 1.2635∗∗ 0.0484 0.6115
(0.7718) (0.7007) (0.5788) (0.0355) (0.5853)
Portfolio yield (real) −1.2743 −1.5315∗∗ −1.3875∗∗ −0.0446 −1.4915∗∗
(1.0516) (0.7222) (0.6637) (0.0458) (0.6296)
Group lending share −0.4718 −0.3496 −0.2898 −0.2214
(0.4116) (0.3321) (0.3320) (0.3099)
Rural lending share 0.1091
(0.4590)
Maturity
ln_Assets −0.0884 −0.0274 −0.0307 0.0095 −0.0814
(0.0903) (0.0707) (0.0738) (0.0140) (0.0646)
Age_young 0.5349 0.2937 0.3085 −0.0362∗ 0.0102
(0.3563) (0.2750) (0.2936) (0.0197) (0.3842)
Age_mature 0.5014 0.5205 0.4730 −0.0378 0.0486
(0.4331) (0.3233) (0.3478) (0.0311) (0.3435)
Debt-to-asset 2.4963∗∗∗ 1.9892∗∗∗ 1.8626∗∗∗ 0.1515∗∗∗ 0.8857∗∗
(0.5820) (0.4816) (0.4888) (0.0447) (0.4316)
Financial performance
OSS −0.5995 −0.6939∗∗ −0.5645∗ −0.0052 −0.7935∗∗
(0.4143) (0.3428) (0.3102) (0.0125) (0.3274)
Funding approach
Deposits-to-assets −3.4770∗∗∗ −3.2543∗∗∗ −3.2111∗∗∗ −0.0475 −2.1088∗∗∗
(0.9022) (0.6354) (0.5462) (0.0693) (0.6041)
Poverty level
GDP per capita −0.1659∗∗ −0.1072∗ −0.1641∗∗∗ −0.0080 −0.1509∗∗∗
(0.0682) (0.0649) (0.0488) (0.0060) (0.0454)
MFI-specific controls
Financial expenses 2.8144 −0.8061 −0.4270 0.2612 1.3897
(3.6054) (3.2415) (2.3617) (0.1924) (2.6343)
PAR30 −4.1902∗∗ −4.5444∗∗∗ −4.8119∗∗∗ −0.1169∗∗∗ −6.1161∗∗∗
(1.8609) (1.5145) (1.5970) (0.0333) (1.9380)
Legal Type −0.4884 −0.6215 −0.4752 −0.4879
(0.6845) (0.5671) (0.4697) (0.4850)
Year_Index 0.6858∗∗∗ 0.6124∗∗∗ 0.6234∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.5664∗∗∗
(0.1149) (0.0892) (0.0793) (0.0086) (0.1371)
Year_Index2 −0.0321∗∗∗ −0.0305∗∗∗ −0.0306∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0475∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0006) (0.0115)
Kiva_access_lagged 5.5265∗∗∗
(0.3432)
Macroeconomic controls
Region_EAP 0.5451 0.0236 0.4252 0.5299
(0.5666) (0.5092) (0.4628) (0.4257)
Region_AFRICA 1.3773∗∗ 1.3193∗∗ 1.3321∗∗∗ 0.8350∗
(0.6415) (0.5230) (0.4341) (0.4541)
Region_LAC 0.2644 −0.2848 0.1858 0.4024
(0.4141) (0.3941) (0.3115) (0.3126)
Region_MENA 0.2735 1.6209 −0.1368 0.2300
(1.3404) (1.2117) (1.2372) (0.6131)
Region_SA −2.6066∗∗∗ −3.2086∗∗∗ −2.8360∗∗∗ −1.8207∗∗∗
(0.6759) (0.6382) (0.6530) (0.5070)
_cons −4.4695∗∗∗ −4.0320∗∗∗ −4.1188∗∗∗ −0.2788 −1.7628
(1.6517) (1.2272) (1.1918) (0.2110) (1.1440)
N 3,107 3,952 4,723 4,723 4,497
Pseudo R2 0.2113 0.2086 0.1932 0.5341
Table 3.9: Regression results of robustness analysis
Notes: Model I is the base model extended by the share of rural lending. Model II is the
base model including only countries with at least one MFI that has access to Kiva. Model
III follows the base model, but standard errors are clustered across countries. Model IV is a
fixed-effects model. Model V is the base model extended by the lagged access variable as
independent variable. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the
10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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3.6 Conclusion
We empirically study the access of MFIs to subsidized funding provided via
the online peer-to-peer platform Kiva between 2005 and 2015 based on a
worldwide dataset of 909 MFIs. By employing logit regressions, we identify
a positive relationship between the MFI’s social performance and access to
funding from Kiva. Regarding the MFI’s maturity, we find strong evidence that
more mature MFIs in terms of debt-to-asset ratio have and use access to Kiva
more frequently than MFIs which are new to the market. Furthermore, the
MFI’s financial performance and the ability of mobilizing deposits are main
predictors for the likelihood of access to Kiva. Moreover, MFIs operating in
less developed countries with lower values for GDP per capita demonstrate
a more frequent use of subsidized funding via Kiva. Regarding the possible
termination of the funding relationship between an MFI and Kiva we find a
positive correlation between the share of female borrowers and the probability of
terminating the partnership. A similar finding emerges for the deposits-to-asset
ratio. Altogether, the termination of the partnership appears to be driven
primarily by factors on the MFI side, rather than to be initiated by Kiva.
Our results lead to the conclusion that crowdlending effectively expands the
MFI’s possibilities to obtain access to subsidized debt capital without interest
obligation and provides the opportunity to transfer the credit default risk from
the MFI to investors. With regards to the intensively discussed topic of credit
risk in classical microfinance, crowdlending enables the MFI to spread the credit
default risk of one single loan to multiple investors. Furthermore, crowdlending
through Kiva also requests the MFIs to fulfill certain requirements mainly
based on the social investors’ expectations. These requirements in turn are
likely to increase the MFI’s operating expenses. Therefore, we can draw the
implication that Kiva as well as the MFIs carefully consider the impact of the
refinancing through the crowd on the MFI’s overall profit, as an MFI only seeks
the partnership with Kiva as long as this is beneficial. In the long run, the
requirements may not be in accordance with the MFI’s ambition to become
independent and to gain access to the mainstream capital market. Therefore,
crowdlending appears to have the potential to be supportive for and used by
MFIs to a certain extent, but depending on the MFI’s growth strategy, not in
the long run. In our view, this is the most interesting theoretical takeaway on
the topic of refinancing microcredit.
Our study also contributes to the literature on crowdfunding in general by
providing results on the motivation of the involved investors. Our findings
suggest that Kiva appears to attract investors which strongly value the social
performance of an MFI and also prefer to invest into poor countries. This
supports the view that at least a part of crowdfunding investors are affine to
prosocial motivations.
With the increasing relevance of crowdfunding in general and in the field of
microfinance in particular, research on the influence of institutional factors will
also gain more importance. This study, is the first to provide evidence relating
to this issue. As a possible limitation of our study, we have to mention that
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the self-reported data on MIX Market could be biased. To overcome possible
sample selection issues due to the fact that we can only use data on MFIs with
access to Kiva and available MIX data, an expansion of this research to other
platforms appears to be a promising prospect. Another limitation lies in the
fact that the empirical setup cannot completely rule out endogeneity. In order
to figure out what makes MFIs to prefer the source Kiva instead of other cheap
sources of funding (e.g. subsidized debt), one would need a different data set
comprising all available funding sources and could then implement a propensity
score matching to compare the decisions of similar MFIs.
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Abstract: Based on a unique data set on US direct microloans, we study
the funding determinants of interest-free peer-to-peer crowdlending aimed at
borrowers in the US. By performing logistic regressions on funding success
and tobit regressions on the reversed funding time, the existence of a social
underwriting by a third-party trustee as well as information in the description
text fostering the investors’ trust are shown to be main predictors of success-
ful funding. Regarding social impact, the possibility to empower women and
groups of borrowers appears to attract investors, whereas an empowerment of
the family or community beyond the borrowers themselves appears to remain
unappreciated. When examining the vulnerability of the borrowers as a pre-
dictor, the results manifest differences amongst the attitudes of the investors
towards social impact. Investors enabling non-endorsed loans clearly prefer to
support borrowers with immigration backgrounds. In contrast, investors who
fund endorsed loans are reluctant to invest in loans to immigrants.
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4.1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the determinants of funding in interest-free peer-to-peer
(P2P) lending. The interest rate is typically the most crucial parameter in P2P
lending, as it usually reflects the repayment risk of a loan. Obviously, setting
this parameter equal to zero changes the economic basis of the lending, as the
investors who are willing to accept such conditions must derive some utility
from sources other than the financial return. Therefore, the lenders can be
assumed to be socially oriented or ethical investors. We study the question of
the funding determinants in this context with a novel data set stemming from
the online microfinance platform Kiva.
Kiva is well-known as an online crowdlending platform that enables microlending
to the poor by mobilizing debt capital from the worldwide crowd of altruistic
investors. The standard model on Kiva is devoted to the crowdlending of loans
that are intermediated through local microfinance institutions (MFIs). Under
this intermediated microfinancing model, investors refinance microloans which
have already been granted to applicants by MFIs. Previous Kiva studies have
focused on this intermediated loan model for borrowers in developing countries
(e.g. Ly and Mason, 2012a; Burtch et al., 2014; Allison et al., 2015; Moss et al.,
2015; Dorfleitner et al., 2017).
Apart from the intermediation-based microfinancing model, Kiva also facilitates
a direct P2P lending model in which micro borrowers and socially-oriented
lenders interacting directly without any financial intermediation. Kiva’s direct
model is, to a large degree, unique in the practice of microfinance as well as
in the field of P2P lending. From the microfinance perspective, this model is
special as there is no MFI involved (unlike in the Kiva intermediated model).
From the standpoint of classical P2P lending, the fact that borrowers do not
need to pay any interest and that investors therefore do not receive any financial
compensation for the credit risk they take is very unusual.
The investors’ decision-making behavior in the intermediated model of Kiva
has been intensively studied. Several studies show that these investors are
socially oriented and prefer to support loan applications signalling higher social
value (e.g. Allison et al., 2015; Moss et al., 2017). Furthermore, despite a
prosocial setting, they are risk-averse and are concerned with the credit profile
of the intermediating MFIs (e.g. Heller and Badding, 2012; Berns et al., 2018).
Additionally, the investors prefer to fund loans in poorer countries (Jenq et al.,
2015).
While these findings are interesting, they cannot directly be transferred as the
lending decision is heavily influenced by the presentation of a loan through the
MFI and the MFI’s track record and operating country. In contrast, Kiva’s
direct model features real P2P lending with borrowers from a homogeneous
economic region, namely the United States. Additionally, Kiva direct loan
investors make lending decisions based on limited information of borrowers,
while intermediated loan investors can easily utilize the information of MFIs,
such as credit ratings and repayment history. Another difference lies in the
fact that while investors do not receive interest in either Kiva model, most
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borrowers in the intermediated model still refrain from paying interest to Kiva’s
local partners. Moreoever, Kiva direct loan borrowers in the US are responsible
for their loan descriptions, while the MFIs do this in a far more standardized
manner in the intermediated model as many borrowers may not even be able to
complete a P2P loan application process. Without the intermediation of MFIs,
the investors’ behavior in terms of deciding which borrower to support with
interest-free capital, increases in importance. Given the limited information
provided by the borrowers themselves, the question arises concerning how Kiva
direct loan investors make lending decisions, especially when they have both
financial and social concerns. Additionally, recent research on standard P2P
lending has proven that the self-written description texts of the applicants are
important in terms of the lending decision (see e.g. Larrimore et al., 2011).
Information of this type can be expected to be even more relevant if there is no
interest rate serving as a quality signal.
In this study, we investigate the determinants of successful funding under a
real P2P lending model with an interest rate of zero through a financial and
social lens based on a data set of more than 6,000 US direct loans. The data
set is unique due to several facts. First, the loan applicants are exclusively US
citizens facing financial exclusion from the formal capital market. Second, these
loans adopt Kiva’s direct P2P lending model, which is completely different from
Kiva’s intermediation-based model. Third, the data set provided by Kiva’s
API is comprehensively expanded through valuable information obtained from
original campaign webpages.
Logistic regression on the funding success and tobit regression on the reversed
funding time provide interesting insights. First, evidence of the importance of
third-party endorsement of loan applications can be found. Borrowers endorsed
by a trustee attract investors more successfully and faster. Second, it has been
proven that the description text as a measure used to build trust between
investors and borrowers can influence the fundraising result. In addition,
investors appear to consider several social aspects such as the preference of
group loans and the empowerment of women. The empowerment of others
beyond the borrowers themselves does not appear to be a crucial predictor of
funding success and funding speed. In the subsample of non-endorsed loans,
keywords indicating the borrower’s responsibility for family members are even
negatively related to funding success. Regarding the borrower’s vulnerability,
the empirical result is two sided and provides interesting insights into the
varying behavior of investors. Borrowers with immigration background are
clearly preferred by investors who support loans without trustee endorsement.
In contrast, investors of loans that are socially underwritten by a trustee are
more reluctant to invest into immigrants. There is evidence that investors place
more emphasis on the social impact in case the borrowers are not supported
by a trustee. In summary, our findings lead to the conclusion that socially-
oriented investors care about the credit risk as well as the social impact of their
investments.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that sheds some light on the finan-
cial and prosocial considerations of investors funding interest-free P2P loans.
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Moreover, we contribute to the research of microfinance in developed countries
as the borrowers are from the United States. Despite the growing interest in
microfinance in developed countries, there is still limited academic research on
this topic available (Pedrini et al., 2016).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Kiva’s funding model for
direct loans is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, four hypotheses are derived
from theoretical considerations and existing studies. Section 4 describes the
data and the employed methodology. The results of regressions and robustness
checks are displayed in Section 5. Sections 6 concludes.
4.2 Kiva’s funding model for direct loans
Kiva direct loans focus on US citizens who wish to develop a promising business
idea but struggle with access to capital and enables them to receive interest-free
loans of up to 10,000 USD. borrowers neither pay nor do investors receive
any interest on the loan. Investors fully bear the credit default risk. In order
to minimize the risk of fraud, Kiva staff carry out an internal due diligence
process1. Additionally, Kiva requires the loan applicant to successfully pass the
process of so-called ’social underwriting’. During a private fundraising period,
the applicant’s personal network (family, friends) is asked to fund the loan
application to further affirm the applicant’s creditworthiness and to already
collect a portion of the loan. Additionally, the loan applicant can be endorsed
by a trustee (an organization or an individual) that is in a relationship with the
loan applicant. Even though the trustees do not have any financial reliability, it
helps strengthen the borrower’s commitment to the repayment obligation. After
the 3-stage screening process of the applicant’s creditworthiness, the direct loan
application is posted publicly and available to the crowd of socially-oriented
investors. Note that for our analysis the private fundraising does not play a
significant role because every loan application fulfills this requirement (typically
approximately 10% to 15% of the loan amount is prefunded), whereas the
optional trustee is a property that is not given for every application.
Kiva’s direct P2P model is summarized in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Kiva’s direct P2P model for direct loans in the United States
1The internal due diligence process includes a review of the financial history, a verification of
the identity and a validation of the business. Also, all applicants are screened through the
Office of Foreign Assets Control terrorism database due to national security reasons.
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4.3 Theory and hypotheses development
4.3.1 Theoretical basics
P2P lending is doubtlessly one of the most innovative recent forms of financing
as it relies on the wisdom of the crowd to make lending decisions. P2P lending is
sometimes also referred to as ’crowdlending’, which points towards the fact that
it is the most important type of crowdfunding (Ziegler et al., 2017). Numerous
studies investigate the investment and repayment behavior in P2P lending.
In addition to the investigation of the role of classical hard facts such as
the credit rating or repayment history of borrowers (Lin et al., 2013), recent
studies have been paying attention to soft facts in descriptive texts of loan
applications (e.g. Moss et al., 2015; Allison et al., 2015; Dorfleitner et al., 2016).
For instance, Dorfleitner et al. (2016) find that social or emotional keywords,
which appear in descriptive texts of loan applications are positively related to
funding probability.
Another non-classical source of debt capital is microlending, which has existed in
developing countries since the 1970s (Ledgerwood, 1999). Microlending, being
the main form of microfinance, provides small amounts of credit to people who
are normally excluded from formal credit markets. Many studies on microfinance
find that MFIs can achieve very high repayment rates by adopting group lending
methodology or other contractual innovations (e.g. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999;
Morduch, 1999). In the recent years, the microfinance movement has also spread
to the western economies. However, the literature on microfinance in developed
countries is comparatively scarce as the industry is still in its infancy (Pedrini
et al., 2016; Bourlès and Cozarenco, 2017). To cite an example, Bourlès and
Cozarenco (2017) investigate the link between borrowers’ motivation and the
repayment of microloans in France and find that ’necessity entrepreneurs’ have
more difficulty repaying loans than ’opportunity entrepreneurs’.
As a prosocial microfinancing platform, Kiva has achieved huge success and
drawn the special attention of researchers to its innovative forms of connecting
microfinance and crowdfunding. Burtch et al. (2014) find that cultural differ-
ences and geography have a significant influence on the fundraising outcome
of Kiva intermediated loans. Dorfleitner et al. (2017) observe that MFIs who
have a better level of social performance in terms of lending to women, lending
responsibly and charging low interest, are more likely to be refinanced through
Kiva. Jenq et al. (2015) examine behavioral biases of investors supporting
Kiva’s intermediated loans and find that investors favor borrowers who appear
to be more attractive. Allison et al. (2015) assess the effect of linguistic cues on
the funding result for Kiva intermediated loans and find evidence that investors
prefer to support loan applicants who position their ventures as an opportunity
to help others.
By connecting real P2P lending and microfinance, Kiva direct loan provides a
new way to finance the unbanked population in the United States. In this direct
loan model, borrowers provide loan applications by themselves and investors
(instead of MFIs) decide whom to support based on their own judgement. To
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answer the question concerning how Kiva P2P investors make their investment
decisions toward providing their capital to borrowers through an uncollateralized
and interest-free loan without intermediation, we must consider the selection of
the borrowers and theorize on the utility function of the lenders.
Unprivileged borrower Kiva set the minimum requirements for direct loans
that only US-citizens who are restricted in their entrepreneurial activities due
to being financially excluded, can become borrowers of direct loans (Kiva.org,
2018b). These borrowers strive for the opportunity to become entrepreneuri-
ally involved through self-employment or to expand an existing business and
therefore, these borrowers exhibit the need for capital.
Socially-oriented investor Kiva investors reveal themselves as being so-
cially oriented, highly valuing the social impact of their investment and per-
ceiving a warm-glow effect through supporting others (Ly and Mason, 2012b;
Allison et al., 2013). Following Dorfleitner et al. (2017), the investor’s personal
utility comprises the financial return r and the social return s weighted with
the factor α > 0:
r + α · s (4.1)
At first glance, the investor – similar to kinship groups – refrains from paying
interest and, furthermore, agrees to fully bear the credit risk. Therefore, the
expected financial return is negative (E(r) < 0). At second glance, empirical
evidence clarifies the assumption that investors stress credit risk to be closest
to zero (Dorfleitner and Oswald, 2016; Jenq et al., 2015). In contrast to kinship
groups, Kiva investors are not acquainted with the borrowers personally and
face even greater information disadvantages due to the distance to the borrower
and the limited information provided in the loan application. It is evident
that investors are willing to provide capital only under the condition of a
positive personal utility. Consequently, the expected social return α ·E(s) must
overcompensate for the expected negative financial return. Besides the fact
that other people are supported, it evidently becomes relevant whom to support
(Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Jenq et al., 2015).
4.3.2 Hypotheses development
The information asymmetry problem prevails in every lending situation and is
even more serious for P2P lending investors since they are not professionals like
banks or institutional investors (Yum et al., 2012; Lee and Lee, 2012). Indeed,
the information that Kiva direct loan investors can obtain is often very limited.
A typical US direct loan application on the Kiva website only includes very
basic personal, geographical information, a brief loan description, and trustee
information, while the credit rating is never available and even the repayment
history of the borrower is difficult to obtain due to protection of the borrowers’
privacy. In this case, investors have to overcome adverse selection and the risk
of moral hazard (Bruton et al., 2011).
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To help investors evaluate the credit risk of borrowers, P2P platforms usually
adopt several identifiable or quantifiable mechanisms such as the assignment
of credit rating or cooperation with partners. Several studies show that Kiva
investors in the intermediated loan model make lending decisions based partly
on field partners’ information (Allison et al., 2015; Berns et al., 2018; Ly and
Mason, 2012a). However, a borrower applying for a direct loan on Kiva neither
has a credit score nor a field partner. Instead, the direct loan applications on
Kiva can have trustees who endorse borrowers.
Trustee existence As mentioned earlier, Kiva adopts the process of ’social
underwriting’ as part of its due diligence for direct loans. During this process,
direct loan applicants are required to demonstrate their ability to attract
a network of familiar people, trustees or referees to support them. Some
studies show that social ties are very important in the reduction of information
asymmetry for online P2P lending (Liu et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2013). Kiva
trustees are individuals or organizations that help Kiva to identify credible direct
loan applicants. Even though trustees have no financial obligation concerning
the loans they endorse, they bear a reputation risk by endorsing borrowers and
should thus have an interest in the repayment of loans. Therefore, Kiva direct
loans with an endorsement from trustees could be perceived as being safer
because trustees have to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers beforehand
in order to minimize reputation risk and also to monitor borrowers’ repayment
behavior. By taking the above into consideration, we expect that Kiva direct
loans with trustee endorsement to be more likely to be funded.
H1 (Trustee endorsement): The existence of a trustee is posi-
tively related to the funding success.
Although some Kiva direct loans do have a trustee endorsement, the investors
require more information to help them to reduce the information asymmetry
problem.
Foundation of Trust Apart from hard facts such as credit scores or third-
party endorsement, as significant amount of studies investigate the soft factors
in the descriptive texts of loan applications that may influence investors’ lending
decisions on P2P lending platforms (e.g. Allison et al., 2015; Moss et al., 2017).
For instance, the empirical fact that descriptive texts can reduce information
asymmetries and thus contribute to fundraising has been documented several
times (e.g. Larrimore et al., 2011; Michels, 2012). A longer and more detailed
descriptive text can serve as a signal concerning the borrowers, which prove his
or her level of involvement in the project, which can help build the foundation
of trust between Kiva direct loan borrowers and investors. However, descriptive
texts which are too long could be troublesome for non-professional Kiva direct
loan investors to evaluate, we also expect the positive effect of a longer descriptive
text on funding probability to be dampened when the number of words exceeds
a certain amount.
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Compared with consumption-oriented loans, business-oriented loans can be
perceived as being more trustworthy regarding debt repayment. Dorfleitner
et al. (2016) suggest that keywords addressing a business purpose in the loan
application are related to a higher funding probability because business activities
are likely to create positive cash flows, which can help repay loans. From this
perspective, business-orientation in loan descriptions could be considered to
be a positive signal of successful debt repayment in the future and attract
more attention from investors. Even though all direct loans are intended
for entrepreneurial purposes, according to Kiva’s official requirements, the
descriptions of loan applications can differ greatly regarding this topic as the
texts are written by different individuals. We anticipate that a clear signal of
the willingness to do business with the loan proceeds can help to convince the
investors to support these loans.
Additionally, borrowers of Kiva direct loans who document their education in
descriptive texts can be perceived as being more trustworthy for the following
reason. With the help of loan proceeds, they are more likely to complete
their education. Several studies show that education can make a considerable
contribution to reduction of poverty (e.g. Appleton, 2001; Tilak, 2007). In
other words, these borrowers can improve their repayment ability through
higher educational achievements. Indeed, Dorfleitner et al. (2016) find empirical
evidence that borrowers on a German P2P platform who mention their education
background in descriptive texts have a lower probability of default. Based on
these considerations, we expect signals in descriptive texts that build trust
between Kiva direct loan investors and borrowers to play an important, positive
role for the funding success.
H2 (Trust): Signals in descriptive texts that build trust are posi-
tively associated with the funding success.
The theoretical considerations regarding investors’ personal utility lead directly
to the general hypothesis, being that the investors are more likely to support
loans with greater social impact to maximize their personal utility. Investors
on prosocial P2P platforms such as Kiva are expected to help other people to
alleviate impoverishment as they do not receive any interest from loans. In
fact, even return-oriented investors on commercial P2P lending platforms are
occasionally motivated by social contributions (Pietraszkiewicz et al., 2017).
Therefore, the concept of social impact is of large significance, especially for
the socially-oriented investors on Kiva (Allison et al., 2013; Moss et al., 2017;
Jancenelle et al., 2018). To develop our hypotheses, we discuss two major
fields in which a social contribution can be made, namely empowerment and
vulnerability.
Empowerment Empowerment is a process of change by which individuals
or groups with little or no power, e.g. women or poor communities, gain in
their power and ability to make choices that can change their lives (Cheston
and Kuhn, 2002). According to this definition, we discuss several sub-fields
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that are relevant in the context of our study.
Women’s empowerment, particularly women’s economic empowerment, is the
core mission of United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO.org,
2018). Kiva offers a special loan category, exclusively to female borrowers, and
prioritizes it on the loan requests list. As of October 2017, 81% borrowers
supported through Kiva have been female (Kiva.org, 2018a). Most researchers
agree that prosocial lenders prefer female borrowers. Heller and Badding (2012)
find that Kiva female borrowers in the intermediation-based model are funded
40% faster than their male counterparts. Ly and Mason (2012a) also confirm
that it takes female borrowers of Kiva intermediated loans less time gain funding.
Therefore, we expect female borrowers of Kiva direct loans to receive more
support from investors.
Compared with individual direct loans, group direct loans are expected to
attract more investment as they involve more people and a higher level of social
contribution is probable. In the intermediated model, group loans have been
found to be more likely to raise funds (Berns et al., 2018). In contrast, Ly and
Mason (2012a) find that individual loans can be funded faster than group loans
in the Kiva intermediation-based model, but they attest to the fact that if the
group size is relatively large, group loans are definitely preferred because more
beneficiaries profit from these loans.
Kiva direct loan investors can be expected to appreciate loan applicants who
express their expectations for the future in the descriptive text. Moss et al.
(2015) argue that entrepreneurs who signal their confidence to succeed in their
future businesses are more likely to make a considerable effort to overcome
unfavorable conditions and to accomplish their goals. By showing their strong
expectations in the loan proceeds, borrowers present a picture to investors
concerning how their lives could be changed by receiving the loan. Loan
applications with clear individual visions regarding the future can thus convince
investors that a social impact is very likely to be made through the support
of these people. By taking this perspective, we assume that borrowers with
purpose statements will probably gain more support from Kiva direct loan
investors.
Furthermore, the investors could pay attention to an emphasis on family, with
a view to supporting social empowerment. As suggested by Freedman and Jin
(2008), loans requests on Prosper which mention family members are more likely
to be funded. Allison et al. (2015) also find that words for family members and
generic terms that refer to humans in the description texts, written by the MFI,
can reduce time to funding for Kiva intermediated loans.
Moreover, we expect that borrowers who place emphasis on helping the com-
munity receive more support from investors. As Calic and Mosakowski (2016)
suggest, orientation of crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter towards sus-
tainability can positively affect the fundraising result. Moss et al. (2017) also
demonstrate that Kiva intermediated loan investors are more quick to lend
to borrowers that highlight their social positioning. By supporting prosocial
borrowers, Kiva direct loan investors do not only help borrowers to fulfill their
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personal goals but also help more people indirectly. Therefore, we expect these
prosocial loan applications to be preferred by the direct loan investors.
H3 (Empowerment): A description text indicating empowerment
possibilities is positively related with the funding success.
Vulnerability Besides empowering women, family and the community, Kiva
direct loan investors can focus on borrowers who are in a very vulnerable
position and need help urgently to make a social contribution. Borrowers can
evoke strong emotions by expressing their misery in descriptive texts. Jenq
et al. (2015) find that perceived neediness is positively related to the funding
speed of Kiva intermediated loans. According to Dorfleitner et al. (2016), who
study German P2P platforms, loans with negative keywords in descriptive
texts have a higher funding probability. Allison et al. (2013) also demonstrate
that mentioning concerns leads to a more rapid funding process in the Kiva
intermediated loans.
Among the needy and vulnerable borrowers, Kiva direct loan applicants with an
immigration background are of special interest to us in this study. Immigrants
often suffer from a lack of resources and financing support in a foreign country.
According to the survey of Aldén and Hammarstedt (2016), non-European
immigrants in Sweden report upon more discrimination by traditional finance
institutions. Since one of the biggest concerns for investors on Kiva is to help
the needy (Allison et al., 2015), borrowers with an immigration background are
very likely to be the target group to whom Kiva direct loan investors prefer to
lend their helping hand. In summary, we expect that direct loan applicants
that appear to be vulnerable are more likely to be funded.
H4 (Vulnerability): If the description text indicates that a bor-
rower is more vulnerable, the probability of funding is higher.
4.4 Data and methodology
4.4.1 Data description
Our analysis is based on interest-free direct loans which are requested by US
citizens using the direct P2P model on Kiva. The data set is derived from Kiva’s
public API and includes loan applications posted on Kiva between 2011 and
2017 which can either be categorized as ’successfully funded’ or ’non-successfully
funded’. The data set is extended through the addition of information extracted
from the original campaign webpages. Loan applications include information
on loan conditions and the trustee endorsement if a trustee is provided. The
applicant’s personality and the purpose for the loan request are described in a
descriptive text, written individually by the borrower. The data set is cleared
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by removing observations with unrealistic values regarding the loan amount >
10.000 USD (strict limit defined by Kiva) and unsound loan applications without
a description text and therefore lacking information both on the applicant and
the purpose of the loan. The final data set comprises 6,121 observations.
Therein, 4,077 loans are successfully funded and 2,044 loans have expired.
All variables relevant to our analysis are explained in detail in Table 4.1. Two
dependent variables are observable. The first one is funding success, being
defined as a binary variable with a value of one if the loan request is successfully
funded by the crowd of investors and zero otherwise. Additionally, the funding
time for funded loans is observable. The funding time in days measures how
long it has taken loan applicants to receive successful funding via the crowd.
The second dependent variable, reversed funding time, is defined by calculating
1,000 divided by the funding time in days, thereby, setting the reversed funding
time of non-funded loans below the smallest calculated value (numerically equal
to zero), representing an infinite funding time. Values are logarithmized.
All four hypotheses stated above are tested through several explanatory variables.
First, one of the most obvious differences amongst loan applications is whether
it is endorsed by a trustee or not, which is the subject of the first hypothesis.
Whether or not a trustee is given is incorporated with a dummy variable. The
trustee type can be distinguished between individuals, non-profit organizations
and others. For loan applications with trustee endorsement, we are able to
calculate the trustee’s experience in days at Kiva at the point of time the
respective, new loan application is posted publicly. Furthermore, we include a
dummy variable for the trustee’s proximity to the loan applicant by comparing
the US-state in which the trustee and the loan applicant are located. The
proximity of trustees and loan applicants located in the same US-state are
perceived as being higher.
Insights into the applicant’s personality and the purpose of the loan are mainly
provided in the description text which we have used and in which we have
searched for keywords in order to gather further details. All keywords are
defined and reported in Table 4.2.
Second, in order to test whether the applicant’s effort to build trust helps to
attract potential investors, signals within the description text are considered. A
first indication of the applicant’s willingness to share information with potential
investors is the extent of the description text. The extent of the description
text is summarized by the number (#) of words. With the text analysis using
Business Keywords the applicant’s intention of planned entrepreneurship can
be discovered. The variable Keyword Education clarifies whether the applicant
appears to have an appropriate educational background to enable the successful
management of the entrepreneurial activity.
In the context of social lending, the empowerment attained through the granted
credit is highly valuable to investors, being the subject of H3. A dummy variable
for individual indicates whether the loan supports only one individual borrower
or more people, as is the case with a group of borrowers. The applicant’s
gender as one of the most discussed aspects in microfinance and crowdlending
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is considered, in order to illustrate if explicitly female borrowers are empowered
(e.g. D’Espallier et al., 2011; Heller and Badding, 2012). Female/male individuals
or groups of only female/only male borrowers are defined as being female/male,
respectively. Groups consisting of male and female individuals are categorized
as being mixed. The applicant’s expectation associated with the access to
and usage of the loan is represented by the dummy variable Keyword Purpose.
Furthermore, empowerment beyond the applicant’s own benefit is measured
by the Keyword Family and the Keyword Community, which measure the
mentioning of family members and the community in which the loan applicant
belongs respectively.
Last but not least, the applicant’s vulnerability is measured by the immigration
background and negative keywords following the findings of e.g. Allison et al.
(2013) and Dorfleitner et al. (2016). The immigration background of the
applicant and/or his family is considered if this aspect is explicitly mentioned
in the loan application. Otherwise the applicant is assumed to be a native
US-citizen with no immigration background. Furthermore, the description
text usually includes information about the applicant’s social and emotional
constitution. Negative Keywords are associated with the applicant’s vulnerability
as the applicant appears to already have faced severe difficulties and social
abuse.
The following control variables are considered in the analysis. Loan conditions
like the loan amount in USD and the loan length in months are included through
the variable principal per month. Furthermore, the intended usage of the loan
is categorized into one of 14 activity sectors such as services and food. In
contrast to negative keywords, Positive Keywords support the applicant in
being perceived as having a balanced social constitution, which is included as
a control variable. While all loan applicants are visualized in a photograph,
only a few loan applicants use a video to further emphasize their personality.
A dummy variable for the availability of a video is included. Additionally, the
US-state in which the loan applicant is located and the year in which the loan
was posted are also considered. As a last control variable we include the time
until expiration of an open loan application on Kiva. All loan applications have
a defined time period during which the loan must to be fully funded; otherwise
the loan application - as a non-funded loan - is removed from Kiva’s webpage.
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Variable Expected effect Description
Dependent variables
Funding success Binary variable with the value of one if a loan application
meets its funding goal, zero otherwise.
Reversed funding time Metric variable calculated as 1000 divided by the funding time
(in days). The funding time indicates how long it takes loan
applicants to meet funding goals. Values are logrithmized.
Cox survival time Metric variable for the funding time (in days) for funded loans.
For non-funded loans, the time until expiration is employed
as survival time. Values are logarithmized.
H1 Trustee endorsement
Trustee + Dummy variable with the value of one if the loan application
has a trustee, zero otherwise.
Type Trustees are categorized into individuals, non-profit organiza-
tion, others, and no trustee endorsement. Reference category:
Individuals.
Trustee’s experience + Time period in days the trustee has had experience on Kiva.
Trustee’s proximity + Dummy variable with the value of one if the trustee and the
applicant are located in the same US-state, zero otherwise.
H2 Trust
# of words + Length of the narrative description of the business idea and
the applicant’s background measured in 100 words.
Keyword_Business + Dummy variable with the value of one if the applicant’s
planned entrepreneurship is explained, zero otherwise.
Keyword_Education + Dummy variable with the value of one if the applicant’s edu-
cational background is stated, zero otherwise.
H3 Empowerment
Gender + Categorical variable for female individual/groups, male indi-
vidual/group, and mixed group consisting of female and male
borrowers. Reference category: Male individual/groups.
Individual − Dummy variable with the value of one if the loan is a individ-
ual loan, zero otherwise.
Keyword_Purpose + Dummy variable with the value of one if the applicant’s expec-
tation with the help of loan proceeds is stated, zero otherwise.
Keyword_Family + Empowerment in terms of family members being positively
affected by the loan. Dummy variable with the value of one
if family empowerment is stated, zero otherwise.
Keyword_Community + Empowerment in terms of the applicant’s intention to benefit
his or her community. Dummy variable with the value of one
if community empowerment is stated, zero otherwise.
H4 Vulnerability
Immigration + Dummy variable with the value of one if immigration back-
ground of the applicant is given, zero otherwise.
Keyword_Negative + Dummy variable with the value of one if social dislocation of
the loan applicant is mentioned, zero otherwise.
Controls
Principal per month Metric variable calculated as loan amount (in USD) divided
by loan length (in months, the duration between the disbursal
date, and the due date of the last repayment obligation).
Keyword_Positive Dummy variable with the value of one if the applicant’s posi-
tivity experienced is stated, zero otherwise.
Video Dummy variable with the value of one if a video is available,
zero otherwise.
Expiration Metric variable (in months) calculated based on the duration
between posting date on Kiva and planned expiration date.
Year index Index variable for each year in which the loan application is
posted in an ascending order (e.g. 1 for 2011 and 7 for 2017).
Activity sector Dummy variable for activities categorized into agriculture,
arts, clothing, construction, education, entertainment, food,
health, housing, manufacturing, retail, service, transportation,
and wholesale. Reference category: Agriculture
US-state US-state in which the loan applicant is located.
Table 4.1: Definition of variables
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Hypothesis Variable Keywords
H2 Trust Keyword_Business business, career, client, company, customer, employment1,
entrepreneur1, expand, financial stability, invest, job, net-
work, profession1, profitability1, skills1.
Keyword_Education academic, Bachelor, college, degree, education, exam,
graduation1, Master, PhD, (high- / home-) school, student,
study, undergraduate, university.
H3 Empowerment Keyword_Family aunt, boy, brother, (grand-) child, dad, (grand-) daugh-
ter, family, (grand-) father, husband, kid, marriage1, mom,
(grand-) mother, (grand-) parents, partner, pregnant, siblings,
sister, (grand-) son, uncle, wife.
Keyword_Purpose believe, better future, better life, chance, dream, fascination1,
motivation, passion1, purpose, vision.
Keyword_Community community, friend, help1, serving others, support1.
H4 Vulnerability Keyword_Negative abuse, addiction1, cancer, civil war, death, defeat me, des-
tiny, difficulty1, disruption1 drug, enemy, hard work, incarcer-
ation, insane, pain1, passed away, poverty, prison, sick, ups
and downs, victim.
Controls Keyword_Positive enjoy, fun, happiness1, greatness1, love1, pleasure, smile1,
thankful, thank you.
Table 4.2: Categorical variables depicting possible keywords in the description text
Notes: The keywords are obtained by analyzing the description text of loan applicants using
the computerized text analysis software LIWC2015. All keywords are stated as being singular.
The respective plural words are also taken into account. 1 indicates that all respective verbs,
adjectives, and adverbs are also taken into account as keywords.
4.4.2 Methodology
The main determinants of successful debt funding through Kiva by socially-
oriented investors are expected as being credit risk and social impact. Credit risk
is measured by the facts of trustee endorsement and a borrower’s willingness to
share information, summarized in the vector Ri in our models. The borrower’s
vulnerability and the empowerment of the borrower and others identify the
social impact, considered in our model as vector Si. Vector Ci represents the
loan-specific controls and the year index. The loan-specific error term is i. The
latent variable Y ∗i is determined through
Y ∗i = β0 + β1Ri + β2Si + β3Ci + i ,
which is fed into respective link functions according to the logistic and tobit
estimations. The dependent variable is – either funding success or reversed
funding time. First, funding success, being defined as a binary variable, is
subject to our research. We use logistic regression models with Eicker-Huber-
White robust standard errors to estimate the probability of successful debt
funding. Second, we are interested in the funding time which is only observable
as a positive time interval for successfully funded loans but not for non-funded
loans. In order not to lose the observations of non-funded loans and to account
for our total data sample consisting of censored (reversed funding time = 0) and
uncensored (reversed funding time > 0) observations, we apply tobit models
with robust standard errors.
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4.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.4 and Table 4.3 report upon the descriptive statistics for metric and
categorical variables which contribute to test our hypothesis. The descriptive
statistics for our control variables are displayed in Table A1 in the appendix.
The requested loan amount ranges from 100 USD to 10,000 USD, which is
set as the upper credit limit by Kiva. On average, the loan length is 25.2
months. The calculated principal per month is defined with a minimum value of
10.4 USD/month and a maximum value of 1,333.3USD/month. Both extreme
scenarios correspond to the subsample of non-funded loans. Only a small
portion of the loans is requested by groups of at least two individuals as
98% are requested by individuals. The majority of loan applicants is female,
compromising 57% of the entire sample. More than 60% of the successfully
funded loans are given to female borrowers.
A trustee is available for less than half of the loan applications on Kiva. In the
subsample of funded loans, 55% of the loans are endorsed by a trustee, whereas
in the subsample of non-funded loans, only 16% of the observations are endorsed
by a trustee. On average, the trustee has experience of almost 15 months, which
is a factor that does not differ greatly between the subsamples. The negative
minimum value of -119 days is reasonable in the case of a trustee being acquired
after public posting of a loan and the commencement of fundraising. Most of the
trustees are categorized as being others, followed by Non-Profit organizations
and lastly by individuals. In more than 90% of the cases, the trustee and the
loan applicant are located in the same US-state.
The description text comprises an average of 545 individual words. The text
description is more comprehensive in the subsample of successfully funded
loans compared with the subsample of non-funded loans. The keyword search
reveals that more than 80% of the loan applicants describe their expectations
related to the loan. Loan applications which do not state the entrepreneurial
activity are seldom. The educational background is frequently stated. 84% of
loan applicants provide insights into their family situation and an astonishing
96% about the community the applicant belongs to. In 19% of the cases, an
immigration background is explicitly mentioned in the description text. The
share of immigrants significantly differs by 7.5% between the subsamples of
funded loans and non-funded loans. In less than 32% of all cases, the description
text includes negative aspects, but in more than 72% it contains positive aspects.
Regarding our controls, the availability of a video is unusual in single cases.
The loans are widely distributed among the activity sectors with a peak for
services, followed by food and retail.
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Total sample Funded loans Non-funded loans
N=6,121 N=4,077 N=2,044
Variable Obs. Relative Obs. Relative Obs. Relative
Funding success
Yes 4,077 66.61 4,077 100.00 0 0.00
No 2,044 33.39 0 0.00 2,044 100.00
Trustee
Yes 2,588 42.28 2,255 55.31 333 16.29
No 3,533 57.72 1,822 44.69 1,711 83.71
Type
Individual 478 7.81 405 9.93 73 3.57
Non-Profit 899 14.69 804 19.72 95 4.65
Others 1,211 19.78 1,046 25.66 165 8.07
No endorsement 3,533 57.72 1,822 44.69 1,711 83.71
Trustee’s proximity
Yes 2,358 91.15 2,070 91.84 288 86.49
No 229 8.85 184 8.16 45 13.51
Keyword_Business
Yes 6,053 98.89 4,031 98.87 2,022 98.92
No 68 1.11 46 1.13 22 1.08
Keyword_Education
Yes 3,873 63.27 2,638 64.70 1,235 60.42
No 2,248 36.73 1,439 35.30 809 39.58
Individual
Yes 6,020 98.35 3,993 97.94 2,027 99.17
No 101 1.65 84 2.06 17 0.83
Gender
Male 2,521 41.19 1,532 37.58 989 48.39
Female 3,530 57.67 2,488 61.03 1,402 50.98
Mixed 70 1.14 57 1.40 13 0.64
Keyword_Purpose
Yes 5,018 81.98 3,416 83.79 1,602 78.38
No 1,103 18.02 661 16.21 442 21.62
Keyword_Family
Yes 5,180 84.63 3,500 85.85 1,680 82.19
No 941 15.37 577 14.15 364 17.81
Keyword_Community
Yes 5,897 96.34 3,937 96.57 1,960 95.89
No 224 3.66 140 3.43 84 4.11
Immigration
Yes 1,183 19.33 889 21.81 294 14.38
No 4,938 80.67 3,188 78.19 1,750 85.62
Keyword_Negative
Yes 1,954 31.92 1,334 32.72 620 30.33
No 4,167 68.08 2,743 67.28 1,424 69.67
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for main categorical variables
Notes: The entire data sample contains 6,121 observations. Absolute values and relative
values of the categorical variables are displayed. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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Total sample
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Loan amount 6,121 4,914.41 3,036.05 100.00 5,000.00 10,000.00
Loan length (in months) 6,121 25.24 8.14 1.00 24.00 51.00
Principal per month 6,121 183.80 86.74 10.42 208.33 1333.33
# of words (in 100 words) 6,121 5.45 2.27 0.66 5.25 26.25
Trustee’s experience (in days) 2,588 442.34 472.86 -119.00 280.00 2073.00
Expiration (in days) 6,121 67.74 125.63 15.00 52.50 1,682.01
Funded loans
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Funding time (in days) 4,077 44.15 30.09 0.10 39.04 300.55
Loan amount 4,077 5,206.48 2,994.86 100.00 5,000.00 10,000.00
Loan length (in months) 4,077 25.87 8.10 1.00 24.00 51.00
Principal per month 4,077 191.92 82.07 12.50 208.33 1111.11
# of words (in 100 words) 4,077 5.70 2.22 0.84 5.56 26.25
Trustee’s experience (in days) 2,255 440.50 472.36 -119.00 273.00 1986.00
Expiration (in days) 4,077 79.89 150.76 15.01 58.05 1682.01
Non-funded loans
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Loan amount 2,044 4,331.85 3,034.47 125.00 5,000.00 10,000.00
Loan length (in months) 2,044 23.98 8.09 6.00 24.00 42.00
Principal per month 2,044 167.62 93.30 10.42 166.67 1333.33
# of words (in 100 words) 2,044 4.95 2.28 0.66 4.65 21.39
Trustee’s experience (in days) 333 454.76 476.72 -62.00 336.00 2073.00
Expiration (in days) 2,044 43.52 32.48 15.00 34.59 462.76
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for metric variables
Notes: The entire data sample contains 6,121 observations. The variables are defined in Table
3.1.
Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients for exogenous metric variables are shown
in Table 4.5. We do not expect any multicollinearity issues as all pairwise
correlations are far below 0.8, which is the critical value according to Kennedy
(2008).
1. 2. 3. 4.
1. Principal per month 1.000
2. Trustee’s experience 0.1640∗ 1.000
3. # of words 0.1706∗ 0.0799∗ 1.000
4. Expiration 0.1638∗ −0.0221 0.0613∗ 1.000
Table 4.5: Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients for metric exogenous variables
Notes: Values labeled with the symbol ∗ are significant at the 5% level. The variables are
defined in Table 3.1.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Results regarding the funding success
We focus on the empirical results of the estimated logistic models regarding
the probability of funding success on Kiva. The respective logistic regression
models are presented in Table 4.6. Model I is the basic model consisting of
details which are obvious in the loan applications. It is extended by adding
the different types of trustees, resulting in model II. Model III is the main
model, including visible and less-visible details on credit risk indicators and
social performance indicators of loan applications as determinants of funding
success.
First, the credit risk associated with a loan application and its impact on
the probability of funding success is investigated by considering two aspects,
namely trustee endorsement and the foundation of trust. The dummy variable
clarifying whether or not a loan application is endorsed by a trustee provides a
clear picture as it is positive and significant at the 1% level. Loans which are
endorsed by a trustee are more likely to be funded than loans without trustee
endorsement. The result is further strengthened by the dummy variables stating
the type of trustee in model II. While loans without endorsements are less
likely to be funded compared with loans underwritten by an individual, loans
promoted by a non-profit organization are even more likely to be funded.
Furthermore, the foundation of trust between the investor and the borrower
is expected to play a role. The length of the description text is used as a
measurement for the borrower’s willingness to share information. The coefficient
of the number of words is positive and significant. Therefore, the longer the
text description, the higher the probability of successful funding. However, the
investor could be overwhelmed if a text description is too long. The squared
number of words is included in order to test for such a u-shaped relation. The
coefficient of this variable is significant and negative. Regarding the coefficients
of Keyword_Business and the Keyword_Education, we are unable to find any
evidence as the coefficients are not significant.
Second, the investor’s social return of providing capital is also examined by
considering two aspects, namely the empowerment and support of vulnerable
borrowers. The dummy variable demonstrating female borrowers is positive
and significant in all model specifications. Female borrowers are more likely to
receive funding than their male counterparts. Regarding whether the loan is
requested by an individual or a group of borrowers, we are able to ascertain that
individual applicants have more difficulties to receiving funding than groups
of borrowers. The borrower’s expectation of entrepreneurship by accessing
capital through the loan is examined, but the corresponding coefficient is
not significant. Besides the benefits for the loan applicants themselves, it is
desirable for family members or the community to benefit from the given capital.
However, keywords associated with family prove themselves to be negatively
related to funding success. The result is significant and contradictory to our
expectation. One possible reason could be that the borrower’s dependency on
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and responsibility for his or her family members appears to be obstructive in
terms of entrepreneurship as opposed to positive in terms of empowerment.
The second variable demonstrating community empowerment is positive but
not significant.
Regarding the borrower’s social circumstances, the main difference between
loan applications is whether or not the loan applicant has an immigration
background. The coefficient of the respective dummy variable is positive and
significant at the 1% level, providing evidence that immigrants are more likely
to be successfully funded through the crowd of socially-oriented investors. One
reason behind this finding may be that investors perceive immigrants as being
more needy based on their individual narratives as well as that they generally
associate immigrants as being vulnerable and suffering from exclusion in the
United States. In contrast, the borrower’s previous social dislocation stated by
negative words does not appear to be a significant determinant.
The considered control variable for the time until expiration of the loan ap-
plication shows a positive and significant coefficient. Loans without a strict
time limit for fundraising are more likely to be funded. It is interesting that
the year index variable is positive and significant, which could be considered
as an indication for the investor’s learning curve in terms of supporting US
direct loans. Taking into account that the volume of US direct loans on Kiva
has increased significantly over the last years (see Table A1) as well as the
positive development of funding success, it appears promising that investors are
becoming more confident when providing capital directly to US citizens in need.
None of the other controls such as Keyword_Positive, Principal per month and
video dummy provide any further insights.
Additionally, the data sample is divided into the subsamples of loan applications
with trustee endorsement and the subsample of loan applications without trustee
endorsement. The subsample regressions support our understanding of whether
investors of loans strengthened by social underwriting through trustees behave
more risk-aversely or less socially than investors who invest in unsecured loans.
In the subsample of endorsed loans, 38 observations are lost as all loans requested
by a mixed group of female and male individuals are successfully funded. The
focus on the subsample of loans with trustee endorsement in model IV and V
allows us to include further variables that provide details about the trustees
and the investors’ responses to them. The trustee’s experience of supporting
loans on Kiva is positive and significant in model IV, but not in model V, which
also includes the year index. Consequently, as the trustee’s experience in days
increases with the years, the result appears to be time-dependent and should
not be overvalued. A noteworthy observation is the positive and significant
coefficient of a trustee’s proximity to the borrower. The fact that trustees
and borrowers are located in the same US-state is positively related to the
funding success. One reason behind this finding could be that investors assess
the ability and power of trustees to guide and monitor borrowers to improve if
the proximity to the borrower is given.
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Regarding the borrower’s willingness to share information in the description
text, the results are similar to those in the total data set. The coefficient of
the number of words is positive and significant. The u-shaped relation is only
significant for the subsample of loans without trustee endorsement in column
VI. The keywords illustrating the planned entrepreneurship and the borrower’s
educational background remain insignificant.
Regarding empowerment, in contrast to the main models, the individual dummy
is not significant for either of the subsamples. Female borrowers still appear to
be targeted by investors. Keywords associated with family remain negative and
significant in the subsample of loans without trustee endorsement. This may
signal the investors’ doubt about the possibility of the explicitly mentioned care
of family members being brought into line with successful entrepreneurship,
especially without the support of a trustee. Keywords regarding the community
and the borrower’s expectations concerning the business remain insignificant.
The vulnerability of borrowers emphasized by the immigration background and
negative words does not appear to have any impact on the probability of the
funding success in the subsample of loans endorsed by a trustee. In contrast,
the immigration dummy is positive and significant in the subsample of loans
without trustee endorsement. These investors appear to highly value the social
impact of investing in immigrants while other investors are more reluctant to
provide capital to immigrants. The coefficient of negative keywords is positive
but not significant.
The coefficient of the video dummy is negative and slightly significant in model
V. Investors do not appear to view video messages given in the loan application
particularly positively. The results of all other included control variables remain
unchanged compared with the models on the total data set.
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All observations with trustee w/t trustee
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Trustee endorsement
Trustee 1.5852*** 1.5398***
(0.0881) (0.0886)
Type_Non_Profit 0.3114* -0.0535 0.0455
(0.1828) (0.1903) (0.1920)
Type_Others -0.0463 -0.3274* -0.2496
(0.1661) (0.1783) (0.1798)
Type_No_End. -1.5132***
(0.1510)
Trustee experience 0.0004*** 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Trustee proximity 0.6564*** 0.6614***
(0.2168) (0.2150)
Trust
# of words 0.2465*** 0.2647*** 0.2645*** 0.2683***
(0.0468) (0.0872) (0.0873) (0.0587)
# of words2 -0.0096*** -0.0093 -0.0089 -0.0109***
(0.0032) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0041)
Keyword_Business 0.0294 0.3369 0.3248 -0.1019
(0.2981) (0.4354) (0.4378) (0.3940)
Keyword_Education -0.0226 0.1292 0.1525 -0.0332
(0.0696) (0.1344) (0.1336) (0.0839)
Empowerment
Individual -1.0796* -1.0952** -0.9528* -1.3781 -1.4042 -0.8295
(0.5519) (0.5507) (0.5608) (1.1968) (1.1501) (0.7150)
Gender_female 0.5735*** 0.5769*** 0.5298*** 0.2388* 0.2280* 0.6389***
(0.0683) (0.0683) (0.0698) (0.1369) (0.1365) (0.0849)
Gender_mixed -0.3578 -0.3598 -0.2615 -0.4520
(0.6348) (0.6339) (0.6404) (0.8156)
Keyword_Purpose 0.1307 0.1193 0.1520 0.1046
(0.0838) (0.1709) (0.1692) (0.1007)
Keyword_Family -0.1965** -0.0707 -0.1169 -0.2381**
(0.0915) (0.1710) (0.1706) (0.1116)
Keyword_Community 0.0729 -0.1594 -0.2733 0.1845
(0.1642) (0.3191) (0.3264) (0.2048)
Vulnerability
Immigration 0.5991*** -0.1029 -0.1323 0.7473***
(0.0969) (0.1803) (0.1801) (0.1095)
Keyword_Negative -0.0162 -0.1147 -0.1093 0.0261
(0.0715) (0.1378) (0.1375) (0.0854)
Controls
Keyword_Positive -0.1092 -0.1465 -0.1414 -0.1024
(0.0751) (0.1461) (0.1452) (0.0909)
Principal_month 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Video -0.1297 -0.1395 -0.1438 -0.6957 -0.8832* 0.2408
(0.3123) (0.3142) (0.3107) (0.4658) (0.4799) (0.3371)
Expiration 0.0342*** 0.0341*** 0.0335*** 0.0213*** 0.0262*** 0.0372***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0046)
Year Index 0.3287*** 0.3309*** 0.3196*** 0.2132** 0.3169***
(0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0419) (0.0844) (0.0526)
Activity sector yes yes yes yes yes yes
US-state yes yes yes yes yes yes
_cons -1.5408* -0.0480 -2.7005*** 1.3975 0.2327 -3.0215***
(0.8953) (0.9101) (1.0089) (1.4965) (1.6047) (1.0334)
N 6,121 6,121 6,121 2,550 2,550 3,533
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.261 0.273 0.135 0.140 0.213
Table 4.6: Coefficients of logistic models on funding success
Notes: Models I - III include all observations. Model IV - VI consider the subsamples of
loans with and without trustee endorsement separately. Model I is extended by including
the different types of trustees, resulting in Model II. Model III is the main model including
several social performance indicators which have been extracted through keywords from the
description text. Models IV - VI follow the main model. Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-
consistent errors are used. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at
the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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4.5.2 Results regarding the funding time
In addition to the funding success, the funding time of loan applications on
Kiva can be observed. Subject to our tobit regressions is the calculated reversed
funding time. This means that the faster a loan is funded, the higher the reversed
funding time and vice versa. Tobit regression is able to deal with censored data,
which safeguards against the loss of observations of non-funded loans. The
model set up is unchanged and follows the applied logistic models. The results
are displayed in Table 4.7. Models I - III include the entire 6,121 observations
for funded and non-funded loans independently of trustee endorsement.
First, focusing on the variables measuring credit risk provides us with a clear
picture of the fact that credit risk is negatively perceived by investors and
results in a longer time until funding is granted. Trustee endorsement has a
positive impact and leads to a reduced funding time which is confirmed by both
variables, the trustee dummy and the types of trustees.
Signals in the description text as an instrument to build trust and attract
potential investors appear to have an influence on the funding time as well.
In accordance with the regressions on funding success, a longer description
text reduces the funding time, the u-shaped relation is observable and Key-
word_Business and Keyword_Education are insignificant.
Second, the social impact of the investment decision is taken into account
while making the decision regarding which loan application to support. Loans
requested by groups of borrowers and female borrowers are funded more quickly
as the respective variables are significant in all model specifications, whereas
keywords for family and community do not appear to be crucial predictors.
Additionally, the coefficient of keywords stating the purpose for the loan ap-
plication appears to be positive and significant. This is a first indication that
investors are attracted by the borrower’s expectation related to the access to
capital.
Regarding the vulnerability of the borrower, the results on funding time follow
those on funding success. Borrowers stating an immigration background receive
faster funding while the borrower’s previous social dislocation does not appear
to influence the funding time.
The coefficient of the principal per month is negatively related to the funding
time. This could be due to the investor’s distrust in the borrower’s ability to
repay a proportionally high loan amount succeeding a short loan period. Loan
applications including positive keywords appear to experience a slower funding
process. The included control variable of time until expiration is positive and
significant. The year index appears to be significant in all model specifications.
This illustrates that the funding time decreases with the years. Taking into
account the growing amount of direct loan applications on Kiva, the result is
only explicable if either the pool of potential investors increases or the existing
investors invest more capital. Both possibilities are interesting in terms of
Kiva’s future development.
Furthermore, both tobit models for the subsamples of loans with and without
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trustee endorsement are conducted separately. The results are shown in models
IV, V, and VI in Table 4.7. In the subsample of loans with trustee endorsement,
loans endorsed by an individual tend to be funded more quickly than loans
supported by third parties categorized as non-profit organization or others.
Additionally, investors appear to positively react to the trustee’s experience
and the proximity between trustee and borrower, resulting in a lower funding
time for endorsed loans. Regarding the signals in the description text that
build trust, the results on funding success for both subsamples are confirmed
through the existence of a similar relationship between the variables and the
funding time. In terms of empowerment, the coefficients of the variables remain
unchanged compared with the findings on funding success. Female borrowers
are preferreda and the dummies for individuals, the borrower’s expectation
and community empowerment are insignificant. Keywords representing the
borrower’s family are negatively related to funding time in the subsample of
loans without trustee endorsement.
Again, the difference between the subsamples is apparent when looking at the
borrower’s vulnerability. The immigration background appears to be a main
predictor for the funding time of loans lacking trustee endorsement. This is not
the case for loans endorsed by a trustee. The coefficient of negative keywords is
also contrary for both subsamples, but not significant.
The principal per month remains negative, albeit slightly significant only in
the subsample of loans without trustee endorsement. All control variables
demonstrate the same significant relations as those in the funding success
analysis.
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all observations with Trustee w/t Trustee
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Trustee endorsement
Trustee 1.0305*** 0.9765***
(0.0483) (0.0484)
Type_Non_Profit 0.1144 -0.0708 -0.0015
(0.0883) (0.0626) (0.0634)
Type_Others -0.0537 -0.1754*** -0.1236**
(0.0841) (0.0599) (0.0602)
Type_No_End. -1.0187***
(0.0798)
Trustee experince 0.0003*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Trustee proximity 0.2308*** 0.2315***
(0.0790) (0.0784)
Trust
# of words 0.1671*** 0.0819** 0.0832** 0.2569***
(0.0289) (0.0351) (0.0348) (0.0476)
# of words2 -0.0070*** -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0106***
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0030)
Keyword_Business -0.0240 0.0843 0.0684 -0.0396
(0.1942) (0.1717) (0.1704) (0.4057)
Keyword_Education -0.0497 0.0022 0.0097 -0.0458
(0.0443) (0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0797)
Empowerment
Individual -0.6085** -0.6186** -0.5539** -0.2963 -0.3212 -0.7161
(0.2753) (0.2752) (0.2727) (0.2497) (0.2479) (0.5373)
Gender_female 0.4591*** 0.4606*** 0.4209*** 0.1370*** 0.1291*** 0.6938***
(0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0431) (0.0805)
Gender_mixed -0.2460 -0.2450 -0.2003 -0.0741 -0.0932 -0.2567
(0.3317) (0.3314) (0.3285) (0.2985) (0.2964) (0.6573)
Keyword_Purpose 0.1030* 0.0250 0.0446 0.1095
(0.0545) (0.0578) (0.0575) (0.0957)
Keyword_Family -0.0887 -0.0152 -0.0308 -0.2404**
(0.0590) (0.0591) (0.0587) (0.1081)
Keyword_Community 0.0653 0.0341 -0.0232 0.1597
(0.1111) (0.1046) (0.1043) (0.2169)
Vulnerability
Immigration 0.4342*** -0.0694 -0.0749 0.7463***
(0.0553) (0.0581) (0.0577) (0.0988)
Keyword_Negative 0.0121 -0.0643 -0.0621 0.0642
(0.0441) (0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0801)
Controls
Keyword_Positive -0.0854* -0.0717 -0.0667 -0.0945
(0.0473) (0.0481) (0.0477) (0.0855)
Principal_month -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Video -0.1104 -0.1180 -0.0970 -0.4076* -0.5013** 0.1679
(0.1956) (0.1956) (0.1940) (0.2143) (0.2132) (0.3242)
Expiration 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0156***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0014)
Year Index 0.1702*** 0.1724*** 0.1660*** 0.1032*** 0.3287***
(0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0476)
Activity sector yes yes yes yes yes yes
US-state yes yes yes yes yes yes
_cons 2.0411*** 3.0306*** 1.3009** 3.1608*** 2.8117*** -0.3850
(0.4986) (0.5013) (0.5417) (0.3698) (0.3726) (0.8794)
N 6,121 6,121 6,121 2,588 2,588 3,533
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.072 0.078 0.040 0.044 0.087
Table 4.7: Coefficients of tobit models on reversed funding time
Notes: Models I - III include all observations. Models IV - VI consider the subsamples
of loans with and without trustee endorsement separately. Model I is extended by the
including different types of trustees, resulting in Model II. Model III is the main model
including several social performance indicators, which have been extracted through keywords
from the description text. Models IV - VI follow the main model. Eicker-Huber-White
heteroskedastic-consistent errors are used. Values labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level. The variables are defined in
Table 3.1.
100
Chapter 4. Funding determinants in interest-free P2P lending
4.5.3 Implication regarding the hypotheses
We hypothesize that investors consider both the credit risk and the social
impact of their investment decisions. Credit risk is examined by two hypotheses,
namley the existence of a trustee and the borrower’s ability to build trust.
All in all, H1, which states that potential investors perceive the existence of a
trustee to be supportive in terms of evaluating creditworthiness, limiting credit
risk, and ensuring repayment of the employed capital, is supported.
The borrower’s willingness to share information is positively related to the
funding success and reversed funding time as it builds trust and attracts
investors, which supports our expectation in H2. However, text descriptions
which are too long are not favorable and tend to deter investors. Signals
of entrepreneurship and education in the text description do not appear to
influence the investor’s behavior.
The social impact of the investment decision is examined by two further hy-
pothesis, namely those of empowerment and support for vulnerable borrowers.
Clear evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3 is observed in terms of empowering
women as female borrowers are favored by investors. Groups of borrowers
are more likely to be funded and receive funding faster when considering the
total sample, but this is not apparent in the subsample regression. Signals
of the borrower’s expectations associated with access to capital are positively
recognized by investors throughout the entire sample but not in the subsamples.
Empowerment beyond the borrowers themselves does not appear to attract
investors. In the subsample of loans without trustee endorsement, investors
are even reluctant to provide capital to applicants who explicitly mention their
responsibility towards family members.
Hypothesis 4 on the vulnerability of borrowers is confirmed for the complete
sample and the subsample of loans without trustee endorsement. The financial
needs of immigrants are recognized and investors strive to support these appli-
cants. But this is not the case for investors funding loans with the endorsement
of trustees. The clear difference between investors leads us to the conclusion
that some investors are already satisfied through investing in these types of
interest-free direct loans, whereas others perceive additional value in the act
of supporting immigrants. The borrower’s previous social dislocation does not
appear to evoke investors’ emotions at all.
4.5.4 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of our main findings, Cox proportional hazard models,
which analyze the ’survival time’ of the loan application, are carried out. There,
both dependent variables, namely funding success and funding time, are jointly
considered as being the time interval until the event of being successfully funded
is estimated. Seven observations are lost due to negative values subsequent to
taking the logarithm of the funding time. The regression results are shown in
Table 4.8.
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Considering all observations in the columns I, II, and III, the majority of
variables reveals itself to be consistent with our main results. A difference arises
regarding the signals that build trust. The u-shaped relation of the length of
the text description is not confirmed anymore. However, the tendency remains
unchanged. Keywords associated with education turn out to be negative and
slightly significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of keywords regarding the
borrower’s family becomes significant. This finding could be influenced by
the significant regression result in the event of being successfully funded. In
summary, the overall picture is robust as our hypotheses are supported by the
main indicators.
The results of Cox models for the subsamples of loans both with and without
trustee endorsement are presented in columns IV - VI. Most of the results remain
stable with same values and slightly changed confidence levels. Compared with
the main model, Hypothesis 3 is further confirmed by the significant coefficient of
the dummy variable, indicating an individual versus group loan. A considerable
gain in insight can be seen in the fact that the borrower’s vulnerability is
able to attract investors who invest in loans without trustee endorsement but
outfaces investors who invest in endorsed loans. Both variables - Immigration
and Keyword_Negative - demonstrate significant and contrary coefficients in
the subsamples. This result clarifies our presumption based on our main results
obtained by running tobit regressions. The control variable Keywords_Positive
is negative and becomes significant in the subsample of loans endorsed by a
trustee, indicating that these investors do not appreciate emotions. Overall,
the regression results positively both contribute to and conform to our main
models.
102
Chapter 4. Funding determinants in interest-free P2P lending
Cox proportional hazard models
all observations with trustee w/o trustee
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Trustee endorsement
Trustee 0.3743*** 0.3537***
(0.0386) (0.0385)
Type_Non_Profit 0.0270 -0.2021*** -0.0680
(0.0655) (0.0693) (0.0697)
Type_Others -0.0694 -0.2387*** -0.1499**
(0.0611) (0.0654) (0.0644)
Type_No_End. -0.3981***
(0.0609)
Trustee experince 0.0006*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Trustee proximity 0.2757*** 0.2432***
(0.0936) (0.0908)
Trust
# of words 0.0757*** 0.0706** 0.0800** 0.1634***
(0.0248) (0.0346) (0.0370) (0.0429)
# of words2 -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0072**
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Keyword_Business 0.0158 -0.0990 -0.0675 0.1487
(0.1459) (0.1589) (0.1850) (0.2443)
Keyword_Education -0.0639* -0.0266 -0.0260 -0.0475
(0.0353) (0.0484) (0.0494) (0.0518)
Empowerment
Individual -0.5543*** -0.5561*** -0.5338*** -0.3673 -0.4348* -0.6638*
(0.1686) (0.1704) (0.1736) (0.2673) (0.2423) (0.3890)
Gender_female 0.2706*** 0.2717*** 0.2632*** 0.1411*** 0.1444*** 0.4043***
(0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0463) (0.0471) (0.0533)
Gender_mixed -0.3461* -0.3374 -0.3378 -0.2237 -0.2741 -0.4726
(0.2068) (0.2082) (0.2134) (0.3050) (0.2881) (0.4499)
Keyword_Purpose 0.0570 -0.0106 0.0180 0.0521
(0.0445) (0.0620) (0.0621) (0.0637)
Keyword_Family -0.1042** -0.0105 -0.0359 -0.2223***
(0.0471) (0.0638) (0.0655) (0.0725)
Keyword_Community 0.0150 0.1690 0.0707 0.0511
(0.0849) (0.1056) (0.1055) (0.1401)
Vulnerability
Immigration 0.1833*** -0.1366** -0.1513** 0.4493***
(0.0437) (0.0603) (0.0613) (0.0589)
Keyword_Negative -0.0021 -0.1017** -0.0950** 0.0960*
(0.0353) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0524)
Controls
Keyword_Positive -0.0938** -0.0881* -0.0991* -0.0306
(0.0376) (0.0505) (0.0508) (0.0555)
Principal_month -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0018***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Video -0.0496 -0.0540 -0.0426 -0.0692 -0.2775 0.1116
(0.1259) (0.1256) (0.1242) (0.1910) (0.1948) (0.1888)
Expiration -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0007** -0.0002 -0.0385***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0015)
Year Index 0.2641*** 0.2645*** 0.2684*** 0.2365*** 0.1744***
(0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0306)
Activity sector yes yes yes yes yes yes
US-state yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 6,114 6,114 6,114 2,588 2,588 3,526
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.054
Table 4.8: Coefficients of Cox proportional hazard models
Notes: Robustness analysis through Cox proportional hazard models for the total data sample
and exclusively for the subsamples of loans with trustee endorsement as well as loans without
trustee endorsement. Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent errors are used. Values
labeled with the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the
1% level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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Furthermore, we run additional logistic regressions and probit regressions on
funding success, which are shown in Table 4.9. First, we include an interaction
term of trustee endorsement and an immigration dummy in the main logistic
model to further investigate how investors of endorsed loans behave in regards
to loan applicants with an immigration background. The interaction term is
negative and significant at the 1% level, supporting our findings on subsample
regressions, being that investors of endorsed loans tend to pursue minimal credit
risk than increased social impact.
Second, all loan applications with an amount of less than 1,000 USD are excluded
as these ones are less likely to properly support or enable entrepreneurship.
The majority of variables does not change. Keyword_Purpose turns out to be
significant, indicating that the borrower’s expectation increases in importance
concerning higher volume loans. The negative coefficient of Keyword_Family
is not anymore significant.
Third, probit models analogous to the logistic models on all observations and
the subsamples of endorsed and non-endorsed loans are run. The results are
shown in columns III - VI. All variables employed to test the hypothesis on
credit risk and social impact remain stable and are consistent with our main
results.
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all observations with trustee w/o trustee
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Trustee endorsement
Trustee 1.6851*** 1.5450*** 0.9357***
(0.0933) (0.0896) (0.0516)
Type_Non_Profit -0.0116 0.0203
(0.1025) (0.1038)
Type_Others -0.1623* -0.1373
(0.0966) (0.0973)
Trustee experince 0.0002** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Trustee proximity 0.3744*** 0.3769***
(0.1197) (0.1197)
Trust
# of words 0.2555*** 0.2351*** 0.1521*** 0.1531*** 0.1528*** 0.1690***
(0.0479) (0.0475) (0.0272) (0.0522) (0.0525) (0.0339)
# of words2 -0.0101*** -0.0089*** -0.0063*** -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0073***
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0023)
Keyword_Business 0.0660 0.1604 -0.0262 0.1390 0.1375 -0.0891
(0.3021) (0.2849) (0.1725) (0.2454) (0.2474) (0.2303)
Keyword_Education -0.0118 -0.0431 -0.0028 0.0725 0.0788 -0.0051
(0.0699) (0.0710) (0.0411) (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0503)
Empowerment
Individual -0.9245 -0.9519* -0.5706* -0.6569 -0.6827 -0.4851
(0.5678) (0.5609) (0.3065) (0.5611) (0.5499) (0.4119)
Gender_female 0.5145*** 0.5297*** 0.3051*** 0.1331* 0.1315* 0.3754***
(0.0704) (0.0710) (0.0406) (0.0724) (0.0724) (0.0498)
Gender_mixed -0.2172 -0.2475 -0.1154 -0.2196
(0.6495) (0.6398) (0.3534) (0.4718)
Keyword_Purpose 0.1171 0.1432* 0.0798 0.0785 0.0902 0.0620
(0.0845) (0.0849) (0.0490) (0.0924) (0.0923) (0.0591)
Keyword_Family -0.2099** -0.1521 -0.1032* -0.0597 -0.0734 -0.1252*
(0.0927) (0.0925) (0.0533) (0.0936) (0.0938) (0.0663)
Keyword_Community 0.0683 0.0956 0.0574 -0.0516 -0.0823 0.0892
(0.1650) (0.1662) (0.1029) (0.1704) (0.1738) (0.1229)
Vulnerability
Immigration 0.8397*** 0.5919*** 0.3340*** -0.0688 -0.0726 0.4254***
(0.1033) (0.0987) (0.0566) (0.0957) (0.0957) (0.0662)
Keyword_Negative -0.0162 -0.0113 -0.0039 -0.0609 -0.0591 0.0209
(0.0718) (0.0728) (0.0423) (0.0741) (0.0742) (0.0521)
Interaction
Trustee*Immigration -1.0468***
(0.1982)
Controls
Keyword_Positive -0.1057 -0.1257 -0.0683 -0.0693 -0.0688 -0.0629
(0.0754) (0.0768) (0.0439) (0.0788) (0.0787) (0.0535)
Principal_month 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Video -0.1572 -0.1880 -0.0848 -0.3969 -0.4572 0.1377
(0.3164) (0.3130) (0.1803) (0.2793) (0.2829) (0.2031)
Expiration 0.0338*** 0.0332*** 0.0129*** 0.0090*** 0.0101*** 0.0140***
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Year Index 0.3151*** 0.3271*** 0.1492*** 0.0668 0.1788***
(0.0418) (0.0433) (0.0237) (0.0411) (0.0301)
Activity sector yes yes yes yes yes yes
US-state yes yes yes yes yes yes
_cons -2.8633*** -2.6913** -0.9911* 0.8583 0.5497 -1.3529**
(1.0358) (1.0850) (0.5492) (0.7242) (0.7653) (0.6039)
N 6,121 5,927 6,121 2,550 2,550 3,533
Pseudo R2 0.276 0.269 0.256 0.128 0.130 0.192
Table 4.9: Robustness analysis through further logistic and probit models on funding success
Notes: Logit Model I includes an additional interaction term of trustee endorsement and
immigration background. Logit Model II is based on loan applications with a loan amount
> 1,000 USD. Models III - VI are probit models analogous to the main Logit models for
the total data sample and exclusively for the subsamples of loans with and without trustee
endorsement. Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent errors are used. Values labeled
with the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ are significant at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1%
level. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the funding determinants for interest-free P2P lending
by utilizing a unique data set of direct loans requested by US citizens on the
microfinancing platform Kiva during the observation interval from 2011 to 2017.
The data set is unique due to the newly established direct P2P model, the
concept of social financing without interest compensation for credit risk, the
homogeneous group of borrowers and the extended volume of information. The
underlying Kiva model enables direct P2P lending between micro-entrepreneurs
and socially-oriented investors without financial intermediation. Although the
investors bear the full credit risk, they are willing to grant interest-free loans to
borrowers. Borrowers comprise US citizens who face financial exclusion from
the formal capital market. Finally, the data set utilizes information obtained
from original loan-application texts.
The running of logistic regression on the funding success and tobit regression on
the reversed funding time provide interesting insights into the investors’ behavior
regarding investment decision making. The existence of social underwriting
by a trustee appears to have a high positive impact on the funding success
and the reversed funding time. Furthermore, the description length as a
measurement with which to share information and generate the investor’s trust
increases the probability of funding success as well as reducing the funding
time. Empowerment representing the investment’s social impact appears to
be a crucial predictor. Female borrowers are clearly preferred by all investors.
Furthermore, groups of borrowers are more likely to be both funded and funded
faster in the total sample. Evidence of empowerment of others beyond the
borrowers themselves is not found. At first glance, the borrower’s vulnerability
measured by the immigration background is positively related to funding success
and funding time in the total sample. The result is refined by the performance
of further regressions on the subsamples of both loans with and without trustee
endorsement. Investors of loans socially underwritten appear not to support
immigrants. These investors do not strive for maximizing social impact, whereas
the investors of non-endorsed loans prefer to invest in loan applications requested
by an entrepreneur with an immigration background. For these investors, the
borrower’s vulnerability is an appeal to invest, but not for those focusing on
minimal credit risk and investing in loans endorsed by a trustee.
In summary, our findings lead to the conclusion that the investment decisions of
socially-oriented P2P investors takes into account the credit risk as well as the
social impact of the respective investment. Investors appear to have different
preferences regarding the minimization of credit risk versus the maximization
of social impact, which influences their decision on whom to support. This
research provides insights into the investor’s behavior in the context of online
P2P microfinacing in developed countries such as the United States.
We are convinced that further research on the innovative direct interest-free
P2P model has a promising potential. Up to now, important aspects such as
credit risk, competition of loan applications, and the balance between demand
and supply have been clearly under-researched.
106
Chapter 4. Funding determinants in interest-free P2P lending
4.7 Appendix
Total sample Funded loans Non-funded loans
N=6,121 N=4,077 N=2,044
Variable Obs. Relative Obs. Relative Obs. Relative
Keyword_Positive
Yes 4,450 72.70 2,992 73.39 1,458 71.33
No 1,671 27.30 1,085 26.61 586 28.67
Video
Yes 69 1.13 44 1.08 25 1.22
No 6,052 98.87 4,033 98.92 2,019 98.78
Year Index
2011 4 0.07 4 0.10 0 0.00
2012 107 1.75 101 2.48 6 0.29
2013 361 5.90 337 8.27 24 1.17
2014 708 11.57 545 13.37 163 7.97
2015 1,163 19.00 733 17.98 430 21.04
2016 1,766 28.85 1,049 25.73 717 35.08
2017 2,012 32.87 1,308 32.08 704 34.44
Activity sector
Agriculture 439 7.17 377 9.25 62 3.03
Arts 326 5.33 236 5.79 90 4.40
Clothing 445 7.27 288 7.06 157 7.68
Construction 95 1.55 56 1.37 39 1.91
Education 181 2.96 109 2.67 72 3.52
Entertainment 199 3.25 96 2.35 103 5.04
Food 1,361 22.23 1,071 26.27 290 14.19
Health 67 1.09 40 0.98 27 1.32
Housing 42 0.69 20 0.49 22 1.08
Manufacturing 26 0.42 20 0.49 6 0.29
Retail 974 15.91 611 14.99 363 17.76
Services 1,862 30.42 1,103 27.05 759 37.13
Transportation 92 1.50 41 1.01 51 2.50
Wholesale 12 0.20 9 0.22 3 0.15
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables - controls
Notes: The entire data sample contains 6,121 observations. Absolute values and relative
values of the categorical variables are displayed. The variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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5.1 Contribution of this dissertation
This dissertation consists of three research papers on online microfinancing
through the worldwide crowd of socially-oriented investors. Theoretical consider-
ations and empirical results from classical microfinance and online peer-to-peer
crowdlending are utilized as fundamental knowledge to gain further insights on
crowdlending as a source of debt capital for microfinance.
The first research work identifies the MFI’s screening and monitoring quality,
the lending methodology, the credit contract and the borrower’s gender as
predictors of credit default in the intermediation-based microfinancing model.
The empirical results on credit default provide valuable implications for both
the MFIs as financial intermediaries and receivers of interest-free capital and
the socially-oriented investors. MFIs have an incentive to be aware of credit
default predictors in order to adequately decide concerning which loan requests
to post on Kiva for refinancing. The MFI’s reputation is essential to attract
investors and ensure the refinancing possibility in the long run (e.g. Berns et al.,
2018). Investors highly value the repayment of the loan principal in order to
continuously empower several borrowers (Ly and Mason, 2012a). Therefore,
investors also have a high interest to know credit default predictors in order to
be able to adequately decide on which loan requests to support. To conclude,
the results on credit default risk are useful for both MFIs and investors for their
future participation on Kiva.
The second paper investigates the characteristics of MFIs having and using
access to refinancing through the worldwide crowd from the demand and
supply side perspective. Main positive predictors of access are the MFI’s social
performance, the maturity and the economic situation of the country in which
the MFI is mainly located. In contrast, the financial performance and the
extent of deposit mobilization is negatively associated with the probability of
refinancing microloans using Kiva. Regarding the termination of the partnership,
the share of female borrowers and the extent of deposits appear to strengthen
the MFI’s decision to discontinue the partnership. On the one hand, this study
illustrates the characteristics of MFIs which are open to innovative sources
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of refinancing and strive to explore and use crowdlending as a source of debt
capital. On the other hand, it shows which MFIs are reluctant to make use of
crowdlending using Kiva. Additional, from Kiva’s perspective, the determinants
of granting access to which MFIs are shown.
The third research work examines the funding determinants of interest-free
loans requested by US citizens to socially-oriented investors in the innovative
direct peer-to-peer model of Kiva. Main predictors of successful funding are
social underwriting by a third-party trustee, an informative narrative about
the borrower himself and the underlying project and the possibility to empower
women and groups of borrowers. Regarding the vulnerability of borrowers, the
funding behavior of lenders differs as lenders enabling loans without trustee
endorsement prefer to lend to immigrants. That is not the case for lenders
investing in endorsed loans. This study clarifies that socially-oriented investors
consider the credit risk and the social impact of their investment under the
condition of lending without receiving interest rate but bearing the full credit
default risk. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that crowdlending through
socially-oriented investors could be a promising approach to foster microfinanc-
ing in developed countries such as the United States. Therefore, it highly
contributes to the research on microfinance in developed countries which is
clearly under-researched so far (Pedrini et al., 2016).
In summary, this dissertation adds further insights to the literature and em-
pirical research on interest-free crowdlending in the context of microfinance in
developing and developed countries.
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for future re-
search
The innovative phenomenon of microfinancing through the crowd of socially-
oriented investors is worth to be further researched in future studies. The three
research papers in this dissertation face some limitations which are discussed in
the following.
The first research paper investigates the credit default risk of borrowers with
regards to the MFI’s ability to manage its credit portfolio, lending methodology,
loan characteristics and gender of borrowers. As the narrative of each loan
request provides some information about the borrower’s personality, future
research might want to examine if borrower characteristics such as age, civil
status, family situation, education are possible predictors of credit default
risk. Additionally, also here the question rises if the repayment behavior of
borrowers on other microfinancing platforms than Kiva is impacted by similar
determinants or in contrast, does follow other mechanisms.
The empirical results of the second paper are focused on and limited to MFIs
having access and using the refinancing possibility using Kiva’s intermediation-
based model. Apart from MFIs, it is interesting to gain a better understanding
about the characteristics of other institutions like schools, social businesses or
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non-profit organizations acting as financial intermediaries on Kiva. These insti-
tutions are not considered in this study due to data restrictions. Additionally to
Kiva, some further microfinancing platforms such as Rang De, Microgramm and
Deki rely on the intermediation-based model. Therefore, it can be worthwhile
to further investigate – from the demand and the supply side perspective – the
characteristics of MFIs acting on these platforms and particularly to evaluate,
if MFIs intend to access refinancing through the worldwide crowd using more
than only one platform.
The last empirical work is the first one to shed some light on direct loans
from socially-oriented investors to microentrepreneurs in developed countries
by investigating the investors’ behavior. To best of our knowledge, nothing
is known about the credit default risk. Furthermore, as only two third of the
loan applications are successfully funded, it could be interesting to evaluate
the balance between the supply and the demand side. Until today, direct loans
are only available to US citizens. It is worth to observe if Kiva expands the
innovative direct model to other developed or even developing countries, which
rises further fields of research. Therefore, there is substantial room to further
explore the actors and dynamics of microfinancing via this innovative direct
p2p model of Kiva.
It is highly appreciated if these limitations are considered as motivation for
further research. Overall, it remains interesting if crowdlending through the
worldwide crowd of socially-oriented investors indeed contributes to microfinance
as a new source of debt capital in the long run. Further research on the success
of crowdlending as a source of debt capital in the context of microfinance is
welcome.
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